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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation investigates the rise of moderation in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. The investigation consists of analysis of two trends of thought which 
reformulate the ideas and projects of an earlier generation of dissidence. These trends, 
which have adopted a clearly more ‘accommodationist’ discourse towards difference of 
opinion, peaceful coexistence, political competition, equality, pluralism, and gender 
inclusiveness, have adapted themselves to a new context of social revolution. 
This social revolution has resulted from the expansion of links with the outside 
world, and this has been deepened through the process of ‘reintellectualisation’. This 
term used by scholars of Muslim politics such as Dale Eickelman is used in the 
dissertation to contextualise the rise of discourses of moderation. In particular, this 
reintellectualisation relates to two processes, which are gradually changing the culture 
in the direction of more public debate, participation and acceptance of values of 
dialogue and diversity in general. The first is the media revolution which increased the 
flow of information and the other is the massification of university education abroad. 
These two combined factors contribute to a quasi-cultural shift in Saudi society. This 
dynamic is not acknowledged by Orientalist scholarship that treats the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia as incompatible with change. 
The key objective of the dissertation is to analyse the discourses of moderation 
of two prominent trends of thought, which are called here ‘pragmatists’ (not liberals) 
and ‘puritanical’ (not conservative). It is through this investigation that the key values 
they both associate with moderation become clear. The investigation uses discourse 
analysis of primary data both spoken and written. These two combined sources disclose 
a number of preliminary observations. The pragmatist trend is not fully secular and is 
still influenced by the politico-religious identity of the Kingdom. Its discourse of 
moderation relies on Western values and concepts but these values and concepts are not 
in any way anti-Islamic. The puritanical trend puts the politico-religious tradition into 
sharper focus, showing attachment to the agenda of da’wa and the normative framework 
of Islam’s socio-moral order. However, this trend shows signs of moderation that is no 
longer concerned with issues of jihad, and is venturing into areas of political reform 
having to do with just government, equal citizenship, and forms of inclusiveness within 
the normative system of Islam. 
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It is concluded that moderation as pluralism, ideological moderation and respect 
of the rules of the political game has the building blocks of maturation in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia. Its specificity within the Saudi politico-religious context, moderation 
for the pragmatists is aided through synthesis whereas for the puritanical trend it is 
expressed through reformulation of the existing religious heritage. 
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CHAPTER 1  
SAUDI ARABIA POST 9/11: A FRAMEWORK FOR EXPLORING THE RISE OF 
MODERATION IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
 
Oh, East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet 
Till Earth and Sky stand presently as God’s great judgment Seat;  
But there is neither East nor West, Border nor breed nor birth, 
When two strong men stand face to face, tho’ they come from the end 
of the earth!
1
 
 
1.1 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the 9/11 Backdrop 
In the wake of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington, no Arab 
and Muslim country drew as much security, media and academic attention as did the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The exception was the Taliban’s Afghanistan, which shared 
the spotlight with the Saudi Monarchy. The fact that most of the hijackers who crashed 
the planes on the Twin Towers and on the Pentagon were Saudi nationals came as a 
surprise not only to ‘Saudi-ologists’, but also to the Saudis themselves. The tragic 
events refocused attention on this important oil-rich Arab Gulf country, forcing 
rethinking along a number of lines of inquiry. These tragic events produced more 
questions than answers about the nature of politics, religion, society, and culture in 
Saudi Arabia. The nature of the religious establishment and discourse was frequently 
confused with extremism, and religious education was blamed for 9/11. The whole 
question of polity and the legitimacy of the state and its institutions came under close 
scrutiny. At the same time one most academic question had to do with whether the 
ruling Saudi House would have survived the September 11 attacks had they been 
directed at Riyadh instead of New York or Washington. Hypothetical questions do not 
lend themselves to easy answers. But what is certain is that, like the US and with the 
benefit of historical hindsight of what happened in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Royal 
House would not have spared any firepower at its disposal to safeguard the position of 
its institutions, people, and the ruling elite of the Saudi Kingdom. Events like 9/11 serve 
to refresh our memory that the society of states tends from time to time to take recourse 
to violence in order to defend state survival and interest. And it is quite plausible that 
neither the US nor its Western and Middle Eastern allies would have hesitated to fight 
                                                 
1
 Rudyard Kipling, The Ballad of East and West, 1889 
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on behalf of the Saudi Kingdom. The Kuwaiti precedent is sufficiently illustrative of the 
point made here. So is a more relevant precedent: the 1979 take-over of the Grand 
Mosque by Saudi extremists, which was defused both violently and legally (with the 
approval of the juridical and religious establishment in Saudi Arabia). Another 
intriguing aspect of the largely Saudi nationals-led 9/11 attacks is the extent to which 
this brand of hideously violent militancy was a statement by Saudis against both their 
rulers and their rulers’ protectors. It is not out of place to assume that the perpetrators of 
the violence visited upon New York and Washington on September 11 were motivated 
by local concerns (e.g. Saudi first, and Arab/Muslim second). This is in spite of the fact 
that their attacks seemed to signal a new wave of ‘global terrorism’ – in this case led by 
al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden, a Saudi who was stripped of his Saudi citizenship in 
1994 for his extremism at the turn of the third millennium.  
In order to lend credence to the study and inquiry in this thesis, the whole 
question of politico-religious culture in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia legitimacy must 
be placed under close scrutiny. If the September 11 events are to be read as an 
oppositional political behaviour, deploying a very bloody strategy, then questions must 
be asked about how politics and religion and the discourse of the political and religious 
elites are implicated in the production, legitimisation and application of extremism or 
moderation. This type of questioning relates to leads to the specificity of politics and 
religion in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It must be noted from the outset that 
secularism (understood as privatisation of religion, which leads to separation of religion 
and politics in the running of state affairs) has not in any shape or form featured as a 
political value that is either represented or contested in the Kingdom’s top-down or 
bottom-up, official or unofficial discourses of religion and politics. Secularism is simply 
not an arena of contention in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia -- as it has been in other 
Middle Eastern states (e.g. Turkey, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq or Syria). No reference will 
therefore be made to it in the ensuing analysis. 
It must be pointed out that religion in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia intertwines 
with all aspects of statecraft, social affairs, laws, education and social custom.  A central 
hypothesis in the ensuing analysis within my thesis is that religion informs both 
reformist and conservative forces in Saudi Arabia. One observation must be made here: 
Whilst Sunni Islam is the dominant sect in Saudi Arabia, the Shi‘a form the main other 
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sect, present largely in the Eastern Province of the Kingdom.
2
 This thesis focuses on 
discourses within Sunni Islam. It is from within Islam and through the interpreting and 
reference to the Holy Qur’an, the Hadith (the Tradition of the Prophet Muhammad 
Peace upon Him), and the legal traditions of Islam’s supreme learned scholars and 
doctors that the advocates and opponents of reform derive and develop their their public 
discourses. The type of debate today in Saudi Arabia is not about the validity or utility 
of religion. Rather, the debates competing for influence, public ascendance, and 
political acceptance are about which Islamic arguments are to be used to justify or deny 
reform. It is within this moment of debate and counter-debate that an emerging culture 
of ‘moderation’ is being created in Saudi Arabia. This is the key position that I propose 
to develop and examine in my analysis.  
The specificity of the Saudi case and religion and politics within it cannot be 
stressed enough. The following observations explain this specificity. The first 
observation regards the nature or the brand of Islam adopted in Saudi Arabia and how it 
relates generally to the state and the practice of politics. It is the association of the two 
that gave birth to the Saudi state King Abd Al-Aziz created in 1932. Dissolving this 
association is neither is nor would it be without consequences for the state’s very raison 
d’être and historical identity and even legitimacy. However, despite the historical 
confusion of religion and politics in the Saudi Kingdom, Islam is increasingly becoming 
diverse. Voices of challenge or opposition from below to ‘official’ Islam are emerging. 
The sources of these voices will be identified and explained throughout the thesis, 
highlighting how the state has sought to control or influence Islamic responses from 
below. In the main, however, the dynamics of the relationship between Islam and the 
Saudi State generally remains intact. Hanbali (very often referred to by scholars as 
Wahhabi) Islam is bound up with the Kingdom’s raison d’être and even raison d’Etat.  
But some adjustments have been made to shore up the House of Saud’s political 
legitimacy, namely, by creating the long-awaited Majlis al-Shurah (Consultative 
Council in the early 1990s. Whether the Consultative Council and the emerging voices 
of Islam from below bode well for religious and political freedoms is not clear at the 
moment. This may become clearer in the future after one generation or two go through 
                                                 
2For more on the Shi‘a in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, see Jacob Goldberg, “The Shii minority 
in Saudi Arabia,” in Juan Cole and Nikki Keddie (eds.), Shi’ism and Social Protest (New 
Haven: Yale Univesrity Press, 1986); Josh Teitelbaum, “The Shiites of Saudi Arabia,” Current 
Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 10 (August 2010). 
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the usual ‘democratic apprenticeship’ needed for a new political class made up of 
Saudis from both the Royal House (e.g., reform-minded princes, such as, amongst many 
others, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, Prince Salman, Governor of Riyadh, and Walid bin 
Talal, are not averse to liberal measures of the Saudi system) and from society (e.g. non-
princely caste). 
The second observation regards an important caveat. It regards the tendency of 
students of the Middle East, including its Arab and Muslim states and societies, to 
‘Orientalize’.3 When writing about Arab or Muslim countries, it is always tempting to 
proceed from the assumption that Islam is the “master signifier” of identity and that its 
place in all aspects of political or ideological discourse and practice is a given. This 
temptation for Orientalist thinking is strong in relation to the nexus of politics and 
religion in Saudi Arabia, and how they collectively shape and re-shape political 
legitimacy, discourse, family laws, international politics, and domestic affairs. In any 
case, such a temptation is problematic in two ways. To resist it is to deny that the 
conflation of politics and religion in Saudi Arabia is empirically a fact of political life. 
To give in to it is to engage in reductionism.  For no critical exploration of the relation 
of religion and politics in Saudi Arabia can be thorough without implicating equally 
important dynamics, which sustain and reproduce it. Such dynamics include the 
political economy and its hydrocarbon basis (which cultivates loyalty and patronage), 
and external relations, namely the nature of the ruling house’s alliance with the US and 
the resulting Pax-Americana that originated in the early 1990s (which tacitly accepted 
the nature of the politico-religious association in Saudi Arabia). All of these factors 
cannot obviously be placed in separate boxes as though they do not intertwine.  
In order therefore to capture the nature of politico-religious discourse, and what 
I hold to be the resulting culture of moderation, the analysis below will therefore adopt 
an approach through the thesis that stresses the context of this trend. In order to 
appreciate the context thoroughly, I will try to account for the interplay of multiple 
factors, rather than adopting a mono-dimensional understanding of the question of 
politico-religious discourse in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Such a multi-dimensional 
enquiry seems all the more timely given that the September 11 attacks continue to 
preoccupy scholars with recurring research questions. These questions concern the 
                                                 
3
 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin Books, 
1978). 
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potential for reform, the source of reform and moderation, the role of religious and 
political elites within such a movement, and even the very viability of a Saudi State that 
continues to be averse to freed debate, dissidence, power sharing, institutionalisation, 
rulers’ accountability, and greater equity. But they regard questions about autonomy 
from foreign meddling in Saudi affairs, which increased following the 9/11 attacks with 
criticism of the association of religion and politics and even the viability of religious 
education and syllabi in Saudi schooling and higher education. 
 
1.2 The Key Questions and Thesis ‘Problematique’ 
What is the nature of politico-religious discourse in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (KSA) in the post-9/11 world today? How is the process of the 
‘reintellectualisation’ (the term belongs to Dale Eickelman and Jon Anderson) of the 
public sphere in Saudi Arabia producing discursive moderation and moderates? To what 
extent it can be argued that current discourses are constructing a ‘culture of moderation’ 
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia? If so, what is the context for the rise of such a culture? 
These are the key questions that I shall follow in order to address the question of a 
culture of moderation in my thesis with special reference to Saudi Arabia. 
The post-9/11 world has condemned the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to un-
questioned Orientalist depictions and stigmas. The Kingdom is more or less reduced to 
an exporter of ‘terrorists’ and of a brand of Islam wrongly called in journalistic and 
academic writings ‘Wahhabism’. Rarely, does the name ‘Hanbalism’, the correct name 
of one of Islam’s four rites of Sunni jurisprudence feature when describing the nature of 
the religious verve and discourse in KSA. The thesis I am attempting to develop and 
find evidence for the discourse analysis exercise within it has a threefold research 
agenda: 1) Generally, to argue that KSA is neither frozen in time nor is it single or fixed 
as far as politico-religious discourse is concerned. Contrary to Orientalist 
generalizations and reductionisms, KSA is today witnessing a quiet transformation or 
process of renewal (tajdid), religiously and politically. Yet little or no scholarship has 
been produced about this emerging trend. Both KSA and politico-religious discourse 
tend to be represented as monolithic. My thesis contests this misrepresentation. One of 
my key objectives is to display the diversity of the politico-religious debate and fervour 
in KSA. I aim at exploring the full gamut of the attendant trends of innovative thought 
in the ‘public sphere’ with special reference to religion and politics. As far as this 
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section of my thesis is concerned, what my inquiry is seeking to do is present new 
evidence and knowledge at the heart of this fledgling phase of renewal. 2) The crux of 
this exercise is not limited to a focus on presenting retorts against Orientalist 
simplification of the politico-religious discourse and practice in KSA. More precisely, 
the aim is to engage, through the use of discourse analysis, with the discourse of 
renewal or (al-khitab al-tajdidi) in KSA. This I envisage through a systematic use of 
discourse analysis. The data to be subjected to this exercise will be obtained from texts 
(written documents, such as religious and journalistic articles as well as interviews). I 
shall explain this task in detail in the section on methodology. The central focus of this 
exercise to examine specifically the acquisition of a ‘culture of moderation’ or what is 
known in Islamic discourse wasatiyya (literal meaning is ‘moderation’). There is an 
almost hidden discourse, gradually giving rise to this culture of moderation, which is yet 
to be fully explored, analysed and appreciated by students of Saudi Arabia’s politics, 
society, religion and culture. This is one area where my inquiry can potentially make a 
significant contribution: at once addressing Orientalist theses and presenting a new 
thesis on the moderating discursive forces and voices quietly and surely transforming 
KSA. The significance of this project lies in presenting new knowledge on a topic, 
which remains ignored, by studying primary materials and exploring indigenous 
constructions of the field of both political know-how and attendant religious knowledge 
(and interpretation) in KSA. 3) In examining systematically the nature of the discourse 
and practice of what I claim to be an emerging culture of moderation, I intend to touch 
on the dialectics of obscurantism (I shall avoid use of the term ‘extremism’ in the rest of 
the thesis) and moderation. The aim of this exercise is to give a thorough 
contextualization of the rise of voices and forces of moderation, political and religious, 
in KSA. This contextualization supplements the discourse analysis to be used in thesis. 
In fact, without this contextualization the discourse analysis may not be complete or 
comprehensive. The reason is that in order to understand one set of new innovative 
ideas, one must fully understand and appreciate the set of ideas, on the opposite side, 
which fan the forces of obscurantism.  
 
1.2.1 The Problematique of ‘Moderation’: Are there no Moderates in Saudi Arabia? 
At one level, the ‘problematique’ I am trying to address in this study regards the 
Orientalist one-sided caricaturing of Muslims, including Saudis. Daniel Pipes’ famous 
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phrase “there are no moderates”4 demands thorough and systematic response about this 
assertion. Indeed, if Pipes is correct and there are no moderates, this must be analysed 
comprehensively. Similarly, if he is incorrect and there are moderates, and the scholarly 
and policy-making communities of the West and even the Arab and Muslim worlds are 
not aware of them, then the question must be put to bed. Obviously, I am arguing, 
through the case study of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, that there are moderates, or 
more precisely that there is an incipient formation and building of an ethos of 
moderation (which I shall try to define below). May be moderates have for so long been 
marginalized because Arab governments have largely been inclined to accommodate 
non-moderates, especially on matters regarding Islamic law (which covers sensitive 
areas such as family law, inheritance law, custody law). The non-moderates, as opposite 
the moderates, from Algeria to Egypt, and including Saudi Arabia, have formed a 
powerful lobby and voice that governments listen to from time to time. The reason is 
that there is a reciprocal dependency: regimes need endorsement of the religious 
orthodoxy (including ad-hoc fatwas or politico-religious decisions) and the religious 
elite needs the state for rubber-stamping Islamic laws, funding religious institutions and 
education, and employing the graduates of the Islamic institutions. A very good 
example is the fact that Arab states’ war along Western armies that ousted Iraq of 
Kuwait in 1991 required the green light from the religious elite. This happened in Egypt 
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This is true, at least, of the state-dependent side of 
the religious elite. It does not mean there were no objections from independent and anti-
state clerics.  
After 9/11 and with the rise of al-Qaida activities all over the Middle East, 
including in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the state had to look for, fund, and 
accommodate publics of ‘moderates’ or ‘moderate’ forces and voices. The Kingdom 
was under fire from the West – critics blamed the rise of global terror on the so-called 
‘Wahhabi’ creed.5 And it was easy to point the finger at bin Laden as a by-product of 
                                                 
4
 Pipes, “There are no Moderates,” in The National Interest, pp. 48-57. 
5
 Examples of these are Dore Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom; and Stephen Schwartz, Two Faces of 
Islam: The House of Saud from Tradition to Terror . For more on anti-Wahhabi and Saudi bias 
after 9/11, See, Richard H. Curtiss & Delinda Hanley, “Israel-Firsters Wage Negative Media 
Campaign against the Kingdom,” in Abdul Rahman Al-Zunaidi et. al., Saudi and Terror: Cross-
Cultural Views (Riyadh: Ghainaa Publication, 2005), pp. 362-372.   
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Saudi upbringing, culture and Wahhabism.
6
 How the acts of small pockets of violent 
and anti-Western elements became a liability for the Kingdom and for Saudis, more 
generally, necessitated action on the part of the state to re-shape the public and political 
culture. This context is important for understanding how moderates and a culture of 
moderation have been promoted – with both tacit and explicit state planning. Tacitly, 
the ‘public sphere’ is today characterized by multi-vocal and diverse discourses of 
public affairs. In other words, the non-moderate voices no longer command the field of 
speech in the public sphere (I will also try to define this term below). This is one aspect 
that this study will systematically address by analyzing through discourse analysis 
samples of the moderate and non-moderate discourses. The abundance of new 
communication technologies (chat rooms, satellite TV, Internet, blogs, etc.) have all 
contributed to the rise of diverse, widespread, energetic and continuous discourses 
amongst the elites (public opinion formulators) and the public at large. What I am 
interested in is the discourses of the opinion formulators (clerics, official and non-
official, scholars, journalists, and ruling elites). Explicitly, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
has today nearly 100,000 students in Western universities, men and women. This is one 
method used by the state to help construct a culture of moderation within Saudi Arabia. 
This is more plausible if one notes that Saudi Arabia is one of the very Arab states not 
to be subjected to Western colonialism, that is, either by direct processes or internal 
forces of Westernisation. What Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Morocco 
experienced about 70 years ago through Anglo-Franco colonial restructuring of their 
societies had not an equivalent in the Kingdom.  
In a way, what Saudi Arabia did not experience through direct colonialism in 
terms of ‘moderating’ the local publics or socializing them into modes of thinking and 
acting amenable to acceptance of Western partnership is, more or less, even though 
through a specific state declaratory policy, is taking place today through the re-
educating of Saudis abroad, the explosion of media and Internet revolutions, and the rise 
of voices of moderation. As yet, these voices are not powerful but they are 
accommodated and tolerated by the state, including in the leading Saudi dailies (such as 
‘Al-Sharq Al-Awsat’), Satellite TV channels, in the Kingdom’s Foreign Affairs 
                                                 
6
 Refers to the Sunni puritanical creed founded by Shaykh Muhammad bin Abd Al-Wahhab in 
the Arabian Peninsula in the 18
th
 century. It expands on the legacy of the Hanbali School, one of 
Sunni Islam’s four schools of jurisprudence. 
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Department, the Diplomatic Academy, the religious elite, the Royal Court, and the 
Royal family. 
My thesis addresses the question of the rise of moderates and a culture of 
moderation in the Kingdom in the firm belief that the process of socializing Saudis into 
moderation must be driven from within Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, I think reform and a 
process of nation-building focused on moderation can be only a gradual, and no doubt a 
complex, process. Telhami, Hill and their co-authors are correct in this respect:  
Yet those Americans calling for reform in Saudi Arabia must bear 
in mind that political change cannot be imposed from the outside, 
and especially not by the United States. The process will be slow. 
In fact, a gradual approach is the only guarantee of political 
change: no reform process is likely to produce a positive, stable 
outcome without the cooperation of the monarchy, and only 
sustained, gradual reforms will be palatable and not immediately 
threatening to the current government.
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It took Western societies and states hundreds of years to realize their own 
cultures of moderation and sound political management. Since 9/11, there has been a 
wide chorus of demands from without the Kingdom for reform. Demands for reform 
from within the Kingdom will be examined in the third chapter. But these have always 
existed in the Kingdom. However, they intensified after the arrival of US troops and 
bases in Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s (eventually these were relocated to 
neighbouring Qatar, which today hosts the largest US base in the Gulf region). The 
events of 9/11 form the context of the rising external pressure placed on the Saudi state 
to reform. In this respect, the West and in particular the US applied this pressure in a 
reactionary way: directly responding to a flashpoint in West-Muslim relations. Plus, 
security was the key interest behind the push for reform in the Kingdom. This was not a 
push for reform for the sake of reform or for the sake of Saudi citizens. Rather, it is the 
security of the US and American citizens, particularly, and of course that of her Western 
allies, that motivated the call for reform in Saudi Arabia. There are four aspects about 
the push for reform from without the Kingdom which together capture the security-
driven push for reform in the Kingdom. A standard reform demanded by Western 
individuals, organizations and governments is more inclusiveness of women. I shall 
return to this aspect when I specify the reforms undertaken since King Abdullah was 
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crowned ruler of the Kingdom in 2005. The other three as Telhamy and Hill explain 
revolve around the ongoing fear of so-called Saudi youth. Plus, there are the vital oil 
interests, which the West would like to see privatized, opening share-holding 
opportunities for oil companies in North American and Europe – in a way largely 
related to Western capitalist practices in the Saudi oil industry.  
The Saudis will need to reform their political, educational, and 
economic system, not only for their own sake, but also to improve 
the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the rest of the world. If 
reform is rejected, then new pressures from the young, restless 
majority -- many of whom are unemployed and some of whom 
are increasingly radicalized -- will pose serious challenges 
internally and externally.
8
  
The key phrase here is “increasingly radicalized.” This comes at a time of 
heightened tension, following 9/11, in Muslim-Western relations. In fact, the term 
“radicals” or “radicalized” (in some journalistic and academic circles they are described 
to be “ultra-conservatives”) are terms, which I avoid in this thesis for its imprecision. 
But as in the case of Iran, it is used to denote the religious and political hardliners in the 
Islamic Republic. The word “moderate” is attributed to forces that seem to be open to 
co-habitation and entente with Western powers, stand against terrorism, and on the 
whole accept social and political reform. I shall give a working definition of my own 
when I look at terminology below. However, the key point is that in pursuit of its own 
reform, the West itself, according to close observers of Saudi affairs, is called upon to 
pursue strong ties with the Kingdom, considered a “radical” state, at the expense of 
confusing distinction between, more or less, a hostile (such al-Qaida) and friendly (e.g. 
the government of Saudi Arabia) “radical.”  
It is one thing to have radical non-state groups that advocate and 
employ violence against the United States; it would be a very 
different matter to have a radical government employ the pulpit of 
Mecca, where millions come every year on pilgrimage, to set a 
hostile tone in the name of Islam. This prospect alone -- which 
seems quite realistic in Rouleau's portrait of "the most rigorous 
theocracy in the Islamic world," where Islamic radicals "have 
called into question the very legitimacy of the al Saud dynasty" -- 
should be enough to convince Americans that a close U.S.-Saudi 
relationship is in their best interest.
9
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I must agree that it must be the motive of self-interest that determines the 
inevitability of close ties with the Kingdom. However, it would be wrong to think that 
Saudi Arabia does not wish to sustain strong ties with the US. The Kingdom values her 
US ties and relations, which are so strong in terms of strategic, economic and political 
benefits for both. This is one reason why the historic ties with the US means that Saudi 
policy-makers do respond to American pressure – when cultural and religious sensitive 
matters are not involved or compromised. The rulers and policy-makers are also 
mindful of the internal powerful religious lobby and elites that cannot be ignored or 
totally sidelined. They can be weakened as has been gradually happening under King 
Abdullah. But they still have the power of the pulpits and today satellite TV, Facebook, 
blogs, and the Internet more generally to spread religious ideas, including criticisms. 
These facilities are also made available with tacit government approval to preachers 
considered “moderate.” These young preachers, some of whom have a technical not 
religious education, resemble the US Tele-evangelists (such as Ahmad Al-Shugairi).
10
 
Under the current Saudi monarch there has been increasing response to the call for 
reform from outside. This is one additional context for understanding the rise of a 
culture of moderation in the Kingdom. Key reforms by King Abdullah point to a top-
down trend to go ahead with reforms that were never expected possible. And these 
reforms must be seen to be amongst the building blocks of the currently emerging 
culture of moderation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
However, it must be pointed out that the criticism that these reforms have not yet 
been institutionalized is correct. They have, as one analyst correctly states, created a 
“more open environment.”11 It is this environment that sums up the crux of King 
Abdullah’s reform. Certainly when the question is asked as to “what does ‘reform’ 
mean in Saudi Arabia,” as Neil Patrick has done, the answer, I believe, lies in the 
increasing “openness”, which I consider to be a necessary condition for a culture of 
moderation. As Patrick himself answers his own question he notes that “reform in Saudi 
Arabia does not constitute a clearly articulated programme to reach a defined 
outcome.”12 I agree with this sentiment fully. But I also disagree in that an overall 
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atmosphere of moderation is the centerpiece of king Abdullah’s reforms since 2005. For 
instance, as Patrick himself notes, divergent opinions are more present in the media 
(owned largely by media barons from the royal house). His criticism that they constitute 
“different commentaries on the local and regional scene” by the royal media barons 
stands. However, the fact that there are different commentaries must not be belittled. 
They are steps towards what Patrick views to be still missing “a true debate.”13 This 
takes time and requires a supporting network of moderates and a culture of moderation. 
Examples of these key reforms are listed below: 
 In February 2009 King Abdullah appoints a woman to his cabinet and 
dismisses a top cleric who is considered to be “fundamentalist.”14 Observers 
viewed this as an attempt by the Saudi monarch “to refashion the religious 
establishment at a time the country faces the global financial crisis and 
renewed threats from al-Qaeda militants;” and strengthen “the voices of 
modern Islamic thinkers.”15 
 Educational reform with new powers, resources, and autonomy given to the 
ministry overseeing this important sector. Largely, this is due to the fact that 
the West has been pushing for reform of education. As Patrick notes “the 
education ministry has become something of a reformist fiefdom;” this 
involved “some curricula and course book changes” and the creation of a 
well-funded institution of excellence, the “King Abdullah University of 
Science and Technology (KAUST).”16 
 Ongoing legal reform and the establishment of a new “Supreme Court, the 
highest court of appeal.” It is charged with re-training of judges and this 
should in the long term boost rule of law.
17
 
 Moreover, steps were for the first time taken to boost the principle of judicial 
independence. This is viewed by analysts to be “one of the most significant 
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reform moves King Abdullah has made so far.”18 The Supreme Court to 
which 9 Court of Appeal judges were appointed, and its separation from the 
Supreme Judicial Council (comprised of 12 jurists) has consolidated judicial 
independence. Under the new 2007 law, the reorganization of the judicial 
system weakened the role of the Ministry of Justice and overall bureaucratic 
interference in the administration of justice. The Ministry’s prerogatives are 
now exclusively the domain of the Supreme Judicial Council, and the latter’s 
prerogatives are transferred to the newly created Supreme Court.
19
 Despite 
these positive reforms there is more that will be done to ensure that the new 
judicial set up tackles illegal human rights violations by the security forces, 
which are not approved by the state.
20
 
 The gradual empowerment of women with the first woman ever given a 
ministerial portfolio in February 2009. Another won a seat in December 2009 
in the elected board of the powerful Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
21
 
“Following that, the Ministry of Commerce appointed four women board 
members” to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry.” And thanks to the 
overall atmosphere of openness in the Kingdom there is currently a well 
orchestrated campaign by many activists and organizations to secure voting 
rights for women by the time of the 2011 elections, originally scheduled for 
2009. 
 Even if they may be considered a tentative step towards reforms, the 2005 
municipal elections, held the year King Abdullah was crowned, are a 
milestone as far as Saudi political transformation is considered. They are the 
first elections ever in the Kingdom, and Sadiki, for instance, considers them 
to bode well for future reform even though he rightly dampens optimism. He 
states that it is unrealistic to expect the first set of elections to herald 
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democratization.
22
 What validates his cautioning is the frequent criticism that 
the partly elected and partly appointed municipal council are weak at the level 
of decision-making. This inefficiency is put down to three factors: the 
councilors are yet to understand their duties, the lack of team-work skills 
amongst the elected and the appointed councilors, and public apathy.
23
  
 The creation in 2006 of the Allegiance Committee (or Institution) to vote on 
the fitness of future monarchs and crown princes to rule is a bold piece of 
reform. It could potentially develop into a higher and autonomous authority 
that renders succession not automatic and subject to vetting legal 
mechanisms. The Allegiance Committee is also empowered to select a five-
member transitory council to run state affairs for one week in the event that 
the three princes nominated by the outgoing king do not win enough votes 
amongst all the key sons and grandsons of King Abd Al-Aziz Al-Saud, the 
founder of the Kingdom. 
 Last, but not least, is the National Dialogue Centre (markaz al-hiwar al-
watani), which was created a few years ago to broaden Saudi-Saudi debate 
about all matters regarding public affairs. In a country where there are still no 
strong civil society or political parties, the centre is a forum for youth and 
other activists, dissidents, policy-makers, and public opinion formulators to 
air free opinion without fear of state reprisal. It also serves to transmit ideas 
from this forum to policy-makers at the highest level of the state.  
After this summary, I now move on to the next section where I shall try to 
explain the key assumptions that inform my thesis. In it I clarify my anti-Orientalist 
position in this thesis. For this purpose, my second chapter, which examines the wide 
body of scholarship on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, seeks to focus on the Orientalist 
nature of scholarly discussion of the Kingdom.  
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1.3 Conceptual Framework I: Anti-Orientalism 
Directly and indirectly, my thesis seeks to question Orientalist analyses on KSA. 
Said’s work, which first addressed the ubiquity of anti-Muslim and anti-Arab writings 
amongst some Western historians, colonial administrators, and social scientists in 
general, did not look at instances of Orientalism against the Arab Gulf. A great deal, for 
instance, was accorded to how British administrators, such as Lord Kitchener, talked 
about Egypt. But little or no information is found in Said’s fascinating study on KSA or, 
for that matter, other Arab Gulf states, for instance. Nonetheless, the key point is that 
Said developed and left behind an important framework for students of the Middle East, 
cautioning them against both generalisations and reductionisms – the two commonplace 
‘cardinal sins’ of Orientalism as Sadiki points out in his work on Said.24 For Bryan 
Turner
25, it seems that whenever the ‘West’ and ‘East’ are coupled, contrast and 
difference are stressed. This is quite evident in the representations of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia Western scholarly and journalistic works, which I shall explain further in 
the next chapter. The ‘West’ is privileged as the sole source of enlightenment, 
rationality as well as of knowledge of democracy.
26
 Again, as Sadiki remarks in his 
work The Search for Arab Democracy, ‘East’ or ‘Orient’ is paired with ‘West’ only for 
the convenience of constructing mirror images. ‘Orient’ is invented to highlight and 
celebrate, by way of contrast, what the ‘West’ is and is not. In such mirror images the 
‘non-West’ is marginal to rationality, peripheral to good rule, and on the sidelines of 
knowledge-making. Most accounts of Muslim thought and practice, especially after 
9/11, particularly, and study of the Arab Middle East, generally, expose the survival of 
this Orientalist line of thinking. 
In this regard, one significant reductionism within the wide field of Middle East 
politics displays the prejudicial position of the ‘Occident’ as the sole source and, 
definitely, ‘knower’ of democracy, moderation, and tolerance, for instance. Examples of 
this type of Orientalist thinking has been explained elsewhere (e.g. Bernard Lewis, at 
least as Said views his scholarship). The ‘Orient’ – and more precisely the Middle East 
– is largely depicted as a consumer of ideas. That is, the ideas, ideologies, knowledge 
systems, and the theories invented in and by the ‘Occident,’ which seem to be 
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transmitted but with some resistance by Islamic forces (unlike Westernisers who are 
keen to adopt them, such as Kemal Atatürk in turkey in the 1920s and 1930s). The 
result is unequal power relations where the ‘Occident’ acquires the means of control 
over the ‘Orient’, and through these ideas and advocates of Westernisation, seems to 
sustain and reproduce such advantageous relations. Many scholars have captured the 
essence of these unequal relations of power, namely, those looking at them by using the 
postcolonial framework (and the 1980s the proponents in Southern and Latin America 
of the so-called ‘dependency school’).27 To an extent, there is ground to argue that the 
unequal ‘West’-‘East’ relations are comparable with the core-periphery relations 
mapped out by the dependency school in order to explain processes of exploitation, 
dependence, and hegemony.  
Primarily, the study I am trying to develop here appreciates the anti-Orientalist 
ontology through which scholars such as Said, Maxine Rodinson (regarding whether 
Weber’s ‘Protestant Ethic’ has no equivalent in Islam ), Bryan Turner (on the question 
of Western rationality in general, and the question of Marx’s depictions of Eastern 
‘modes of productivity) and Sadiki (in relation to Western democracy and 
democratisation) seek to question the various dichotomies constructed about ‘West’-
‘East’ relations. This leads to the production of standard dichotomies, Sadiki points out 
(modern vs. traditional, democratic vs. authoritarian, civilised vs. barbarian, etc.). This 
is one reason why he notes that the key Orientalist scholars working on Islam or 
political Islam tend to search for an essence within either (See Table 1). In relations to 
my case study – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – I seek to apply Said’s ideas by 
highlighting Orientalist thinking towards Saudi Arabia. Through this exercise, and by 
examining the nature of the emerging discourses and counter-discourses of moderation 
in Saudi Arabia, I aim to show that there is a brand of local knowledge that is unknown 
to most Western, and even Arab, students of the religion, politics and society in this 
country. So the type of knowledge that is used to elaborate a new public morality, and a 
multivocal public discourse, and, subsequently, a new trend of thought and intellectual 
and political building blocks of a new culture or ethos of moderation relies on local 
sources, voices, and forces. This is one reason why I argue that the adjective liberal 
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(small government, laissez-faire, largely secular politics, etc.) does not resonate well 
within Saudi Arabia. An American liberal harbours a set of values that do not readily 
translate well when assessing the value system of a Saudi liberal (still champions role of 
the state in political and economic management, preference for a mixed economy, 
acceptance of role of religion in society and politics, etc.). This is one reason why I have 
chosen to speak of ‘moderate’ discourse or a discourse of ‘moderation’, which I will 
define in the section on language in my thesis.  
Table 1 Key Islamists’ Understandings of ‘Fundamentalism’/Islamic Movements28 
Scholar View of ‘political Islam’ Critique/Evaluation 
Eric Davis, 1984
29
 
“Islamic radicalism”: 
stresses revolutionary zeal 
Not nuanced as if radical change 
is singular for all forces of 
political Islam, with stress put on 
‘militancy’, i.e. negative 
R. Hrair Dekmejian, 
1985
30
  
“Fundamentalism” used 
interchangeably with 
Arabic translation 
“usuliyyah” 
Distinction between ‘passive’ and 
‘militant’ strands with stress on 
‘regenerative’ capacity  
Emmanuel Sivan, 
1985
31
 
“Fundamentalism” is a 
continuum with two poles: 
“conservative” and 
"extreme” radicals 
Continuum idea is innovative and 
captures nuances but ignores 
overlap between ‘conservative’ 
and ‘extreme’ ‘radicals’ 
Olivier Roy,1988
32
 
“Fundamentalism” 
equated with “Islamism” 
as ‘neo-fundamentalism”: 
ever changing zealous and 
revolutionary forces 
Dynamism and difference are 
stressed; tends towards negative 
labeling: ‘neo-fundamentalism” is 
not any clearer than 
‘fundamentalism” 
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Ervand Abrahamian, 
1989
33
  
“Fundamentalism” is made 
up of both  liberal and 
radical forces  
Boxes ‘political Islam’ into neat 
groups of radicals: clerical, lay-
religious, and secular. ‘Clerical 
populism’ ignores historiography 
of Islam’s learned scholars  
Martin Marty & 
Scott Appleby, 
1991
34
 
“Fundamentalism” refers 
to anti-state politicization 
Dilutes spiritual or religious ethos 
of political Islam 
Graham Fuller and 
Ian Lesser, 1995
35
 
“fundamentalism” denotes 
“mutual siege” 
Lacks contextualization; use of 
‘siege’: generalization and 
imprecise abstraction 
Youssef Choueiri, 
1997
36
  
“Fundamentalism” denotes 
radicalized revivalism with 
totalitarian tendencies 
‘Ideologizes’ political Islam in a 
fixed way; stresses sequential 
linearity 
John Esposito, 
1999
37
  
“Fundamentalism” is 
dynamic; subject to 
increased ‘radicalization’: 
“revivalism” to “neo-
revivalism” to “neo-
revivalism” to extremism  
Ignores parallel process of 
increased ‘moderation’, and the 
interplay between processes 
leading to ‘extremism’ and 
moderation 
Barry Rubin, 2002
38
 
“Fundamentalism” refers 
to oscillation between 
revolutionary militancy 
and outright terrorism 
Apocalyptic view, that leans 
towards a ‘martial’ view of all 
things Islamic 
Gilles Kepel, 2002
39
  
“Fundamentalism” qua 
‘jihad’-bent movement is 
dying: transition to ‘post-
Islamism’ 
Captures idea of dynamism; but 
Kepel’s work is yet to be 
deconstructed properly for its 
generalisation and Orientalism 
 
As the above summary in Table 1 shows, the forces of Islam, Muslim discourses 
or Islamists (forces seeking a role in public affairs by politicising Islam) remain the 
subject of Orientalist constructions. One critique found in the illustration of Orientalist 
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depictions of these forces is the tendency to ignore what Sadiki describes “processes of 
moderation,” which is of relevance to this inquiry. These depictions tend to ‘box’ forces 
of political Islam into categories such as ‘radicals’. They also stress the ‘martial’ 
component of these forces and of Islam generally, as shown in the summary. There is 
definitely a thread that connects the pre and post-9/11 Orientalist renditions and 
readings of political Islam: namely, proscribing Islamists, an objective that the gurus of 
so-called ‘Islamic extremism’ or ‘Islamic neo-Fascism’ seem to profess. And as Said 
points out, the Occident produces Orientalist thinking because it can, and because it is 
supported and funded by power structures deeply rooted and established in Western 
political and academic institutions, public and private. After 9/11, this has been 
heightened owing to the vast increase in Western power establishments in funds 
allocated to taking care of security – both as a subject of study and measures to counter 
what Esposito once deftly called the ‘Islamic threat.’  
On the intellectual level, little has changed in the ‘covering of Islam’ by Western 
public intellectuals and establishment (see Table 1). The assertion by Daniel Pipes that 
what he neatly labels “fundamentalist Islam” should be treated as “a narrow, aggressive 
twentieth century ideological movement”40 may already have trickled into the brand of 
security-driven research of the so-called Islamic ‘radicalisation’ in the twenty-first 
century, threatening to remain a permanent mantra in the ‘Islam’-‘West’ relations. For 
instance, the US foreign policy-making apparatus is guilty of this oversimplification and 
hostility vis-à-vis Islamists.
41
 This tendency to paint all ‘political Islam’ with a single 
brush rekindles the passion for Orientalism. By declaring that “it is misguided policy to 
distinguish between moderate and extremist fundamentalists,”42 Pipes reproduces a 
typical example of generalisation that Edward Said cautions against in his 
Orientalism.
43
 Indeed, it is a clear illustration of the bottom line of Said’s work, that is, 
that generalising is generic to Orientalising. Islamists may share a common objective or 
aspiration. That is, the drive to emulate the Medina model or city-state polity built by 
the Prophet Muhammad in the sixth century AD as a community bound together by 
                                                 
40
 Pipes, “There are no Moderates,” p. 55. 
41
 Arthur Lowrie, “The Campaign against Islam and American Foreign,” Middle East Policy, 4 
(September 1995).  
42
 Daniel Pipes, “There are no Moderates: Dealing with Fundamentalist Islam,” The National 
Interest (Fall 1995), p. 54. 
43
 Said, Orientalism. 
27 
 
Qur’anic principles of legality, equality, compassion and organised according to ethics 
of consultation (shura).  
Orientalist readings produce parallelism when it comes to situating Islamists in 
relation to democracy. Representations of Islamists tend to denude them of all affinity 
with humanist values. One observer writes that “Islam does not recognize coexistence 
as a basic doctrine. Coexistence goes against Islam’s sense of world order.44 In the same 
vein, another notes that “an Islamic state as espoused by most of its proponents is 
simply incompatible with values and truths that Americans and most Westerners today 
hold to be self-evident.”45 The same commentator adds that the Islamists do not have a 
complete understanding of democracy, specifically as majority rule without minority 
rights: Islamic law gives minorities “protected not equal status.”46 This brand of 
Orientalist ‘knowing’ of Islam and Islamists repeats nineteenth-century binary 
classifications that used negative terms such as ‘barbaric’, ‘primitive’ or ‘uncivilised’.47  
Generally, traditional Orientalists maintain that Muslim societies have 
historically lacked the institutions or the key condition for democracy: civil society. 
Western political theory stresses the necessary presence of civil society for resistance by 
society of arbitrary state power and for the birth of democratic institutionalised politics 
and dispersed power.
48
 Traditional Orientalists dismiss politically organised Muslim 
social forces as being in the main personalistic and informal. That is, absence of the 
building blocks of ‘civic culture’ necessary for the production of functional and modern 
and rational political systems. Moreover, according to this view informal and 
personalistic organisation is incapable of carrying out to the task of challenging 
authority. To the contrary, the pattern of political and civil organisation in Muslim 
societies lends itself to promoting “clientage network whose members traded their 
loyalty for the patronage and protection of some notable.”49 Accordingly, the resulting 
political behaviour is bound to an ‘Islam’ in which “despotism” is “implicit in [its] very 
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core.”50 The indictment here is clear and categorical: “The totalistic character of the 
faith seemed to imply that only a totalitarian state could put its dogmas into practice.”51 
This “totalistic character” is generally summed up in the permanence of a culture of 
political passivity throughout Muslim history. The neo-Orientalists’ take differs. They 
contend that there had always been a split in medieval Muslim realms between the state 
and society. The reason, it is argued, is the Muslim learned scholars’ reluctance or 
objection to endorse political power. This they did on the account that “secular rulers” 
were prone “to corruption and despotism.52 Sympathy to this position amongst the 
Muslim public meant secular rulers could command only “tepid and intermittent 
support.”53 This split, they note, is the hallmark of contemporary Muslim states and 
societies. Flowing from this is a depiction of Muslim politics as being essentially 
marked by tribalism, disjunctive state-society relations, passive subjects, and static 
statecraft except in times of dynastic challenges and change of power-holders. This 
Orientalist position of Muslim politics, mainly being hostile to state-making, civility, or 
moderation, finds expression in the work of a number of neo-Orientalists. Patricia 
Crone is a classic example: “Hence the political pattern that accompanied this 
disjuncture was one that oscillated between extremes of despotism and anarchy on the 
part of the state, and ritual avoidance and factionalism on the part of the notables.”54 
 
1.4 A Conceptual Framework II: Language and Terminology 
What do I mean by ‘moderation’? This is the key concept that I must define 
carefully for the sake of clarity throughout my thesis. Aristotle comes to mind. He was 
one of the first Greek philosophers to place value on ‘moderation’ and to consider it a 
virtue in its own right. Aristotle was against excesses in anything. A complete life is one 
that regulates the excesses, for instance, of courage or cowardice according to a given 
situation. Too much of either leads to deficiency in human character. Moderation is a 
key idea that modern Western political systems and societies adopted from Aristotle (in 
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Politics) who as Alexander the Great’s teacher tried to stress the notion of moderation in 
political rule. passed on to.  
This tradition survives and a brief survey of literature leaves no doubt as to the 
importance of moderation in politics. B. C. Smith, for instance, argues that the values 
and orientations found to be associated with the stability of democracy are moderation, 
co-operation, bargaining and accommodation. He states that moderation and co-
operation “imply toleration, pragmatism, willingness to compromise, and civility in 
political discourse.”55 Linked to this is the element of time, which Smith considers to be 
“often…a critical variable here…” in institutionalizing the value of moderation.56 In her 
examination of Islamist movements active in the contest of politics, Tamara Coffman 
Wittes offers a similar definition of moderation. In her view, the determining factor of 
“relative moderation” is “attitude toward political pluralism.”57 She goes on to explain 
what pluralistic values imply in the political game: whether a movement views itself as 
only one of “a number of different tendencies, and without special prerogatives.”58 
Moreover, according to this pluralistic criterion the willingness of a movement to accept 
electoral defeat is an important attitude. Since a recurring suspicion is that Islamists 
tend to be exclusivist, there is a question about whether Islamist leaders are inclined to 
enter into broader coalitions “with non-Islamist movements on behalf of common 
goals.”59 Finally, she stretches her description of moderation to include Islamist 
willingness to respect and be part of a political system in which they have no power. 
The type of moderation she defines relates to the attitudes needed for democratic 
politics with stress on the values of “pragmatism,” and “compromise.”60 Gupta Pushkar 
argues that one distinction between “moderate religious parties” and “extremist parties” 
is the former’s inclination “towards inclusion and consensus in their relationship with 
other religious communities or sects.” The latter’s tendencies are towards “strong 
majoritarian impulses and” exclusion “towards other religious communities as well as 
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those who do not subscribe to their interpretation of religion.”61 For this reason, Pushkar 
distinguishes between ideological and strategic moderation: 
We must therefore suggest two kinds of moderation: ideological and strategic. 
Ideological moderation indicates genuine dilution of core foundations of a political 
party’s ideology, whether or not it is the result of political learning, recognition of 
electoral and other constraints or other factors. Strategic moderation is entirely 
opportunistic in that it does not reflect ideological change within the party in question.
62
   
Robert Springborg referring to the situation in Turkey views moderation as 
accommodation as well as acceptance by others, for accommodation to be based on 
mutuality.
63
 This is one reason he considers moderation to depend on context. In this 
respect he notes that, to apply Pushkar’s notion of strategic moderation, that what he 
describes “radical” political forces “are for the most part still present, but sitting on the 
political sidelines presumably waiting for a return of conditions that will favour them 
rather than Muslim democrats.”64 He adds that this weakens moderation, and 
subsequently reform in general.
65
 
To these elements from the previous definitions, one must add a short reference 
to Habermas. In his well-know classic text The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere, he introduces the concept of “public sphere.”66 In referring to this term, I do not 
in any way use it with the kind of historical baggage that goes with it, namely, its 
European bourgeois origin. No such social stratum exists in Saudi Arabia. I use it 
simply to denote the realm of public affairs, involving both state and society and the 
interactions involving the two sides in any environment. But I find even if in a 
minimalist way Habermas’s concern with democratic politics that offer opportunities 
for all people to be involved in public debate very relevant to the notion of moderation I 
                                                 
61
 Gupta, M. Pushkar, “Between Moderation and Extremism: Religious Parties in Chile, India, 
and Turkey,” first draft, Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association, USA, 2004, p. 12. 
62
 Ibid. 
63
 Robert Springborg, (2007) ‘Political Islam and Europe views from the Arab Mediterranean 
States and Turkey’, in M. Emerson & Richard Youngs, (eds.), Political Islam and European 
Foreign Policy: Perspectives from Muslim Democrats of the Mediterranean, (London: CEPS, 
2007),  pp.160-184 
64
 Ibid., p. 168. 
65
Ibid. 
66
 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society (Boston: MIT Press, 1989). 
31 
 
want to develop and apply in my thesis. In particular, the stress Habermas puts on the 
general environment that allows for two political ingredients, which make a public 
sphere viable: Firstly, “rational critical debate about public issues” by all citizens or 
“private individuals”; and secondly, the value that “arguments not social status or 
traditions determine decisions.”67 The elements of the ongoing public discussion 
highlights mutual acceptance or acceptance of people whose views, creeds or ideologies 
differ as well as the idea of equality between private citizens with reasonability of 
arguments is the criterion of what ideas and decisions are adopted or rejected. This is 
very important especially in states like Saudi Arabia where still status and tradition 
determine political identity and political membership. 
From the above definitions I adopt the following working definition of 
moderation. It is made up of four elements: a/ acceptance of pluralism (in Arabic 
ta’ddudiyya), not necessarily of political parties, which do not exist in the Kingdom. I 
mean by this plurality of ideas. b/ Dialogue, which I adopt from the idea of public 
debate being accessible to all developed by Habermas. This is vital for societies still in 
the process of nation and state-building and where political institutionalization is still 
limited. c/ from Pushkar I adopt the notion of ideological moderation in the sense that 
compromise is essential for common political values and goals in a stable political 
system. d/ Coffman’s idea of respect of the rules of the political game is another value 
that I consider to be relevant to moderation.  
Three of these four components will be used as criteria for evaluating 
moderation in the discourse of actors from both society and the state. These three 
criteria are: a/ acceptance of pluralism; b/ ideological moderation; and c/ respect of the 
rules of the political game. I have dropped dialogue for the simple reason that it seems 
to recur a great deal in Muslim discourse of all political issues related to reform. It is a 
term that is widely used in all discussions whether these relate to political participation 
and inclusiveness or respect of laws. I have left it out to avoid confusion since the term 
has multiple use in Islamic language and does not require special treatment because 
multiple and repeated use of it makes it almost ‘ordinary’ as a political value. 
So what is text? What is discourse? In this study text refers to meaning 
embedded in written or spoken forms of communication. The sum of texts or inter-
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textuality combining constantly evolving significations and meanings embedded within 
all kinds of texts, written and spoken, in a specific context and including the interpreter 
or author’s own understanding of the meanings communicated to her through 
informants or through document analysis, for instance. Discourse is therefore complex 
as Van Dijk argues.
68
 And this complexity, which involves a variety of interactions and 
meanings means that discourse is open to misinterpretation and manipulation for all 
kinds of reasons -- such as ideological, political or propagandist reasons. In this study, I 
have mentioned for instance how ‘strategic moderation’ and ‘ideological moderation’ 
differ. The former, for instance, inevitably involves manipulation of spoken or written 
discourse. The role of the discourse analyst is therefore very challenging in 
understanding the context of communication and the meanings resulting from it.    
I shall now go on to describe my methodology and research design. 
 
1.5 Methodological Framework 
I begin this section by revisiting my key questions for the purpose of linking 
them to my methodology. I have proposed to address three interconnected questions. 
These are: What is the nature of politico-religious discourse in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (KSA) in the post-9/11 world today? How is the process of 
“reintellectualisation” (the term belongs to Dale Eickelman and Jon Anderson) of the 
public sphere in Saudi Arabia producing discourses of moderation as well as 
moderates? To what extent it can be argued that current discourses are constructing a 
‘culture of moderation’ in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia? The common term that 
reappears in all three questions is discourse. It is through and within discourse that I am 
seeking to answer these questions which all touch on the question of ‘moderation.’ The 
first question defines a Saudi specificity: the fact that religion and politics intertwine. I 
have explained that this results from the nature of the state, which (Chapter three looks 
specifically at the politico-religious discourse in relation to reform) had its origins in the 
skills and leadership in a way of the two ‘founding fathers’ of Saudi statehood: the 
religious founder is Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the political founder 
Amir Muhammad Ibn Saud. No such thing a secular discourse exists in Saudi Arabia. It 
has no grounds in Saudi scholarship or in the country’s history of political thought. 
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Islam has always shaped the politics of the Kingdom. Hence the use of the term 
‘politico-religious’ denotes this specificity in a country which (like the UK) still has no 
written constitution, and furthermore claims the Qur’an, the Noble Book of Islam, to be 
its constitution. I am claiming – as the date in my research site suggests – that there is 
an ongoing process of “reintellectualisation.” The term as used in this thesis refers to the 
renewal of discourse (khitab) in the Kingdom. What is ‘new’ in this movement of 
‘renewal’ of discourse is the ‘moderation’ effect that is impacting on debates within the 
public sphere. Religious forces are gradually accommodating non-religious discourses, 
and less religious discourses are increasingly becoming respectful of the discourses of 
religious moderates. Eickelman and Anderson use the term to describe the rising 
Muslim public sphere by mentioning three important dimensions: a/ to be autonomous 
of the state, and more relevant to my study case, happening “at the intersections of 
religious, political, and social life.”69  b/ The Muslim public sphere (since it is not 
secular in the Western sense) it tends nonetheless to be “discursive” and “participative.” 
c/ The “reintellectualisation”, which from my own point of view means the rise of new 
moderate discourses or new discourses of moderation with messages of renewal, is 
described by Eickelman and Anderson to also point to “presenting Islamic doctrine and 
discourse in accessible and vernacular terms.”70 I add to their descriptions of the new 
discourses the adjective ‘moderate.’ Even the fact that the language itself has changed 
and made accessible is a sign of moderation and willingness to reach to wider audiences 
and connect with as many discourses as possible. Therefore one assumption is that 
moderation is the key substance of reintellectualisation of public debate within Saudi 
Arabia. 
In line with the above, the stress on discourse makes this study more compatible 
with qualitative
71
 than quantitative methodology. The research site – Saudi Arabia’s 
state and civil society – poses limitations on quantitative research the dominance of 
which is today being reduced and challenged.
72
 Reliance on polls, surveys, in a country 
where all records are state-controlled and with no polling traditions and limited 
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transparency, is very difficult and unreliable. Permission for these research methods are 
vetted very closely by the state and most respondents prefer to engage with investigators 
through debate and discussion. Plus, there is wide-ranging written data to supplement 
forms of spoken discourse. This has influenced my preference for using discourse 
analysis. Not less important is the fact that an investigation into the rise of moderate 
discourses would necessitate an investigation and interpretation into the meanings of 
moderation in the discourses produced by various actors, whether they are stated-
affiliated or autonomous. 
Why a qualitative research methodology? Apart from the difficulties described 
above that would surely pose a major obstacle for the writing of a thesis on a sensitive 
issue – moderation and reform – there are advantages and strengths that would result 
from using it. At least four must be stated and they all justify my preference to use a 
qualitative methodology. Firstly, qualitative research is embedded in historical and 
interactional mode of thinking according to Denzin and Lincoln. The historical and 
contextual advantage in applying this method is due to the ability of researcher to 
interact with the individuals whose ideas and actions, in the private or public sphere, 
shape “a particular historical moment.” This is one of the aims I have stated in the thesis 
is to gather data by interacting with select actors whose ideas, actions and discourses 
today seem to shape the rise of moderation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
73
 Secondly, 
the role given to authorial agency makes the researcher a dynamic participant in 
qualitative research. The author involves the data through explanation and interpretation 
of meaning through analysis of that data, whether written or spoken. Moreover, the 
authorial agency enables the researcher to “draw upon [one’s] own experiences as [an 
additional] resource in their inquiries.”74 This appeals to myself as someone who has 
worked as a royal advisor and have experience of my own, which will help me process 
the data, interpret it as well as interpret embedded within it with authority since I have a 
background in state politics (when I served in the Saudi Embassy in London from 2002 
to 2005) and private politics (since I have worked as a royal advisor to His Royal 
Highness Prince Turki Al-Faisal). My work as an advisor gave me unique access to data 
and personalities, and made me witness to many happenings. So my solid understanding 
of Saudi politics places me in a position to interact with the interviewees as well as with 
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the data I collect from the various interviews. By contrast with qualitative research 
methodology, quantitative methods tend to exclude the researcher whose ideas are not 
allowed to compromise the data or its analysis. Through the access and knowledge my 
position offers me, I have already made preliminary assessments of the research site by 
talking to a number of potential interviewees. I was able to gather written documents 
and sit in religious seminars by leading learned scholars of Islam. I held similar 
meetings with learned scholars of Islam, judges, teachers and civil servants whose 
views would be an important source for this study.  
These initial interactions and meetings have been encouraging to continue with 
this project on the rise of moderation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. I needed to 
ensure that the research and the research site are viable, and that they can support my 
work on moderation. Thirdly, and connected with this advantage, is the fact that the 
qualitative researcher is in a position to “think reflectively …and biographically.”75 
Lastly, qualitative methodology’s “empirical strategies”, such as interviews which I 
have planned as one main instrument for gathering a large part of the data for this study, 
have an important advantage: “to make connections among lived experience, larger 
social and cultural structures, and the here and now.” The use of written and spoken 
data in a specific time framework results in informative and solid analysis only when 
connections are made between them as well as between them and the author. This 
mixing of different sources of data in this exploratory study of moderation is well suited 
to the task of making connections through discourse analysis.  
Discourse analysis in this study is in a nutshell the interpretation of ‘moderation’ 
as a public ethos – way of thinking and acting in the public sphere – by looking at 
written and spoken data obtained from official and non-official actors in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia. This is a methodology that is used by linguists as well as sociologists 
or political scientists. The work of Fairclough
76
 and Van Dijk
77
 are amongst the more 
established. They apply it to the study of media reporting of migration issues and the 
content of racism in such reporting, for instance. The task of discourse analysis is 
specifically the interpretation of forms of communication, written documents and 
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speech such as interviews, by looking at them within their social, political or cultural 
contexts.
78
 Moderation is Saudi Arabia may differ from its various meanings in other 
contexts. It is in a way an Islamic concept. The aim of the Prophethood or ‘message’ of 
the Arab messenger Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him) is to create a moderate 
community (ummatan wasata) as in the Qur’an.79 In this study I have defined 
moderation through the use of criteria I explained above. Its interpretation through 
discourse analysis will be through an attempt to see how the informants understand 
moderation in relation to acceptance of pluralism, ideological moderation and respect of 
the rules of the political game. Through these three criteria I am trying to explore the 
meaning given to moderation in a variety of discourses within the 9/11 context and the 
context of ‘reintellectualisation’ of Saudi society and public sphere. I have mentioned 
that my sample population of informants will come from statist and non-statist sources 
and actors. Here I want to take this a step further and re-name the two types of (as well 
as sources of response on moderation) discourse ‘pragmatic’ (accommodating of the 
three criteria) and ‘puritanical’ (hostile or understands moderation through reference to 
another set of cultural or political criteria). The aim is then to find out the meanings 
given to ‘moderation’ in ‘pragmatic’ and ‘puritanical’ discourses. So the study does not 
assume that ‘pragmatic’ or ‘puritanical’ meanings are confined within or limited to the 
official/top-down/state-affiliated and not the non-official/bottom-up/societal discourses. 
It would be interesting to find out whether ‘moderation’ exists ‘trans-laterally’ or across 
political and social strata and platforms (official and non-official). Table 2 sums up the 
map of the discourse analysis task described above. 
Table 2 Map of Discourse Analysis of ‘Moderation’ 
Criteria Discourse for 
Moderation 
Discourse against 
Moderation 
Data Sources 
1. Acceptance of 
pluralism 
 Pragmatic  Puritanical 1. Official/statist: 
 Written + Spoken 
 
2. Non-official 
Written + Spoken 
2. Ideological 
moderation 
 Pragmatic  Puritanical 
3. Respect of Rules  Pragmatic  Puritanical 
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To solidify the use and justification of discourse analysis I wish to stress once 
again the relevance of its use in this study for the purpose of “...seek[ing] to reveal how 
texts are constructed so that particular...perspectives can be expressed delicately and 
covertly...”80 It is the construction of meaning in relation to the concept of ‘moderation’ 
and how such constructions are made that this study focuses on. In this case, it is to find 
out whether the overall meaning given to moderation takes place according to 
‘pragmatic’ or a ‘puritanical’ thinking. The context within which meaning is 
constructed points to power relations, which also must not be overlooked in interpreting 
meaning. King Abdullah’s reforms represent a top-down and statist type of practices, 
carrying weight and using language which is not hesitant. They provide an important 
context for the emergence of the discourses to be analysed in this thesis. Unlike the 
King, those speaking without the cover of the crown and the state think carefully about 
what kind of speech and, subsequently, meaning they produce. This dimension of 
discourse being tied to a system of power relations makes the use of discourse analysis 
very suited to the objective of understanding the production of meaning and the context 
of meaning. This linkage between discourse and power results from Foucault’s 
influence, which discourse analysts have made very good use.
81
 Related to this point 
about the use of discourse analysis in this study is the two advantages of 1) 
understanding how social “events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by 
relations of power and struggles over power;” and 2) the ability to “explore  how...these 
relationships between discourse and society [are] a factor securing power and 
hegemony.”82 This is one reason why the reflective analysis( in chapter 7) of the 
discourse analysis of the interview materials in chapters 5 and 6 aims at bringing into 
the analysis the dimension of language and meaning in order to understand fully the 
importance of the ‘pragmatic’ and the ‘puritanical’ discourses of moderation.  
The authorial agency and the author’s won understanding of how ‘moderation’ 
is produced as a meaning and as a set of related power relations will be very useful in 
terms of ending the thesis with theoretical assumptions (grounded theory as opposite 
applying a specific theoretical framework in the thesis) about ‘moderation’, and a 
‘culture of moderation’ in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia the future. The use of very 
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minimalist ‘grounded theory’83 in this study is framed by defining in a general sense the 
features of two categories (‘pragmatic’ vs. ‘puritanical’) of discourse in relation to 
‘moderation’. In particular, it is the extent to which these two categories inform the 
author about the meanings given to moderation: for or against the acceptance of 
pluralism, ideological moderation and rule of the political game. How these two 
categories are embedded in existing power relations is in itself another way of deriving 
general assumptions about the discourse of ‘moderation’ in the Kingdom.   
 
1.5.1 Sources of Data 
The above map is suited to the research design I am proposing to undertake this 
study. I have defined moderation as not to leave this important dimension of the 
research open-ended. The three criteria noted in Table 2 frames the parameters of the 
inquiry, helping me develop a precise set of questions for my semi-structured empirical 
task when during the research fieldwork for the purpose of conducting interviews. The 
minimalist set of questions for the fieldwork interview on the three criteria will be 
repeated for all informants. This will help me record the variety of responses for the 
same questions, and noting down the similarities and differences, and the extent to 
which they denote ‘pragmatic’ or ‘puritanical’ positions in relation to moderation. As 
the interviews will be semi-structured, the ‘un-fixed’ questions will be determined by 
the responses to the ‘fixed’ questions and the overall context of the interaction with the 
interviewees. Interviews are therefore one vital source of information for the task of 
discourse analysis. My other data source will be written texts (mostly articles, from 
newspapers or blogs and speeches) by known intellectuals belonging to the pragmatic 
and the puritanical trends.  
The variety of sources is a good tool for cross-verification of responses on 
moderation. Since the task will obviously start with reading and analysis of the written 
data, then that will give me the chance to formulate ideas about where the various 
informants stand on the question of moderation. Should interviews return a different 
response, the interview would be the right place to clarify difference in position or 
response. Interviews are an invaluable source of information in an inquiry like this. 
However, they can be too staged and risk being unnatural or intimidating means of 
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gathering information. I was obliged by ethics of the research fieldwork to inquire and 
seek permission as to what is the best way for recording the data from my informants, 
which preferred note-taking not recorded interviews. There is a tendency in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has an oral tradition, for people to speak more freely 
when not recorded. There is still fear that recorded information might end up in the 
hands of the state police when the information discussed may be sensitive. I have years 
of experiences in public communication and I am familiar with the local and cultural 
etiquette when it comes to what goes and does not in situations like these. I have relied 
on this personal experience to ensure access to informants and data. 
I have had access thanks to my advisory post. I have had on hundreds of 
occasions learnt the art of communication with official and non-official individuals and 
groups. My origins in the Qaseem, in the Kingdom’s Northern region, have given me an 
invaluable experience through the attendance of religious seminars or circles of learning 
(halaqat). I have also attended the activities and seminars of the Tableegh, an apolitical 
Islamic movement focused on da’wa (spiritual reform and religious preaching). This 
has enabled me to acquire skills specific to understanding religious discourses (al-khitab 
al-dini). Moreover, it has helped me establish relations amongst the community of the 
religious scholars, which is an important elite in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This in a 
way has been aided by my relation to one of the top learned scholars of Islam (my 
maternal uncle) and a high cleric sitting on the supreme religious council, which reports 
directly to the king and decides the direction of religious reform or its limits. This 
contact was partly useful when conducting the interviews, as well as in getting advice 
on which senior clerics to interview and learn about their position towards and discourse 
of moderation. However, I went about my research and interviews professionally by 
keeping my identity and relation to my uncle hidden. This was vital to ensure 
information obtained was not compromised by knowledge of my relation to him. 
Lastly, as someone who was highly positioned to obtain access, I benefited a 
great deal from visits to official religious institutions in the two holy shrines of Islam, 
places, I visited on numerous religious occasions. I had also visited the  special 
department for the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice, known by the name of or 
religious police (al-mutawwa‘), and having acquaintances there makes this institution, 
which was relatively weakened under King Abdullah, a potential source of information. 
Connections in the country’s important Supreme Council of Judges, which has 
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administered over the justice system for a long time. It has recently been reformed and 
this context is itself a good reason to see how the reforms impacted on the perception 
and practice of moderation. I have contacts in the municipalities elected in 2005, and 
including responses from elected municipality would bring into the analysis an 
important set of ideas and opinions to my study. Lastly, the Consultative Council 
(majlis al-shura), the equivalent of a parliamentary body, has highly educated deputies 
and a wide cross opinion which proved to be beneficial to the inquiry. 
The above mix of indirect (not included in the analysis) and direct (used as 
source of primary evidence) sources have offered the research a rich range of data to 
support my empirical inquiry into the meanings of moderation in Saudi Arabia. 
 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
In addition to the current chapter (Saudi Arabia after 9/11: A Framework for 
Exploring the Rise of Moderation in Public Discourse) in which I define my key 
questions, problematique, key concepts and methodological framework, I have six 
chapters. The second (The ‘Orientalisation’ of Saudi Arabia: A Critical Reflection on 
Orientalist Constructions of the Kingdom) surveys the wide body of scholarship on the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, focusing specifically on how it is ‘constructed,’ paying 
particular attention to ‘Orientalisation’ (Said’s term) and Orientalism. This exercise sets 
the scene for the remainder of the analysis and the thesis in general. What is particularly 
interesting in this chapter is how Saudi Arabia is constructed as a place where there is 
rigid orthodoxy, hostility to reform and change, and extremism not moderation. As 
mentioned before, little has been written about Orientalist scholarship on the Arab Gulf. 
So this chapter adds new knowledge about Orientalism in relation to this region.  
Chapter three (The Impact of Wahhabism on Religion and  Politics and 
Politicisation in Saudi Arabia) examines the close relationship of politics and religion 
in the Kingdom, and looks at the politico-religious origins of the Saudi state with its 
Wahhabi identity. Chapter four (Reintellectualisation: A Contextualisation of 
Discourses and Counter-Discourses in Saudi Arabia) initiates the analytical section of 
the thesis, focusing on the process of ‘reintellectualisation’ and its impact on reform and 
pluralisation of discourse. against the background of ‘reintellectualisation’. In this 
chapter, this background is explained, by highlighting discursive unity and tension, and 
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the impact of ‘reintellectualisation’ and its attendant discourses. Moreover, through this 
chapter, I try to explore how reform is sought and validated by dissidents and other 
groups active in society. Two groups are identified: a/ the loyal opposition and how they 
validate ‘protest’ and what is the specific content of their demands; b/ the more serious 
opposition whose demands leads to a state of mutual hostility with the ruling elite and 
the Saudi state in general. This analysis is important for understanding the dynamics, 
contexts and language of reform and in the leadup to the discourse analysis of the 
pragmatist and puritanical discourses in chapters five and six.  
Chapter five (Construction of Moderation in Saudi Arabia: A Discourse 
Analysis of the Pragmatic Trend) examines the discourse of the pragmatist, by using 
primary data obtained from interviews and texts by intellectuals affiliated with the 
trend. Through the interpretation of what meaning is given to moderation using the 
three criteria (pluralism, ideological moderation, and respect of the rules of political 
game), this chapter seeks to understand the perception and content of moderation by this 
trend of thought. 
Chapter Six (Construction of Moderation in Saudi Arabia: A Discourse Analysis 
of the Puritanical Trend) repeats the same exercise done in the previous chapter but this 
time by looking at discourse of the puritanical trend. Again the exercise uses primary 
date obtained through interviews and texts by intellectuals or opinion-formulators 
closely affiliated with this trend. The same three criteria will be applied in the analysis 
of the written discourses as well as data obtained through the semi-structured 
interviews. 
Chapter seven (A Reflection on Moderation in Saudi Arabia) brings together the 
findings of chapters five and six. The reflection looks at the language and content of the 
two trends of thought as a summary of the analysis in the previous two chapters. The 
reflective exercise considers the similarities and the differences in terms of the language 
used, the various meanings given to key concepts and phrases, and the key ideas 
communicated in relation to moderation.  
The conclusion will sum up the main arguments as well as considers the 
limitations of the research. It will end with a brief section on future directions for 
researching the subject of moderation in Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf in general. 
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1.7 Conclusion 
The first chapter has sought to define the conceptual and methodological 
framework of the study of the discourse of ‘moderation’ in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. This is a discussion that relates to the nature of politico-religious discourse in 
the Kingdom due to the nature of the state and its twofold identity as political and 
religious at once. It also relates to the ‘reintellectualisation’ of the public sphere in the 
Kingdom following 9/11 as well as within the context of the key reforms introduced by 
king Abdullah since his crowning in 2005. Because of the presence of inseparable 
boundaries between religion and politics, Orientalist bias still exists in scholarship about 
the Kingdom and the Arab world. For this reason, the thesis has stated an anti-
Orientalist position, which will be explored more systematically in the second chapter. 
Working definitions of a number of key concepts are given in this first chapter. In 
particular, a three-criterial understanding of ‘moderation’, the key concept around which 
discussion and analysis revolve in the thesis is stated. It refers specifically to acceptance 
of pluralism, ideological moderation and respect of the rules of the political game. 
Following this discussion of key terms, the chapter defined discourse analysis and 
justified the use of this methodological framework, highlighting the importance of 
meaning, context of meaning and social events and overall power relations within which 
discourse is embedded. It also describes the key sources of data collection, including 
primary sources such as interviews. These will be aimed at official and unofficial types 
of discourses of ‘moderation.’  
The next chapter examines another type of discourse, Orientalist constructions 
of Saudi Arabia in the wake of 9/11, by reviewing the existing literature on the 
Kingdom.   
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CHAPTER 2  
THE ‘ORIENTALISATION’ OF SAUDI ARABIA: A CRITICAL REFLECTION ON 
ORIENTALIST CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE KINGDOM 
 
…by Orientalism I mean several things, all of them, in my 
opinion, interdependent. The most readily accepted designation of 
Orientalism is an academic one, and indeed, the label still serves 
in a number of academic institutions. Anyone who teaches, writes 
about, or researches the Orient and this applies whether the person 
is an anthropologist, sociologist, historian or philologist either in 
its specific or its general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or 
she does is Orientalism.
84
  
Orientalism is a discourse of difference in which the apparently 
neutral occident/orient contrast is an expression of a power 
relationship.
85
 
 
2.1 Focus 
I have in the first chapter outlined a research agenda that seeks to understand the 
ongoing re-intellectualisation of Saudi society and polity. The key questions I will be 
trying to answer revolve around the new trends of thought and the discourses of the 
moderates and those advancing puritanical views and ideas of Islam and reform in 
general in KSA. This exercise necessitates an exploration of the brand of discourses by 
Saudis. In this chapter I try to give an account of Orientalism about Saudi Arabia in 
order to contextualize the rise of the new discourses and trends of thought to be 
explored in the chapters on discourse analysis of moderation. Existing literature on KSA 
exemplifies what Said calls ‘Orientalism’. That is, discourses by the West (or the 
Occident) on the East (or Orient). As in the above definition by Said, I shall use the 
term ‘Orientalist’ to designate an attitude more than a nationality or a regional origin. 
This is important to explain for two reasons. The first is that Orientalists as analysts, 
observers, or academics expressing views and producing ideas on the East are not just 
Western. Said has a special designation, for instance, for Arab or Muslim Orientalists. 
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He calls them “Oriental Orientalists.” There are Orientalists involved in the production 
of ideas about KSA from within Saudi Arabia, or at least originate from the Kingdom 
despite being based in Western institutions or higher education or other establishments 
of power, within and without government. The second designation regards the fact that 
what ultimately defines an Orientalist for Said, and for that matter in Bryan Turner’s 
scholarship, is a general attitude. The above quote by Turner captures the essence of 
Orientalism: the stress of difference and contrast between the West or Occident, on the 
one hand, and the East or Orient, on the other. This stress on difference taints and 
misrepresents the East or the Orient. How does this happen? Largely, misrepresentation 
is done through generalization as well as through reductionism. I will get back to this 
discussion later. 
The analysis in my second chapter has two interconnected objectives. I shall 
firstly explain what Orientalism is and how it works. I shall through this explication 
give a critical overview of Orientalism and, briefly, touch upon the relationship between 
Orientalism and Occidentalism. Secondly, I shall review key select texts on KSA, 
highlighting the tendency of Orientalists, Western and non-Western, to misrepresent 
KSA through either generalization, reductionism or both. I believe this exercise is far 
more beneficial to my thesis than a traditional approach to literature review, which in 
some cases turns into a descriptive exercise. 
In a way, my own approach will account of the body of scholarship throughout 
chapters two and three. In chapter three where I look at the role of religion and the 
Wahhabi creed in Saudi society and attempts at reform, I will look at key sources on 
these questions, including Arabic texts on Shaykh Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab’s thought and 
substance of his reform,
86
 which is today denigrated everywhere after the terrorist 
events of 9/11. In terms of Arabic literature, I must say in all honesty that I have found 
the works concerned with the political system in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to be 
rare. Those which are profound, rigorous and critical are even rarer. The few that broach 
the taboo subject of reform or politics in the Kingdom are disappointing.  
They tend to be written from the perspective of the government, using state 
statistics and referring to data produced by the government. This data is very difficult to 
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verify from independent sources but this should not have discouraged its authors from at 
least cautioning the reader to the pitfalls inherent in such data. Finally, what is most 
disappointing about Arabic work on the political system of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia by Saudis is the hagiographic content of this work. Hagiographic as these books 
tend to revolve around the figure of a king or Saudi figure whose achievements are 
described with little or no critical input or scholarly distance and objectivity. None of 
these are really worth using in this thesis. Several examples of these books, most likely 
written with state blessing and funding, offer no more than tedious description of 
political and socio-economic ‘achievements’ and meaningless figures.87 Since local 
politics and reform, in particular, is often a taboo that Saudis avoid for obvious reasons, 
Saudi scholars tend to turn their attention to writing accounts of Saudi foreign relations, 
bilateral and multilateral.
88
 These, too, are of little or no relevance to this qinquiry. 
My use of Orientalism and Said’s work here grounds this exercise theoretically. 
I consider this to be really significant in that it serves to highlight the tendency of 
producers of ideas about Saudi society and polity to ignore aspects of change and 
diversity within KSA. Whether this type of knowledge is due to ignorance or deliberate 
misrepresentation is not a theme of this inquiry. The inquiry’s key theme is to account 
for the brand of knowledge that is being produced about KSA and how this knowledge 
seems to represent an Orientalist attitude typical of those described by Said in his 
famous work first published in the late 1970s. Precisely, as Turner rightly sums it up in 
the above quote, this attitude is twofold: not neutral, and represents an “expression of a 
power relationship.” In that power relationship, the West prevails over the East. 
Therefore, as Said observes, it does so because it simply can and because it has the 
means and the resources, including military, to do so.
89
 On the whole, the chapter’s 
objective is to highlight illustrative discourses that provide us with manifestations of 
bias in the ‘Orientalization’ of KSA in Orientalist scholarship, both Western and 
Oriental. 
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2.2 Understanding Orientalism & Occidentalism 
When it was published in 1978, Edward Said’s most famous work, Orientalism, 
it did not take long to become literally a ‘bible’ for all those addressing questions of 
postcoloniality or working on questions having to do with subaltern studies. It remains 
today a relevant piece of work. It has transformed the way students of Islam, Middle 
East, the postcolonial world and its societies and subaltern studies, think and address 
their subject matters. What is the core message of Edward Said’s seminal book? The 
crux of the book varies from scholar to scholar. As far as my own use and justification 
are concerned, the central message of Said’s book revolves around how discourse of the 
‘other’ can be a powerful medium of maintaining exiting power relations in which the 
‘Occident’ and its significant ‘other’ are never equal. The ‘Occident’ is evidently the 
predominant side in that equation of power; the ‘other’ whether it is Arab, Middle 
Eastern or Muslim, is misrepresented as the weak side in that power relation of 
dominance. Said writes that Orientalism is a “body of theory and practice…[with] 
considerable material investment. Continued investment [turned] Orientalism...[into] an 
accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness…”90  
The resulting pre-constructions or constructs do not mirror an objective reality 
out there. They are constructed through discourses which are tainted by all kinds of 
‘filters’. These ‘filters’ include the political, culturalist, ethnocentric, racist, and the 
ideological, all of which are used to designate the Oriental object inferior standing. The 
‘other’, the subject of study by practitioners of Orientalism – whether they are political 
scientists or colonial administrators – are lumped in categories that produce 
generalizations and reductionisms. This brand of production of ideas or discursive 
formations are partly instruments of hegemony, keeping the ‘Orient’ either ‘primitive’, 
‘authoritarian’, ‘savage’, ‘barbarian’, under-developed’, ‘fanatic’, and ‘uncivil’. These 
discursive formations serve to highlight difference, as Tunrer has observed above. One 
can say that these designations are necessary: they give opposite descriptions to those 
that define the ‘West’. Generalizations that the ‘East’ is ‘barbarian’ or ‘backward’ are 
definitions that the ‘West’ is ‘civilized’ and ‘developed’.  
In the heyday of colonialism, Orientalist constructions of Arab and Muslim 
societies and cultures served the endeavour by traditional powers to penetrate the 
‘Orient’. In other words, Orientalism worked once upon time hand in hand with colonial 
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designs to impose dominion over the Middle East. This could be achieved only through 
partial representations of the Arab and Muslim ‘other’. In particular, Islam which shares 
a monotheistic background with Christianity and Judaism remains misunderstood and 
misrepresented. This situation has worsened since the terrorist events of 9/11. Maurice 
Bucaille supports this idea by noting that the type of knowledge produced about Islam 
has on the whole facilitated further mystification and misrepresentation of Islam: 
“Anyone in the West who has acquired a deep knowledge of Islam knows just to what 
extent its history, dogma and aims have been distorted…documents published in 
European languages…do not make the work of a person willing to learn [about Islam] 
any easier.”91 Said introduces many examples of how at the level of knowledge there 
were misrepresentations of Islam. Nonetheless, this Orientalist knowledge was in 
medieval Europe, which continues to be the case today in many journalistic and 
scholarly circles, passed as knowledge. Said states that: “The European imagination was 
nourished extensively from this repertoire [of medieval Orientalist knowledge]…such 
major authors as Ariosto, Milton, Marlowe, Tasso, Shakespeare, Cervantes, and the 
authors of the Chanson de Roland and the Poema del Cid drew on the Orient’s riches 
for their productions, in ways that sharpened the outlines of imagery, ideas and figures 
populating it.”92 The key idea Said is trying to stress, and this in my view lies at the 
heart of his project of thorough deconstruction of Orientalist knowledge, is this: “…a 
great deal of what was considered learned Orientalist scholarship in Europe pressed 
ideological myths into service.”93 Roger du Pasquier reluctantly agrees with Said, by 
acknowledging that some of these myths and misrepresentations have been directed at 
Islam and the Prohet Muhammad: “…one must unhappily concur with an Orientalist 
like Montgemery Watt when he writes that ‘of all the great men of the world, no one 
has had as many detractors as Muhammad…although Europeans today look at Islam 
and its founder in a somewhat more objective light, ‘many ancient prejudices still 
remain’.”94  
What is characteristic of Orientalist knowledge is its binary character, and the 
binary pattern of its ideas. These binary constructs or knowledge facilitates 
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misrepresentation. As in the examples I have given thus far the oppositions between 
‘civilized’ Westerners and ‘barbarian’ Easterners misrepresent because they use simple 
but powerful discursive formations that serve to entrench generalizations and 
reductionistic ideas about the Arab or Muslim ‘other’. In my view, this is typical of 
Orientalist knowledge in the 19
th
 century as well as in the 21
st
 century. Said dismisses 
the Orientalist discourses, which are generally constructed on the basis of false 
stabilities, binary images or knowledge, and dichotomous assumptions – West vs. East, 
democratic vs. authoritarian, male vs. female, and public vs. private. These oppositions 
and dichotomies enabled the dominant ‘West’ to create comparisons which served to 
empower ‘Westerners’ (in establishments of power) as well as identify the ‘West’ to be 
democratic or civilized whilst identifying the ‘East’ as being authoritarian, backward, 
etc. The intention behind the use of such oppositions is “self-other identification” 
according to Sadiki.
95
 Thus discourse is not innocent, and this is where Said’s adoption 
of Michel Foucault’s ideas about ‘discourse’ has been successful in capturing the 
essence of Orientalism as a discourse of domination, generally maintaining unchanged 
power relations between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’ in the postcolonial era. These 
discourses of power create constructs which do not necessarily match a reality that 
exists in the Arab world or Saudi Arabia. As discursive constructs, misrepresentations 
of the ‘East’ or the ‘Muslim’ world, consolidate the power relations that are used to 
structure and restructure the political, social and cultural orders in the ‘Orient’ in the 
image of the ‘West’. 
 This amounts to a form of ‘objectification’ of the ‘other’. As I have already 
mentioned, by reference to Sadiki amongst others, this objectification of the ‘other’, the 
‘Occident’ aims at stressing its difference from the ‘Orient’. In other words, it is a 
method for identifying the Western ‘self’. This is at the heart of Said’s critique of 
Orientalist knowledge, which is based on a style of thought and discourse that 
emphasize as well as take for granted the correctness of the assumption that the contrast 
between ‘Occident’ and ‘Orient’ as ontologically grounded. Based on an ontology of 
difference or one might even say ‘clash’ between Western forms of being and Eastern 
forms of being or existence. Thus Orientalist epistemology or knowledge production 
fulfils the prophecy or the assumption of contrast between ‘West’ and ‘East.’ Such an 
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epistemology becomes the means by which the ‘West’ knows itself as well as thinks it 
can know the ‘East’. The ‘Occident’ defines itself by what the ‘Orient’ is not.96 
Orientalism serves to identify Europeans, in contrast with non-Europeans. Hence, what 
Orientalist discourse produces is the “idea of Europe, a collective notion identifying ‘us’ 
Europeans as against all those non-Europeans.”97 This is what ‘us vs. them’ thinking 
produces in the realm of ideas. 
Today many scholars talk of the continuity of Orientalism. Sadowski uses the 
term “Neo-orientalism.”98 Sadowski argues that neo-Orientalists look at Arab and 
Muslim societies as ‘weak’, unable to develop strong corporate identities and civil 
associations owing to the prevalence of personalistic tendencies in social and political 
organisation.
99
 Two elements that Tuastad considers to be typical of Neo-Orientalist 
misrepresentations of Middle Eastern societies are of relevance to my own thesis on the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: particularistic tribal loyalties in social organisation, religious 
submission, and under-development of statism. These elements, as my analysis below 
shows, are used by Orientalists in reference to KSA. Tuastad states: 
Since it is taken as axiomatic that Middle Eastern societies are 
resistant to democratization, they can, according to the standard 
tenet of Orientalism, be explained by idiosyncratic cultural 
factors. Two incompatible ethoses are seen as colliding in the 
Middle East: the incompatibility between an anarchistic ethos of a 
segmentary kinship-based social organisation, on the one hand 
and, on the other hand, the universalism and duty of submission 
of Islam. The legitimacy of the politics of the nation-state is hence 
understood as too particularistic for loyalty to the divine, and, 
alternatively, seen as undermined by the particularism of kinship-
based ideological localism. The Arabs are thus on the one side too 
particularistic, and on the other side not particularistic enough. 
This represents continuity from Orientalist to neo-Orientalist 
though, whereby Middle Eastern society is seen as either too 
weak or…too strong.100 
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Neo-Orientalism, as a body of discourse produced by academics, journalists as 
well as policymaking, has adopted the normative and ideological assumptions of 
traditional Orientalism. The only difference is that Orientalism existed in mostly a 
colonial context whereas neo-Orientalism is a new version that is suited to postcolonial 
hegemony. In bother, however, the power relations work in favour of the hegemonic 
establishments of power in many Western countries such as the US, Britain and France. 
The post-Cold War and post 9/11 eras have contributed to further defining of the 
scholarly tropes of neo-orientalism. Three interconnected themes are at the heart of neo-
Orientalism. This is true especially in relation to Islam, in general, and political Islam, 
in particular. The three interconnected themes form a common thread that defines the 
traditional bias that Islam is characterised by fixity, immunity to history as a living 
human experience, and by aversion to change. These three themes are the following: the 
‘other’, modernity and the West, and violence. 
Neo-Orientalism is no less potent than Orientalism. Today its discourses make 
up a powerful forum, itself maintained by the experts’ thinking, opinions, views and 
language vocabulary of ‘expert’ views and opinions. These along with the structures of 
power that maintain them, contribute to the cultural construction of the oppositions and 
binary knowledge that locates ‘the same’ and ‘the other’ as mutually exclusive and 
incompatible. Expert opinions in the form of articles, books and, for instance, opinion 
and testimony at US congressional hearings point to the structures of power that make 
possible the production of misrepresentations of the ‘other’ and ‘mythical’ knowledge, 
as Said has discovered in his original work.  Neo-Orientalism is an example of what 
Said refers to as summational statements.
101
 The neo-Orientalists package their biased 
knowledge as summational statements, statements of authority of knowledge that the 
expert constructs about the ‘other’. For instance, in the post 9/11 era, security has 
become influential through a brand of knowledge that more or less ‘demonises’ Islam 
and those who organize politically on the basis of Islamic platforms.  Indeed, the 
security agenda, which now has reached academia, and writings on Islam are partly 
influenced by policy-makers and statesmen so fixated  on political violence and 
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terrorism.
102
 The adjectives Wahhabi’, ‘radical’, or ‘fundamentalist’ are all bandied 
about in order to reinforce and propagate the bias that Islam is a dangerous religion.  
The construction of ‘the other’, often as a fanatical ‘jihadi’ collapses into a 
world where the ‘other’ lives within the immediate confines of ‘the same’.103 Neo-
Orientalist discourses tend to produce miseprentaions the alleged disingenuousness of 
Muslims residing in the West and Islamists in the Muslim world as anti-democratic. 
Dictatorial secular regimes, who deploy ruthlessly the repressive instruments of the 
modern state to ban political and civil liberties and stifle frank debates in Arab and 
Muslim societies. The ‘securitisation of the assumed threat of political Islam seeks to 
identify systematically not terrorism as such but the existence of Muslims with explicit 
religiously informed political views. Daniel Pipes, whom Sadowski considers an 
example of neo-Orientalists,
104
 questions Muslims’ failure to develop moderate 
attidues.
105
 According to his brand of discourse and arguments advanced by other neo-
Orientalists the Islamic threat may not be confined to the use of violence. Additionally, 
the threat is constructed as equally emanating from the absence of western values in 
Muslim societies, and ‘Islamisation’ of western societies. This is one reason why after 
9/11 there have been strong calls for the ban of religious schools and religious education 
in the Arab and Muslim worlds. 
 
2.2.1 Between Orientalism & Occidentalism 
Occidentalism was identified by James Carrier as the alternative discourse to 
Orientalism.
106
 Sadiki writes that ‘he who orientalise must occidentalise.’107  It is the so-
called ‘other half’ of this dualistic discourse. Like Orientalism, Occidentallism is a 
language of essentialism. Just as the Occident constructs the Orient, today the Orient 
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has the means, mainly though blogs, the Internet, mosque sermons, satellite TV all over 
the Middle East, to make its own constructs of the ‘West’.  Carrier identifies two 
alternative interpretations of the concept of Occidentalism: Firstly, not as a term of 
concrete reference but as a discourse, which involves criticism of the ‘West’. Secondly, 
a reference to discourse by non-Westerners developing a self image in contrast to the 
‘idealised’ West. In reality, the discourse of Occidentalism has only begun to emerge in 
the last 20 years and this may account for its lack of true definition.  Sadiki summarises 
Occidentalism by stating that it is a response to ‘the monolithic West, desegregated 
Westerners and selected ideas about Western modernity and culture.’108 
Whilst Said’s seminal book was the first to go a long way in deconstructing the 
power discourses in the ‘West.’ According to Said, these discourses seek to understand 
Arabs and Muslims though generalization and reductionism, as I have stated above. 
They assume the Arab Muslim worlds to be monolithic and static. However, Said’s 
discourse is incomplete. It has failed to identify discourses of Orientalism in reverse 
produced by the ‘Orient’ about the ‘Occident.’ In these discourses in reverse Arabs and 
Muslims make the same errors typical of Orientalism. In these Occidentalist discourses 
one finds representations of ‘otherness’, in this instance ‘Western’, which lumps the 
‘West’ and ‘Westerners’ together as well as sum up relations with the ‘West’ by 
reference to colonialism and hegemony. Sadiki’s writing on the nexus between 
Orientalism and Occidentalism addresses what Said misses out in Orientalism.
109
 Sadiki 
aims to highlight what many practitioners have labeled a type of ‘Orientalism in 
reverse.’110 In the same manner that Said deconstructs the Occident and Occidentals’ 
self-imagining as facilitated through construcs of Orient and Orientals’ ‘otherness’, 
Sadiki shows that the East is equally guilty of constructing Western ‘otherness’ for 
purposes of self-imaging. Thus he highlights how various Islamist discourses, for 
instance, utilize their own stereotypes and representations of the Occident in order to 
assert visions of identity (in opposition to the Western ‘other’) and selfhood often built 
on ideas of piety, immaterialism, and moralism. Sadiki notes that there are basically two 
types of Occidentalist discourses. An earlier wave of Occidentalist writing, produced 
within a colonial context, views the ‘West’ through a negative set of eyeglasses. Sadiki 
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also suggests that a second school of Occidentalism idealized the ‘West’ and sought to 
emulate its achievements. This second school entertained a sense of amazement in the 
thinking of the Arab about Western otherness. However, the colonial past and 
experience have tended to prevail as a prism through which images and stereotypes of 
the ‘West’ are constructed. Given the staying power of this experience and past – the 
twin process of Western imposition of colonialism and then modernization – Islamist 
discourses have used Islam as a rigid and permanent marker of self-other difference. 
Thus Islam becomes a source of ideas and constructs that stress notions of self-
definition and selfhood differentiate between Orientals and Occidentals in the realm of 
social norms, morality, and political values. from western normative structures. Sadiki 
thus shows that in this Islamist discourse of self-other definitions, Western political 
systems, values, and normative structures become subject to criticism, negative 
deconstruction and rejection.  Western ideas about democracy, the nationalist political 
system, secular politics, and liberalism; amongst others, acquire negative associations 
all of which become linked to the colonial experience and Western value systems. 
Occidentalist discourses mimic Orientalist discourses. They use the same linguistic and 
epistemological tools, and their monopoly, typical of Orientalism to answer back at 
Orientalism as well as try to address the power asymmetry in the realm of propaganda, 
in which the West has enjoyed a clear advantage. What is certain, however, is that 
language and knowledge in the case of both Orientalism and Occidentalism have birthed 
stereotypes of otherness and self-other definitions. Thus these two opposed discourses 
reproduce each. The use of binary knowledge and dichotomies are central to the way 
both discourses make the existence of each other possible and durable. 
The criticism that I find relevant and troubling in this respect concerns the 
attempts made by Orientalists and Occidentalists, including theorists such as Said, to 
construct and deconstruct self-other images and accounts of otherness that may be based 
on selective interpretations. Moreover, the author or authorial agency must be accounted 
for in this context. Theorists like Said produce multi-layered interpretations of texts 
used for explaining Orientalism or Occidentalism. This may be inevitable since all texts 
involve levels of understanding and interpreting by the authors and the readers. 
Basically, all exercises of discourse analysis involve two levels of interpretation: 1/ the 
existing interpretation by the author which becomes 2/ the data to which readers or 
analysts add their own level of interpretation. Both levels of interpretation involve 
difference of context, experience and values. The common error of treating 
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interpretation as a starting point of evidence, rather than as a process needing to be 
continually interpreted according to changed contexts, risk creating knowledge built on 
the basis of binary and dichotomous foundations, which could reproduce the very ideas, 
ideologies and assumptions being challenged. The key challenge and this may prove 
difficult for a long time to come, especially in East-West relations post 9/11, is that the 
inquiry into understanding the ways in which Orientals and Occidentals construct 
reciprocal images and stereotypes may inevitably reproduce the fundamental 
ontological and epistemological differences assumed to be permanent fixtures of either 
the Occident or Orient. It is legitimate to inquire into the nature of all discourses of 
otherness, especially, when they contribute to misunderstanding or discrimination. 
However, the recourse to these exercises other than to clarify the nature of 
misunderstanding, injustice or unequal and hegemonic power relations may become part 
of the problem not the solution of how to redress the imbalance in East-West power 
relations. My aim from understanding the process of ‘Orientalization’ of the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia aims to highlight the degree to which KSA is misunderstood and mis-
represented in Western scholarship. It is a discussion that Said, amongst others, have 
ignored.  
Another criticism regards the monolithic treatment of the ‘West’ or the ‘East’. 
Neither is a homogenous bloc. This brings me to my own motivation in seeking to 
understand the discourses and counter-discourses of reform and moderation in KSA. By 
understanding the nature of these discourses and the elements of renewal and 
contestation in them, my aim is to contribute to de-mystification of the Kingdom. That 
is, like all societies, it may have puritanical or conservative forces. But this must be 
understood side by side with forces and discourses of reform and renewal. KSA is not a 
monolith. The study of some of the stereotypes in some discourses is necessary for the 
purpose of this exercise. The challenge for the entire community of Middle Eastern 
specialists and Islamists is not to buy into the Orient-Occident binary and to refuse 
naturalizing the assumption that there are always foundational differences between the 
East and the West. Orientalism itself is not all negative vis-à-vis the Orient and 
Orientals and it must not be assumed to be itself a monolithic body of scholarship. 
Moreover, Orientalists include both negative but also positive texts and discourses of 
the Orient and of Orientals.
111
 The world is not always structures according to 
                                                 
111
 H. Auclert, Les Femmes Arabes [Arab Women] (Paris: Société d’Editions Littéraires, 1990). 
55 
 
dichotomies and negative self-other definitions. My own attempt at clarifying how 
Saudi society is no different to other societies in its aspiration for moderation and 
reform and its diversity seeks to challenge the stereotype of KSA as a distinct society 
and polity – run by ‘mullahs’ and so called ‘radicals’. The discussion aims therefore not 
only refute foundational discourses built on highlighting the self-other contrast, as 
Bryan Turner thinks, but also as opening a dialogue between KSA and the Western 
world to which it is tied through a huge volume of trade and finance and important 
political and strategic alliances.. 
 
2.3 The ‘Orientalization’ of Saudi Arabia in Existing Scholarship 
For the purpose of this exercise in this section, I will refer to select texts. The 
impressions and constructs of Orientalists have for so long depicted images of the 
Orient. This underlines the importance of discourse – negatively and positively – in 
terms of shaping wider thinking and opinion about otherness.
112
 This process began 
with painting and then moved on from the arts to ethnography and the wider domain of 
the humanities and social sciences.
113
 These constructions of the Orient – Arabs or 
Islam in this case – have not always been inspired by good intentions. There are those 
who sought to study the Orient from the viewpoint of philology or linguistics. They 
have contributed a great deal of invaluable knowledge about key texts which Western 
readers cannot access in English or French. On the opposite side, the type of Orientalist 
texts that constructed images of Harem, backwardness or primitive cultures about the 
Arab and Muslim Worlds, have with the same discursive skill painted images of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Some of these images are given here as examples of how 
specific Orientalist thinking directed at KSA has worked for a long time. To go back to 
the opening quotes in this chapter, Turner’s idea of Orientalism as an expression of 
unequal power relations applies to KSA in the same fashion it did to other Orientalist 
practices in the past about Egypt, the Levant or India. Edward Said explains further the 
content of what he calls the construction of the predominantly British and French 
cultural enterprise that makes up Orientalism. This enterprise as Said describes it is 
symbolic of 
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…a project whose dimensions take in such disparate realms 
as the imagination itself, the whole of India and the Levant, 
the Biblical texts and the Biblical lands, the spice trade, 
colonial armies and a scholarly corpus, innumerable 
Oriental ‘experts’ and ‘hands’, an Oriental professorate, a 
complex array of ‘Oriental’ ideas (Oriental despotism, 
Oriental splendor, cruelty, sensuality), many Easter sects, 
philosophies, and wisdoms domesticated for local European 
use…114 
Said’s idea of ‘domestication’ of the Orient and its ideas and objects for 
European consumption, which is a statement about the unequal power relations, applies 
to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. ‘Domestication’ of the Kingdom is significant in that it 
is part of the geography of the ancient world and of monotheistic faiths. A great deal of 
the interest in Saudi Arabia and its society and polity are to an extent associations with 
Islam itself. The earliest examples of Orientalist depictions of the Kingdom were 
inspired by curious individuals who sought to learn all they could about Islam and the 
land in which Islam was revealed and then evolved under the guidance of the Prophet 
Muhammad and his companions into a global religion. In his book, In Pursuit of 
Arabia, Rashid Shaz has ably documented examples of early Orientalist depictions of 
Saudi Arabia.
115
 As Shaz himself puts it the work he produced was motivated by his 
intention to show the ongoing demonisation of Islam and the problems of ‘imagined 
history’. Imagined history is the ideas the ‘West’ produces about the ‘East’, and the 
‘East’ about the ‘West’. In relation to Arabia and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which 
occupies most of the vast geography of the Arabian Peninsula, Shaz echoes in a Saidian 
fashion how Arabia is ‘painted’ and constructed in discourse:  
A mythical Arabia with snake charmers and flying carpets, 
inhabited by a whole lot of strange people; the Muslim 
harem crowded with young damsels perfectly trained in 
‘Islamic style’ sex vagaries, was not a land fit to rule. The 
travelers who set for Arabia soon became eyes and ears to 
the Empire…in their depiction of the Arab or treatment of 
Islam if we find a marked condescending tone for Arabia it 
was simply because they were exploring the land with a 
pre-conceived mind.
116
  
The early depictions, some by sophisticated minds such as the most 
accomplished Orientalists, such as Richard F. Burton who was probably the first 
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Christian, and first Englishman, to enter the Holy sites of Islam in disguise fascinated 
the world. Burton’s 1855 book Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and 
Meccah has Orientalist depictions. Despite his high learning and endeavour to correct 
many misconceptions about Islam, Burton showed Orientalist inkling to learn about 
subjects that have for along time, and continue today, to stigmatize Islam as hostile to 
women and different from the West. He looked at Islam, harems, the slave trade. For 
instance, in his examination of the question of women, according to Shaz, Burton 
claims that “it was Christian influence on Islam which raised the status of woman in 
Muslim society. In his opinion, it was the Christian concept of the virgin mother which 
made the Arabs cite two examples of female perfection in Islam [Prophet Muhammad’s 
first wife khadijah, and the Prophet’s daughter Fatima].”117 W. G. Palgrave’s The 
Personal Narrative of a Year’s Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia is an 
example of the early Orientalist contempt towards Islam and society in the land where 
Islam first appeared, modern-day Saudi Arabia. Palgrave does not try to understand or 
accept the concept of an all-encompassing God in Islam or at least a son-less God. Shaz 
writes that the “Islamic concept of God as having no son, no companion or counselor 
leads the author [Palgrave] to conclude that this God is no less barren in Himself than 
for His creatures and His own barrenness and lone egoism being the cause of His 
indifferent and unregarding despotism around.” Palgrave goes further by stressing the 
despotic nature not only of the concept of God in Islam, but also the despotic and 
passive thinking of one of the great doctors of Islam, the Saudi reformist Ibn Abd Al-
Wahhab, particularly with regard to the reformer’s explanation of the keystone of 
Islamic thought, as Shaz writes, “there is no god but God”. Although Palgrave does not 
hide his respect to Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab’s analytic skill, he nonetheless finds him to 
carry the same thinking and attitude of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions in 
Hijaz: mainly in terms of passivity and autocracy. “…in this one sentence, ‘La ilah illa 
Allah’ [there is no god but God] , is summed up a system which for want or a better 
name, I may be permitted to call the Pantheism of Force, or of Act, thus exclusively 
assigned to God…”118 Palgrave states that in Islam “all is abridged in the autocratic will 
of the one great agent: ‘Sic Volo, sic jubeo, stet pro ratione voluntas’, which is 
equivalent to ‘Insha Allah’, a constantly recurring expression in the Coran.”119 This 
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premise of absoluteness in the Muslim God as well in the thinking of the learned 
scholars of Islam is carried through in themes of Arab and Muslim despotism as well as 
in the ideas of passive or weak Arab societies, such as in the heart of the land of Islam, 
Hijaz, around the city of Medina, and by extension the entire Muslin and Arab worlds, 
in both old and contemporary Orientalism. In other words, passivity and despotism are 
ingrained in Islam and the Holy book of Islam.  
Charles M. Doughty’s depiction of Islam and life of families in what is today 
Saudi Arabia is no less Orientalist. In his travels throughout the country, Doughty 
adopts the alias Khalil. Two components seem to feature a great deal in Doughty’s 
Orientalist account: the irrationality of Islam and Muslims and violent and ignorant 
ways of Arabs. In reference to his company of an Arabian merchant, Doughty writes 
“we chat cheerfully; but such at the Arabs’ dish would be very inept and unreasonable 
behavior! – he were not a man but an homicide, who is not speechless in that short 
battle of the teeth for a day’s life of the body…”120 In Similarly, Doughty’s visit to the 
chief or Shaykh of the Bessam family in Aneyza (in central Saudi Arabia) results in 
more generalization and reductionism not to mention condescending description of his 
Arab hosts and of their faith: “for the…virtues that were in him…cannot amend our 
opinion of the Arabian man’s barbaric ignorance, his slight and murderous cruelty…or 
sweeten our contempt of an hysterical prophetism and polygamous living…Sword is the 
key to their imagined paradise…The Arabian religion of the sword must be tempered by 
the sword: and were the daughters of Mecca and Medina led captive, the Muslemin 
[Muslims] should become as Jews!.”121 The Reverend George Bush, 1796-1859 (related 
to the Bush family in the US), harbours similar contempt to Islam in one of the earliest 
books written by an American theologian on Islam.
122
 Referring to the story of the 
Prophet Muhammad’s night-journey to Jerusalem, the Reverend expresses skepticism in 
the fashion of many Orientalists, i.e. through contempt or in a condescending tone. The 
problem is not expressing skepticism per say as much as expressing assuming Islam to 
be no more than a set of made-up stories by a delusional prophet – almost a “system” 
copied from previous religions not a divinely revealed religion:  
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It is by no means improbable that Mohammed had a farther 
design in forging his extravagant tale than merely to 
astonish his adherents by the relation of miraculous 
adventure. The attentive observer of the distinguishing traits 
of Islamism will not fail to discover innumerable points of 
resemblance between that system and the divinely revealed 
religion of the Jews; and it appears to have been an object 
studiously aimed at by the race…123 
The instances of early Orientalist accounts from travelogues of known 
Westerners, who went to the lands of modern-day Saudi Arabia long before it was open 
to Christians and non-Muslims, collectively sum up the kind of generalizing and 
reductionistic thinking that motivated Said to write a work on Orientalism as a discourse 
of otherness.  Saudi historian Muhammad Al-Buqa‘i who had occasion to revise the 
work by French Orientalist Louis Alexandre de Corancez sums up the attitude of 
Orientalists focusing on Saudi Arabia and in particular its reformer and founder of the 
Wahhabi doctrine, Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. He observes that their 
tendency to generalize or engage in reductionism stems mostly from inability to 
neutralize their bias against Islam. Seeing Saudi Arabia through the prism of a religion 
that Orientalists either misunderstand or hold in contempt makes the non-rigorous 
scholar extend these sentiments to the subject of his study, Saudi society and culture, for 
instance. With regard to the work by de Corancez, Al-Buqa‘i finds his account of 
Wahhabism to be based on hearsay and secondary sources, making it replete with 
inaccuracies, mistakes and bias.
124
  
The Orientalist endeavour to understand Islam and the status of religion 
sometimes led to less than the required level of appreciation of religious diversity in 
KSA. Examples of this common Orientalist flaw exist in several texts. Diversity is 
somehow treated as an ingredient alien to Saudi society and culture. Russian Historian 
Alexei Vassiliev comes to mind as a very good illustration of this point.
125
 In his well-
known work, which has been translated into several languages, including Arabic, The 
History of Saudi Arabia, Vassiliev, in my view, did not skillfully interpret the presence 
of another brand of Islam other than the official puritanical Hanbali-derived Wahhabi 
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creed. Establishment Islam or the centre’s version of Islam has not entirely oppressed or 
eliminated what one may call ‘non-puritanical’ practices or ‘folk’/popular Islam 
(according to Ernest Gellner). The assumption that the historian or the anthropologist 
should find no diversity in KSA or only a single and fixed Wahhabi creed is the most 
commonplace of Orientalism practiced by all kind of Saudi-ologists, in my view. 
Vassiliev is a brilliant historian and manifests deep understanding of Saudi history, and 
this is shown very well in his description, of the early difficult statist gestation from the 
mid-1800s to the early nineteenth century and Egyptian and foreign intervention that 
prevented the emergence of the state. But in the anthropological and cultural sphere I 
fear that his grasp is less powerful. He fails to appreciate that the presence of diverse 
religious practices representative of folk or popular Islam were commonplace in the 
entire Muslim world, and not specific to KSA. Plus, even the powerful reformist 
Wahhabi movement of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries was not capable of eliminating less 
puritanical religious practices that may not adhere strictly to the letter of Islam. In the 
Wahhabi creed, these are considered heretical practices (bid‘ah) and they include use of 
magic, worship of saints or rituals practiced in front of tombs of holy individuals or 
relatives. Vassiliev’s somewhat odd assumption, by a Russian and Westerner, that these 
practices are alien to Wahhabism and that Wahhabism emerged to eliminate these less 
than puritanical forms of folk Islam is a mono-dimensional view of the rise of 
Wahhabism. The thesis that Wahhabism’s evolution was solely determined by the crisis 
of religion
126
 or its pollution fails to consider more complex socio-economic and 
political dynamics. There are two reasons why I believe Vassiliev’s analysis is in my 
view flawed. The first is that it adopts unintentionally the official version of history, 
which views the pollution of Islam as the key drive that led to the rise of Wahhabism. 
The second reason is that Vassiliev’s explanation somehow demotes the agency of the 
key historical figures and forces that created the Saudi state. So there are issues that 
relate to structure and matters that relate to agency that Vassiliev misses out in his 
fascinating historical chronicles of the birth of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
I think there are two common Orientalist tendencies, namely the use of religion 
and of tribe. These two ingredients, I claim, are instrumental in the ‘Orientalisation’ of 
KSA, leading to a great deal of mystification about Saudi society, culture and polity. In 
my view, and in contrast to Vassiliev, Christine Helms demonstrates a more 
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sophisticated understanding of Saudi society and culture, especially in relation to 
tribalism and even religion. In doing so, Helms shows appreciation of Saudi diversity, 
and how tribalism is not a raw cultural or sociological material that always functions in 
a single way. In other words, to refer to the common Orientalist tendency to generalize, 
tribalism must not be treated as a monolith. It can be diverse, inventive, pragmatic and 
even industrious, both politically and economically. In her authoritative study of the 
internal dynamics of decentralization from a geographical perspective, Helms 
establishes a correlation between segmented forms of socio-economic and political 
organization systematically practiced by Saudi tribes and thus the presence of diverse 
non-centralized forms of organization in the hinterland.
127
 These patterns of authority 
based on segmentation and decentralization differ in urban centres where political and 
socio-economic organization tend towards acceptance of centralized power, authority 
and political organization. Historically, centralization of power has never been achieved 
easily in the Kingdom, and the taming of the diverse tribal segmented patterns of 
authority till this day is achieved through mechanisms of consensus, agreement and 
loyalty and not compulsion.  
The analytical approach used by Helms reminds one of the works by the great 
Arab Historian Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun whose work in Al-Muqaddimah illustrates 
profoundly the role of pragmatic and industrious tribalism and tribal solidarity in the 
making of medieval Muslim dynasties, often also implicating geography in the rise of 
hostility towards centralized political authority and preference of independent tribal 
self-governance.
128
 Helms is unique in my view in her appreciation of the combined 
ecological and geographical ingredients that, on the one hand, dictate against 
centralization of state power in KSA, and on the other, play a major role in the 
cultivation of pragmatic tribalism that thrives on autonomy and self-governance.
129
 The 
focus on the internal dynamics lading to the birth of the state in the book’s Part one is 
sophisticated in that Helms shows awareness of geographical and tribal diversity in 
Saudi Arabia. This sensitivity to and appreciation of diversity has guided Helms 
analysis in a unique way to show that the emergence of Saudi statism, political identity 
and political history cannot be put down to a few individuals or an oversimplification of 
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the Wahhabi reformist movement. The role of Muhammad  Ibn Saud and Shaykh 
Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab in the creation of the state did provide eventually the 
unifying institutions, ideology, and structures upon which KSA was founded. But even 
this unifying moment, and the historical twin birth of a centralized authority and a 
reformist ideology/movement did not stamp out diversity. In the Orientalist discourse, 
the absence of diversity amounts to a negation of the dynamics of socio-political and 
cultural renewal and dynamism. This is typical of the view social scientists tended to 
entertain when looking at non-Western societies. These are typically represented as 
static and monolithic. These assumptions summarize another tendency in the depiction 
of non-Western societies: aversion to change. Change and transformation are natural 
historical dynamics which happen according to contexts of time and space, and 
according to local resources. This aversion to change is a stigma pertinent to my own 
study. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for instance, is depicted as if it has not undergone 
any transformation, especially in the religious and political sphere. My inquiry into the 
diverse types of politico-religious discourse at one level aims to dispel this 
generalization. 
The sophisticated analysis by Helms and particularly her awareness of diversity 
goes against the general Orientalist take when it comes for instance to the treatment of 
tribalism. The work by Daryl Champion demonstrates a satisfactory understanding of 
the labyrinthine complex of the Saudi state, notion the interconnections between state 
and tribe, religion and politics, tribalism and economic development, and the various 
forces steering the state, including the royal house, the learned scholars of Islam or the 
‘ulama and the formidable forces of business and what Champion refers to “asabiyya 
capitalism.”130 Somewhat his use of tribalism, I argue, is less sophisticated than that 
described by Christine Helms. Champion gives a weak and dependent assessment of 
both religious and tribal forces. I believe the relationship between state and religion on 
the one hand and state and tribal forces is more complex than Champion describes them. 
The ‘ulama may be dependent on the state, becoming quasi employees of the state. 
However, the relationship is not without a measure of dependence by the state on the 
religious establishment. This relationship will be further described in my third chapter. 
The same applies to the forces of tribalism. Indeed, Abd Al-Aziz Ibn Saud knew with a 
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combination of political skill, force and negotiation how to tame the tribes and direct 
their loyalty towards the centre. But at no stage have tribal forces, mainly those living 
outside settled urban centres and zones of state control, been fully subjected to the 
centre or made fully dependent on the state. They willingly give loyalty to the state, its 
institutions and through the institution of allegiance (or bay ‘ah) to the king of the day. 
Again, tribal forces are part of the fabric of Saudi polity, society and culture and it is 
very difficult to actually separate them totally from the rise of the state or its 
institutions. The royal house itself has tribal roots; the National Guard, amongst others, 
has a tribal dimension; and so does the religious establishment. Treating tribalism as a 
force on its own as if the rest of Saudi institutions, structures and agents are separated 
from it is misleading. Champion shows grasp of this factor in the creation and 
consolidation of state authority and power. But he contradicts himself. He considers the 
completion of statism over tow periods in the 1930s and 1950s spelled danger 
respectively for the Najdi tribal forces (around the central region and Riyadh the seat of 
power) and later for the Hijazi tribal forces. He refers to what he calls the ‘Najdization’ 
of the state, suggesting the Hijazi sophisticated mercantile classes were disposed of in 
the new state. Yet he still recognizes the importance “of the more cosmopolitan, 
sophisticated and technically experienced Hijazis” in the building of a modern economy 
as well as in the process of bureaucratization of the newly founded national Saudi 
state.
131
  
I think the Najd-Hijaz dichotomy suits the Orientalist formula of binary modes 
of thinking which produces oversimplifications, either in the form of generalization or 
reductionism. Both the Hijaz and the Najd are integrated into the state and the evolution 
of the state, each region, however, according to the skills and strengths it possesses and 
is able to contribute to nation and state-building. So I reject this dichotomy as over-
exaggerated by many Orientalists. I view them more as part of the diverse fabric of 
Saudi society, and as such they are both enriching. In this regard, I believe the ability of 
tribalism, religion and modern state institutions and apparatuses to blend coherently and 
integrate into a sophisticated global political and economic actor attests to Saudi 
political inventiveness, and this has left a wider mark on the socio-political 
primogeniture of the Arab Gulf. Where Champion in my view lapses into Orientalism is 
when he uses the term “asabiyya capitalism.” Champion defines this to be the total of 
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corrupt transactions built on the basis of middle-men, patronage practices, and 
nepotistic relations and association with the royal house. For instance, he writes that 
“Najdi domination of Saudi state institutions through the favouring of kin and 
clients…sheds light on the decline and rise, demise and establishment, of individuals, 
groups, social classes and patron-client networks as the Saudi state and political 
economy developed, modernized and changed…”132 In another instance, he adds to 
explain more this concept, connecting it to the oil-based economy of the Kingdom. 
“Bureaucratic favouritism based mainly on kinship and the wasta mechanism [this 
means intermediary to people of wealth and power] fuelled the rise of the new business 
class…Thus the negotiating of all manner of bureaucratic procedures, such as obtaining 
various licenses and permits an registering lucrative agencies, were smoothed over the 
favoured.”133 The practices Champion describes do exist in varying degrees in most 
societies. They are not specifically Saudi. Said Aburish documents them at length in his 
known work Rise, Corruption, and Coming Fall of the House of Saud.
134
  
My personal worry as a native Saudi and a research scholar is that I find the use 
of such a composite concept, literally meaning tribal-solidarity-capitalism, to serve only 
two purposes: oversimplification and stigmatization. We all read about cronyism and 
instances of vast and corruption in the capitalist world. What one ought to defend is not 
Saudi nepotism and patronage practices. But what one feels compelled to question is the 
inherent Orientalist content of the concept. In my view, Maxine Rodinson’s response to 
Max Weber in relation to the latter’s assumption about the inability of religions like 
Islam to develop capitalism, for lack of ability to master rational calculation, applies 
here.
135
 The Protestant Ethic type theses have been sufficiently questioned and 
Champion’s concept obliquely hints at the absence of law and order or rationality in 
tribal capitalism. Moreover, some of the Saudi sources could have provided additional 
material in terms of understanding the intricacies and complexities of the inner working 
of the Saudi system. In particular, one of the rare authoritative and credible books on 
political science by a Saudi, Faisal bin Mish‘al bin Abd al-Aziz, would have been a 
good source for Dr Champion and it would have supplemented his work with more 
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balance. The author rightly argues that the prevalence of religion in the Saudi political 
system does not only function for the sole purpose of legitimation. It also, and perhaps 
this is the dimension Western Orientalists tend to miss out, is that Islam is genuinely 
considered as an organic ethical system providing for consultative and juridical 
mechanisms for accountable and “contractual rule”.136 In other words, the failure of the 
government in Saudi Arabia Islam must not be blamed on Islam. Rather, these flaws 
must be attributed to the governors who fail to institutionalize and implement Islamic 
ethics and practices.     
In the next section, I look at the association of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
with jihad (holy war), mostly after the terror attacks of 9/11. 
 
2.3.1 Orientalism and the Template of Jihad 
In the section above, I tried to look at examples of Orientalization focusing on 
Western sources. Here I try to focus on what Said calls ‘Oriental Orientalists’, Middle 
Easterners who engage in their own forms of Orientalization about Arabs and Muslims, 
not always with bad intentions of course. The 9/11 terrorist attacks continue to feed the 
Orientalist repertoire not only directed at the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but also most of 
the Muslim world. Naturally, there is a reason for this. The activities of Al-Qaida seem 
to be largely concentrated in Muslim territories. But the lion’s share of the focus has 
been on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Tim Niblock’s considers Al-Qaida part of the 
Islamist opposition led by Osama bin Laden.
137
 Niblock covers very well the negative 
impact of these events on KSA. He observes that since 15 of the 19 perpetrators of the 
terrorist attacks were Saudi, it was logical for the backlash to be mostly directed against 
the Kingdom. The backlash was both from within the public as well as within the state 
and affiliated institutions, and think-tanks. The neo-conservatives who acted as the 
ideological partners of George W. Bush’s Administration did more than criticism of the 
Kingdom
138. For instance, Niblock writes “Key elements of Saudi Arabia’s political and 
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economic system were censured. The educational system was criticized for installing in 
Saudis prejudicial attitudes towards Jews and Christians. It was also blamed for 
graduating large numbers of students with religious qualifications, who were 
unemployable within the economy and provided recruits for Islamist radicalism.”139 
These events and the focus on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia set the tone for the rise, in 
my view, of a new wave of anti-Muslim Orientalism, in this case targeting Saudi society 
and culture. The obsession with Wahhabism, jihad and Jihadists all of which are in 
some way or another are linked to Osam bin Laden or Al-Qaida, rightly or wrongly. But 
the consequence of this new wave of jihad-focused Orientalism is as dangerous if not 
more in deepening misunderstanding and generalizing the jihadi or jihadist stigma, 
making the entire Saudi population the target of denigration and reductionistic 
depictions. What Niblock mentions in the above quote about the graduates of the 
Islamic schools providing the soldiers of terrorism or Al-Qaida is widely held to be true 
in many Western and non-Western policy-making circles and academic centres and 
think-tanks. What is dangerous in this is that this misconception is wide enough even 
amongst Arabs and Muslims. Orientalist generalization and reductionism is dangerous 
for treating jihad out of context, truning what was once a venerable and legitimate 
religious and cultural institution into a war-like attitude that is widespread amongst 
Saudis.
140
 I would like to note here the absence of an important distinction in Orientalist 
uses of the terms ‘jihad’ and ‘jihadi’. That distinction regards the difference between 
the Qur’anic terms ‘jihad’ and ‘qital’. The former is general and is not exclusively 
concerned with use of force. The latter specifically refers to fighting and takes place, 
according to the Qur’an, only when it is obligated as a form of self-defence 
necessitating use of force. My use of the term jihad in this thesis accounts for this 
important distinction and does not reflect non-nuanced use as in Orientalist writings.
141
 
Dominique Sourdel’s well know work Medieval Islam, translated by the brilliant 
Orientalist J. Montgemery Watt, gives an understanding to jihad that is grounded in the 
original Arabian context of Hijaz, before and after the arrival of Islam. Sourdel explains 
that Islam set out to establish brotherhood amongst the community of believers, thus 
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dropping clan and class distinctions, and to eradicate materialism and fatalism.
142
 
However, whilst Islam sought to get rid of features of Arabian society and culture such 
as these, it also accommodated others by institutionalizing them within legal and ethical 
framework provided by the new religion. Jihad was one of these areas accommodated 
by Islam, converting it from a disorderly and violent nomadic practice called razzia (the 
Bedouin raids) into an institution for defending and spreading Islam.
143
 By contrast, the 
jihad practiced by Al-Qaida or constructed by Orientalists looks nothing like what Islam 
initially preached, and may not even qualify as jihad, which requires legal, ethical and 
political justification and is not a disorderly mechanism of attack, but rather a self-
defense mechanism in times of war to be used solely against aggressors.   
Perhaps two of the most known names working on KSA and, between them, 
having probably the most profound and sophisticated knowledge of Saudi society and 
polity are Mai Yamani and Madawi Al-Rasheed, both of Saudi origin, have contributed 
to clarification of the place of violence in KSA.
144
 The latter in particular investigates 
the idea of jihad as pertinent to Saudi society. In my view, this amounts to 
stigmatization of KSA, a country which has an element of violence, crime and 
politically motivated violence associated with activists belonging to Al-Qaida. 
However, to make jihad a fixture or feature of Saudi society, polity and culture in 
systematic research smacks with Orientalism. It commits the sins of generalization and 
reductionism. The fact of matter is that jihad, first and foremost, is an Islamic institution 
and not a Saudi one. Secondly, to generalize jihad as if it is a Saudi trait is to confuse 
discursive constructs with ‘reality’. Whatever the ‘reality’ of Saudi culture and society 
may be, jihad is not intrinsic to them. Having now clarified my position on the issue and 
the specific criticism |I level at the work by Yamani and Rasheed, I move now to look at 
their work in relation to this issue.  
Mai Yamani, in my view, introduces a very useful framework which I call 
pluralist. Yamani distinguishes between three trends or currents of thought within the 
politico-religious spectrum. These trends are useful for the following reasons: firstly, 
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the show plurality and diversity, and thus refute Orientalist theses that treat KSA as a 
monolith. This approach, which she explores through an anthropological approach, is 
quite solid and rewarding in that she draws conclusions from interviews and 
anthropological inquiries carried out with youth. It is on this basis that she comes up 
with her division of discourse or activism along three strands: ‘liberal modernists’, 
‘traditionalists’ or ‘conservative salafis’, and the ‘radicals’.145 The liberal modernists 
oppose the state to impose its version of religion and religious interpretations on them. 
Basically, according to this view personal choice should matter in the realm of religion, 
which should be privatized. This is the closest one comes to separation of religion and 
politics. What she calls the ‘traditionalists’, which she adds that they consider 
themselves to be conservative. These are voices that seek to resist any type of change 
that threatens identity and religion. They must not be mistaken for opposing all change. 
For instance, they are consumers of the goods of modernity such the Internet, etc. For 
them change should be compatible with religion and never in contradiction to it. 
Therefore change that contradicts with religion should be forbidden. In one sense, 
stability is an important value and so is tradition and religion-based tradition, which are 
important for Saudi identity. Like the ‘traditionalists’, Yamani adds, the radicals seem 
to blame the state for the state of religious degeneration in the Kingdom. They use the 
products of modernity such as university education and globalization to spread their 
messages, and organize for the purpose of erasing all Western elements that are seen to 
pollute Saudi society, Yamani observes. They are prepared to put a fight for Islam 
peacefully but also violently. Yamani is right in pointing out the overlap in the values 
held high by these three strands in that they all value Islam. The difference is how they 
go about implementing Islam and living as Muslims. The radicals are opposed to the 
West and may be inclined to use violence. The label ‘radicals’ used by Yamani is 
shorthand in most Orientalist scholarship for ‘terrorist’ or someone who is in favour of 
the so-called ‘jihad’. The three strands more or less mirror divisions of ideas within 
Saudi society but they are nonetheless inspired by Western political language and 
values, and the dichotomy between traditionalists and modernists is an Orientalist 
construct. 
Al-Rasheed’s book is fixated on ‘jihad’ and ‘jihadis’, typically echoing 
Orientalist bias. “In the twenty-first century, Saudi society is struggling over religious 
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interpretation…” Thus she opens up chapter four called “the struggling in the way of 
God at home: the politics and poetics of jihad.”146 She adds that contest of religious 
interpretations which defines the battle lines between “Sahwi sheikhs, Jihadis, and 
laymen” does not preclude violence.147 Madawi explains the context of the 1980s and 
1990s as the moment of Jihadist resurgence, including from within prisons when most 
of the leaders and shaykhs of the jihadi movement were interned by the Saudi state.
148
 
Regardless of the globalizing trends that make religious dogma travel afar and un-
policed, Madawi is of the view that what she calls “Saudi Jihadis” have been able to 
make use of locally produced jihadi knowledge and religious interpretations justifying 
jihad. “…regardless of whether the inspiration for, or even the orders to engage in, 
violence come from outside – for example al-Qaida or other global Jihadi movements – 
it is certain that there is a strong local dimension to the jihadi trend.”149 Madawi is here 
describing what amounts to an explosion of ‘jihadi’ practices not only in terms of 
practical execution, but also of intellectual explosion of the ideational underpinnings 
and structures of ‘jihad.’ It is not clear and she has not made it clear at all why she calls 
these practices by the label ‘jihad’, a misnomer that is widely misused mainly by 
Orientalists of the ilk of Daniel Pipes, amongst others. She insists on the Saudi-zation of 
jihadi thought and practice:  
Religious theoreticians of jihad (for example, some ‘ulama), 
interpreters (Islamist intellectuals) and those who carry out 
violent acts such as suicide bombers and other young 
militants are all Saudis, with the exception of a handful of 
activists who belong to other Arab countries…To attribute 
the outbreak of violence in Saudi Arabia in the twenty-first 
century to outside agents such as global terror movement is 
to miss the fact that this violence has its own local religious 
codes, meanings, politics, and poetics which resonate in 
some Saudi circles.
150
 
Madawi’s work resonates with these claims about the prevalence of violence in 
Saudi society without actually giving any other supporting evidence that look at the 
political economy or socio-economic variables, such as poverty and unemployment, 
which have led to the deterioration in living standards and loss of self-respect. Madawi 
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is engaging in a very important discussion about the rise of violence justified on 
religious interpreting of the texts of Islam. She makes no attempt to look at the other 
side of religion which opposes the rise of religion-based violence. In failing to do that, 
Madawi does not present her readers with nuanced analysis of the situation she 
describes about ‘jihad’. I think the text she produces is very analytical and legitimate in 
terms of inquiry, but it advances assumptions that generalize about the source of 
violence and about Saudis as if jihad is more or less a Saudi fixture, as I explained 
above. Yamani, in my view, is more successful in that her approach is more nuanced 
and provides the reader with a more complex picture than the oversimplified account 
given by Madawi. Both suffer from Orientalist assumptions either in terms of 
dichotomies (.i.e Yamani) or generalization and reductionism (i.e. Madawi). 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
Orientalist constructs and construction of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia typically 
focus on standard elements such as tribalism, religion and more recently after 9/11 
notions of Saudi jihad and jihadis. I have argued that like the old Orientalism, new 
forms of Orientalist knowledge tends to generalize and engage in reductionistic 
description of Saudi society. The latest stigma renders a worrying picture that makes the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia almost a ‘factory’ of ‘jihad’ and of ‘jihadis’. What is still 
missing in contemporary scholarship on Saudi Arabia is sophisticated accounts that 
account for the rise of reform and moderation to counter against the Orientalist claim 
that Saudi society is ridden with religious dogmatism and religion-based violence. This 
is attributed either against Islam or against the Wahhabi movement, which was 
originally intended to be a doctrine intended to maximize piety and Godly notion of the 
‘good’ or what is known in Islam as ma’ruf. In the third chapter, I shall look at the 
nexus of religion and politics in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the central tenets of 
the Wahhabi doctrine. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE IMPACT OF WAHHABISM ON RELIGION AND POLITICS & 
POLITICIZATION IN SAUDI ARABIA 
 
Together they [Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
Muhammad Ibn Saud] forged an irrevocable alliance. 
Muhammad Ibn Saud pledged himself and his family to 
uphold and spread the Wahhabi persuasion of Islam. In 
return, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab promised his dominion. The 
sword and the political power that went with it would be the 
realm of Muhammad Ibn Saud and his descendants. The 
Book (the Qur’an) and the accompanying religious, moral, 
and educational authority would the domain of Shaikh 
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the Al-Shaikh, as his 
descendants came to be known. Each would be supreme but 
not absolute in its own sphere of authority, because each 
retained substantive checks on the authority of the 
other...Today more than centuries later, this alliance 
remains the key stone of governance in the Kingdom.151  
...the Wahhabiyya [Wahhabism] brought the notion of the 
state to replace that of the tribe as the unifying force for the 
society. That process has been in operation for a long time, 
indicating that the Wahhabiyya was not an immediate or a 
coincidental response to the moment. Nor in this sense was 
the movement [only] a reaction to a phenomenon of shirk 
[polytheism] or a replay of the old nomadic and tribal game. 
On the contrary, it continued the state formation process, 
giving it a new direction, and as such was a new force 
ushering in a new political era in the history of Arabia. By 
launching the notion of a central state, the appearance of the 
Wahhabi movement marked the beginning of the modern 
history of Arabia.
152
 
 
3.1 Aims of the Analysis 
This chapter concludes Part I of my thesis. I have up to now argued that there is 
a great deal of Orientalism surrounding the ‘construction’ of the Kingdom of Saudi 
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Arabia. A very good example of the Orientalist constructions that continue to prevail 
about the Kingdom is the misunderstanding surrounding the relationship of religion and 
politics. After 9/11, jihad (holy war) is associated with the Kingdom, and very few have 
tried to look at the link of al-Qaida with the Kingdom and its Wahhabi doctrine 
critically.
153
 The Kingdom’s relations with even its most strategic partners, such as the 
US, have been called into question.
154
 Others tended to propagate the view of a 
Kingdom ‘in crisis’.155 Others, in a typically alarmist tone, put it in terms of a ‘battle for 
Saudi Arabia’.156 The work of the Egyptian Scholar Khaled Abou El Fadl, which I will 
comment on in my examination of Wahhabi influence on reform and politics in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, provides some of the harshest critique of Wahhabism. He 
calls it ‘puritanism’, in a negative way, and blames it and the Kingdom on the violence 
against the West and other Muslims since 9/11.
157
 May be Abou El Fadl’s is partly 
correct in his comparison of the methodologies of the ‘puritans’ and ‘moderates’, which 
I will use in chapter 4.
158
 But on his account of the role of Wahhabism in propagating 
violence, he is subjective and even misleading.
159
 An understanding of this relationship 
is necessary for an overall contextualization of the emerging discourses between a 
variety of trends and currents. Some of these, as I have explained in chapter two, seem 
to be challenging the forces that tend to speak on behalf of religion. Other voices 
represent more or less continuity in the sense that they regard reform, nation and state-
building to make sense only within a religious framework. 
My analysis in this chapter deals with three specific questions: what is the 
historical background or origins of the Saudi State and how does religion intertwine 
with politics, with special reference to the impact on politics by the Wahhabi doctrine? 
The influence of the medieval Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiyya will be examined, 
particularly in relations to his thesis on political rule in relation to religion. Part of this 
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discussion examines processes of politicization as well as of the voices calling for either 
reform or challenge. What kind of ‘political culture’ has this politico-religious identity 
given to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia? How does this shaped dissent, in the pursuit of 
reform, in Saudi politics? As part of this discussion ‘advisory’ and radical forms of 
dissent are described. In the final section I reflect on the specificity of ‘reform’ is 
examined which will be divided in to ‘advisory’ and radical voices. The analytical task 
makes it vital to look at concepts such as ‘Wahhabism’, tawheed (Unity of God, 
monotheism) ‘salafism’, ‘taqleed’ (imitation), ‘tajdeed’ (religious renewal or 
innovation), da’wah (call for Islam), and sahwah (Islamic resurgence). I will start the 
analysis with a conceptual discussion   
 
3.2 A Conceptual Discussion: Wahhabism  
What I call here the ‘Wahhabi moment’ opens up the gates of innovation as far 
as the Arabian Peninsula’s history of jurisprudence and intellectual engagement with 
Islam are concerned. The year 1703/1704 when Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab was born carries significance not only in terms of the birth of the founder of the 
so-called today ‘Wahhabism’ or the ‘Wahhabi School’ of jurisprudence, but also for the 
eventual birth of the Saudi state, and, obviously, the role of religion in its founding. I 
shall use these terms despite reservations on this reductionistic terminology. It is 
reductionistic because it tends to suggest some kind of break with previous corpus of 
Islamic jurisprudence. ‘Wahhabism’ or the ‘Wahhabi School’, which are also terms 
widely used by Western Orientalists, does not in any way break with preceding Islamic 
jurisprudence.
160
 Moreover, the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab are an 
extension of the Hanbali School. Within Sunni orthodoxy, this school is associated with 
a literalist tradition in the practice of exegesis (tafseer). Regardless of whether this 
position is correct or incorrect, which is not the aim of the analysis here, Shaykh 
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703/1704-1792) remains an important figure in the 
historical Islamic current of renewal. In fact, it is not at all out of place of to claim that 
the movement often referred to as Islamic resurgence or awakening (sahwah in Arabic) 
was launched by the renewal and reformist ideas of Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab This reformist movement, which started in the first half of the 18
th
 century and 
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extending into the third millennium, must be partly credited with Shaykh Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab’s innovative ideas about what type of Islam the ummah, Islamic community, 
must adhere to and what type of practices and ideas must be avoided. I think that 
establishing this link between Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s renewal in the 18th century 
and the contemporary state of politico-religious affairs is significant for two reasons.  
Firstly, the movement of religious awakening and reform sparked by Shaykh Ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab’s thinking eventually translated into political reform, namely, the 
founding of the Saudi State. Secondly, that history and tradition of reform has not 
ceased at all. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the ‘constructions’ of Saudi Arabia 
post-9/11 cannot be separated from misunderstandings that the terrorist attacks on the 
US has fuelled for a decade now. These constructions tend to associate the acts of 
Osama bin Laden with the puritanical creed developed by Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. 
Al-Rasheed makes this claim when she notes the support given to Bin Laden by the 
Kingdom’s leading learned scholars such as Shaykh Ibn Baz.161 Al-Rasheed does this 
without caring to distinguish between the kind of support he was receiving even from 
the White House at the time in support of an occupied Mulsim State, Afghnaistan, by 
the Soviets. That support was not unconditional. It was not intended for all Bin Laden’s 
activities and in all contexts. What is forgotten that the origins of al-Qaida is partly 
American, during the presidency of Ronald Reagan when the Afghan Mujahideen and 
so-called Arab-Afghans were funded and supported by the US in their war against the 
former Soviet Union whilst occupying Afghanistan. Those who were keen on spreading 
the Shaykh’s reforms beyond the borders of the newly founded state were eventually 
constrained by the time of the centralisation of the Saudi State in the early 1900s, as I 
shall argue below. Plus, the ideas and teaching of Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab were 
intended to ‘purify’ Islam as both thought and practice from widespread heresy. To an 
extent, Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s original mission was purely religious – religious 
reform by a pious Muslim learned scholar (‘alim) from the Hanbali tradition of 
jurisprudence. The central objective was moral, educational, and concerned matters of 
correct practice of Islamic aqeedah (faith). Eventually, this extended to the real of 
politics. I think this extension of reform to the political sphere underlies the significance 
of Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s reformist movement as one that is holistic in nature. In 
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fact, it confirms the Muslim hardened adage of Islam being at once deen wa dawlah 
(religion and politics). This tendency to combine religion with politics is a Muslim 
practice that is not shared with the Western heritage of separation of the two under a 
model of secular politics. I will go back to this issue below. 
The awakening’ or sahwa opened up in the 18th century by Shaykh Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab’s innovative thinking aimed at rekindling the role of religion in the building of 
a an Islamic community able to undertake the Godly commands of enjoining the good, 
and preventing wrong-doing’ (al-amr bi al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy an al-munkar).162 For 
this purpose, the crux of Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s reform focused on the obligation 
to return and refer to the key sources of legislation in Islam or the foundational texts of 
religion: the Qur’an and hadith (the Tradition of the Prophet Muhammad). In initiating 
this trend to restore the place of the sacred text and the Tradition of the Prophet, as well 
as the example of the Prophet’s apostles, and the salaf (righteous forebears) of Islam, 
Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s key innovation was to promote Muslims in Najd, initially, 
and then the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, not so much to re-read these texts as much as 
simply read them as models worthy of imitation in all matters regarding Islam. So his 
innovation can be primarily equated with observing the texts of Islam with the aim of 
correcting deviations, which he saw as a source of social, moral, and, even political 
decay. The example of the Prophet whether in upholding marriage as social venerable 
institution or looking up to his example in the management of non-spiritual affairs is at 
the heart of the renewal called for by Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. His renewal, then, 
can be summed up in a rekindling of the institution of da’wah (call to the cause of 
Islam). This call is not so much about proselytisation to Islam, at a time and in a place 
where the entire community was already Muslim. The concept of da’wah has outlived 
Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s movement. It was eventually adopted by Hassan Al-
Banna, the founder of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. Using this concept, the 
Muslim Brotherhood has always had the ambition to spread its message of the ‘call to 
Islam’ beyond Egypt’s borders.  By contrast, the origins of da’wah in Shaykh Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab’s message was intended to reform the existing thinking and practice of Isalm 
prevalent then, and primarily within Najd and Hijaz (i.e. Saudi Arabia). Thus Shaykh 
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Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s movement can be considered a corrective movement coloured by 
the specificity of time (18
th
 century) and place (Najd initially and eventually Hijaz).  
Its significance also lies in it being a local movement completely untainted by 
outside forces or dynamics. Generally, the ‘cycles’ of decline and renewal, of decadence 
and reform in the Muslim world have historically been triggered by outside forces 
(rivalry with Christendom, the Crusades, invasions, etc.). In this case, the movement of 
reform attributed to Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is indigenous and, generally, is in 
response to local dynamics (e.g. ‘pollution’ of Islam by heretical practices). Commins 
notes two elements that made this localized trend of renewal strong. Firstly, if faced no 
‘doctrinal contamination’ from outside the Kingdom. It acted in a quasi isolationist 
paradigm of jurisprudence at a time when the only visitors to the Peninsula would be the 
short visitations by Muslim pilgrims. Secondly, Wahhabism, adds Commins, purged the 
‘old scholastic’ system of religious learning and jurisprudence, thus attaining full 
monopoly over the production of religious dogmas and canons, especially after many 
learned scholars left and sought refuge in neighbouring Ottoman Iraq.
163
 Shaykh Ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab’s movement enjoyed such monopoly for two additional reasons. Its 
renewal remained immune to Ottoman intervention. The same applied to European 
modernization. Indeed, it predated the influx of Westernisation and its impact, either in 
the form of direct ideological impact (colonialism, ideas of modernization such as 
parliaments, secularization) or in the form of technological impact (modernizing 
techniques, systems of development and associated technologies).  
As an early revivalist and a reformer, Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab may be said to 
be motivated by response to heretical practices and deviations from Islam, namely 
polytheism, within the Arabian Peninsula rather than response to outside ideas and 
Western innovations. Al-Dakhil challenges and refutes a proposition by Bernard Lewis 
that Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s renewal was in response to the “expansion of 
Chrsitendom.”164  This is why Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s reform must be viewed as 
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encompassing within it a religious drive for the sake of reforming fellow Muslims’ 
practices of Islam at a specific time and in a specific place. This makes Shaykh Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab’s reformist movement unique amongst revivalist movements that came after 
him (Al-Mahdiyyah, for instance). Generally, their sahwah or religious awakening was 
intended to counter or respond to the influx of invaders and ideas they brought with 
them. A good example was the ideas and the renewal introduced by Mohammed Abdu 
in Egypt years after Napoleon Bonaparte’s expedition there and the entry into Egypt of 
Westernising ideas and systems. For instance, Egypt’s Muhammad Abdu, like other 
revivalists who came after Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab initiated a radical rethinking of 
the tradition.
165
 By comparison, the reform undertaken by Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
did not. But it would confirm Orientalist constructions to associate Wahhabism with an 
absence of dynamism, as Commins rightly observes.
166
 Abdu, like other 19
th
 century 
religious reformers were motivated by the urgency to find answers the unfavourable 
state of Muslims and Muslims realms in comparison with European states, Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab was concerned with the internal decline of Islam, and not decline in relation to 
Europe. Abdu’s renewal promoted textual re-reading; Basically, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
renewal was about re-enacting the Prophetic path he viewed at that point of time to be 
impure and polluted by heretical practices (e.g. polytheistic types of Sufi practices that 
tended to believe in the intercession by saints).
167
  
The type of tajdeed or renewal
168
 adopted by Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab is characterized by a paradox. One the one hand, it is renewal but is not 
intended for the sake of innovation. Rather, it was kind of a process of ‘re-Islamization’. 
One the other hand, because it urges a return to the foundational texts of Islam it is not 
renewal in the sense of exegetical re-reading of the foundational texts. The substance of 
Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s renewal is a return to the Qur’an and the Tradition of the 
Prophet as a means to purification of existing forms of worship and moral behaviour not 
in line with the teaching of religion. His trend of Islamic renewal seeks a moral and not 
an exegetical intervention. It favours imitation (taqlid) in the sense of following the 
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righteous forebears of Islam and their exegetical canons, which revered the foundational 
texts. Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, in comparison with the trends of Islamic renewal that 
came after him may be considered a literalist and not a rationalist. This is primarily 
determined by the pious substance of the new trend of renewal brought about by Shaykh 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. He did not view and define the problem affecting the ummah 
during his time to be a problem with or within Islam or exegesis of Islam. He viewed 
and diagnosed the problem within the community of Muslims. It is therefore them that 
his reform primarily targeted. There is an agential dimension to this trend of renewal in 
that it threw the weight of reform back onto the public of learned scholars and the 
community of Muslims. The main interpretive innovation in this respect that Shaykh 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab introduced was the stress of the Unitarian substance of Islam. That 
is, he conceives of Islam as fundamentally a religion of tawheed, whereby monotheism 
or Unity of God is a given, the non-negotiable tenet of the Islamic faith. The context of 
18
th
 century Arabia is one where Sufi practices, misunderstood and ill-practised, led to 
what the learned Shaykh conceived of as a polluting agent. So here the agential 
dimension is displayed in the lead-role taken by Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in re-
teaching Islam as a religion of tawheed in which there is no place for polytheistic 
activities or deification of saints that he saw to be one of the flaws within Sufi Islam. 
Primarily, his intervention as a learned scholar aimed at re-tipping the balance back 
towards orthodoxy and literalist theology. A Sufi mysticism that takes Muslims away 
from the fundamental acts of faith was, in his estimation, harmful to a proper 
understanding and practice of religion. Saints were not entitled according to his 
Unitarian theology to any reverence or worship that undermined the Unity of God and 
as the sole divinity worthy of worship, reverence and authority. Thus Shaykh Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab’s new trend of thought and message of renewal is marked by two additional 
characteristics. Firstly, its agential zeal in that da‘wah was adopted as the strategy of 
reform in the initial stages followed by more active and even use of violence against 
polytheism, which qualified as forms of apostasy. Secondly, it was marked by clarity of 
purpose in that Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not only assert the primacy of the 
foundational texts, but also through his Unitarian exegetical trend of thought he had no 
doubt as to what formed true orthodoxy in points of faith (aqeeda) and religious 
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practice: exclusive worship of and belief in one God, and all ‘ibadat (forms of correct 
worship) that uphold and manifest such exclusivity of belief.
169
         
 
3.3 Religion and Politics & Ibn Taymiyyah’s Influence on the Wahhabi 
Doctrine 
Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab stands as the leading voice and agent of 
reform as far as the history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is concerned. His reform, 
which eventually, spilled over into politics when he joined forces with Al Saud clan, 
must be critically qualified. It was not intended to cover the political realm for the sake 
of politics but for the sake of founding a centralized order, religiously and politically. 
However, it did inevitably intertwine with politics. In the previous section I looked at 
the renewal undertaken by Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the concepts 
relevant to the Wahhabi doctrine. In the next section, and in order to understand the 
impact of Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, one must briefly consider at the influence left on 
him by Shayk al-Islam Taqiyy al-Din ibn Taymiyyah who is one of the leading Sunni & 
Hanbali jurists of the 13
th
 century. 
 
3.3.1 The Influence of Ibn Taymiyyah  
Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s purist reform preaches a return to the sacred texts 
of Islam. It is purist in tendency as well as juridical. No Saintly intercessions and other 
heresies should overshadow the primacy of the holy Qur’an and the example of the 
Prophet – the Sunnah nabawiyyah. In the formulation of the body of Godly laws that 
make up Shari‘ah Law, the sacred sources additionally require the example of the 
righteous forebears, or the salaf al-salih (one reason why Wahhabis are considered 
Salafis), and the ijtihad of the jurists.  Thus Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
system of jurisprudence, whilst is primarily reliant on the Qur’an, it accords the 
Prophetic exemplary practice and sayings a foundational status where Islamic law-
making is concerned. Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s purist accent and stress on Qur’an 
and hadith are derived from the eminent Sunni Hanbali jurist Taqiyy al-Din Ahmad ibn 
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Taymiyyah (1263-1328).
170
 Like him, Imam Ibn Abd al- Wahhab had some association 
with Sufism.  Like him, he eschewed his association with Sufism; and like him, he 
found Sufism to deviate from Islam through the status it accords to Saintly worship and 
belief in Saintly intercession. Hence his methodology placed stress on monotheism 
(tawheed) primarily through sole reliance on the Qur’an and the hadith. But as in the 
case of Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Ibn Taymiyyah does not separate 
between religion and politics. The focus of the following discussion will be on this 
aspect of his political thought. At least, four aspects of Ibn Taymiyyah must be 
summarized here as having impacted on the Wahhabi doctrine: a/ the task of 
purification of Islam from all additions, namely, from any influence by Greek 
philosophy, especially its tendency to promote agnostic thinking. Ibn Taymiyyah was a 
devout Muslim and someone who learnt the Qur’an at an early age. So his faith was 
strong and part of his jurisprudence is aimed at preserving and defending the Islamic 
faith and stressing its tawheedi content. So any ideas, from within or without Islam, that 
undermined the Unity of God or Tawheed were rejected by Ibn Taymiyyah. b/ 
opposition to Sufism on the basis of its pantheistic tendencies, especially regarding the 
question of incarnation (hulul) through which man become one with God, which he 
regarded to be confusing and even polytheistic. Ibn Taymiyyah’s response to some of 
the key figures of Sufism, such as Ibn Arabi, is indication of Ibn Taymiyyah’s objection 
to some aspects of Sufism. Ibn Taymiyyah himself had Sufi sympathies, namely toward 
Abd Al-Qadir Al-Jaylani. So the brand of Sufism he opposed was the one that preached 
the unison of God and man and passivity in life, which Ibn Taymiyyah regarded to be 
against the key teaching of the Qur’an and the Prophet’s teachings of involvement in the 
ummah’s affairs. c/ Ibn Taymiyyah revived the institutions of independent reasoning 
(ijtihad) through seeking knowledge directly from the key sources. This belief if 
independent reasoning caused him difficulty with political rulers acting on the jealous 
advice of Sunni scholars whose imitation of the legal heritage was exactly the opposite 
of what Ibn Taymiyyah championed. Ibn Taymiyyah was a free interpreter who did not 
fear thinking against the conventional wisdom of Sunni scholars opposed to ijtihad, 
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especially Ottoman-affiliated scholars. Shaykh Ibn Adb al-Wahhab inherited this 
tendency to disregard the texts of the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence, preferring 
new interpretations taken directly from the Qur’an and the hadith, that is, unpolluted. d/ 
Ibn Taymiyyah’s saw the role of the scholar or the jurist to be on the side of God’s law 
and against injustice and tyranny. He counselled resistance against both, tyrannical or 
unjust     local rulers and unjust invaders such as the Tatars against whom he called for 
holy war (jihad). This is one reason why justice was central to Ibn Taymiyyah’s 
political thought.
171
 
The key ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah’s political thought are found is his major work, 
Fi Al-Siyasah Al-Shar‘iyya fi Islah al-Ra‘i wa al-Ra‘iyya (On the Principles of Legal 
Government). Ann Lambton defines the key ideas that make up his political thought. 
Firstly, total commitment to Godly rule and the place of Islamic law or shari‘ah in any 
legitimate Islamic government.
172
 Lambton argues that association,
173
 political and 
religious, is central to Ibn Taymiyyah’s political project, which explores the question of 
rule.
174
 On the question of sovereignty, we can see the direct of influence of Ibn 
Taymiyyah on Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Sovereignty belongs to God.
175
 The 
primacy of the state and rule is non-negotiable for Ibn Taymiyyah: the state is a 
necessity. This is so to the point that even rule under unjust ruler is better than disorder 
or no rule at all.
176
 This is due to the influence of Islamic political theory, which has 
traditionally feared disorder and disintegration. Moreover, this tendency to prefer unjust 
rule to no rule, argues Lambton, is tied to the inseparability of religion and politics in 
Islam. Rule is to ensure faith is continuous and defensible. Here one finds another 
theme that binds Ibn Taymiyyah and Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Al-Dakhil argues that 
the Shaykh’s reform had a number of objectives: creating a central government as well 
as fighting against disintegration trends in the 18
th
 century in Arabia.
177
 Here the two 
elements of association and necessity of government can be seen to have influenced 
Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s own religio-political thought. Like Ibn Taymiyyah, God’s 
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sovereignty according to the shari‘ah shapes Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab’s political thought. 
Plus, the Wahhabi notion of state, especially after it joined with Saudi protection and 
might, was motivated by defending religion from heresy and polluting influences. This 
belief in the principle of religion and politics as joined not separated, as Lambton states, 
is thought to be for the good or the ‘welfare’ of Islam. Without this, that is, a non-
religious political order where rule by man for man, would harm the populace through 
disorder and in the case of Islam, fitna (discord). Therefore a prime role of Godly rule is 
“obedience to God and his Prophet” which results in the “wellbeing of a country and its 
people”, and this, in turn, can be done “enjoining the good and forbidding evil” (al-amr 
bi al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy an al-munkar).178 This latter Islamic principle is of huge 
importance in Shaykh Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab’s political thought. Finally, all of this points 
to a strong impact of Ibn Taymiyyah’s political theory on Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab and 
Wahhabism. Ibn Taymiyyah’s notion of the state is not at all far from that championed 
by Shaykh Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab and eventually co-founded with his political backers in 
the 18
th
 century in Arabia. Lambton gives a concise definition of Ibn Taymiyyah’s state, 
a state whose dutifulness to God and religion, resemble that Shaykh Ibn Abd Al-
Wahhab helped create: 
The state of Ibn Taymiyya was no longer the ideal 
Caliphate. Politically one ta the time of the early ancestors, 
it had become fragmented during the course of time into a 
number of independent states. The state which he envisages 
has, nevertheless, a shari‘i base and seeks Qur’anic sanction 
for the principles of government he puts forward. The aim 
of the state is the triumph of the word of God and the 
establishment of a society devoted to the service of God.
179
    
The above quote can be easily said without modification to apply to the state 
championed by Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab. It is a state in which God is 
sovereign, and the Qur’an is its constitution. The notion of state knows no separation of 
religion and politics. Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab’s project may be 
religious but it may also have been driven, at least according to one interpretation, by 
political motives, which are largely thought not to form the reason of why his reform 
came about. In this interpretation, Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab might had 
been committed to the ideal of a central government. All he lacked was political 
backers. That is what Al-Dakhil suggests, basing his view on an interpretation given by 
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Ibn Bishr and Ibn Ghannam, that “the sheikh...was pushing for a central state. 
According to both ibn Bishr and ibn Ghannam, the sheikh was carrying the political 
project of the state, looking for a sponsor from among the rulers of the Najd’s 
autonomous towns.”180 Therefore Wahhabism seems not only to encroach on politics, 
but also had since its beginnings the makings of politics and of politicization. 
 
3.3.2 The Contemporary Period: Politicization & Voices of Challenge and Reform 
The crux of the argument below is that Wahhabism intertwines with the State 
and inevitable with politics. As mentioned above, this view of non-separation of 
religion and politics comes directly from of ibn Taymiyyah and therefore counts as one 
of his influences on Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. But the blurring of the political and 
the religious in the Kingdom does not at all mean the relationship does not experience 
differences in opinion. There increasingly evidence of tension between the political 
leadership and the religious authorities, bearing in mind that the religious authority in 
the Kingdom comes under the command of the monarch and his ministers. But the state-
funded Council in which sits the country’s top clerics serves as a sounding board for 
any difficulty, ironing out problems in a way that makes state work smooth.  The 
fascinating dynamic being introduced today, and which is increasingly more apparent 
since the 1990s owing to new media, blogs, Satellite TV, and generally more freedom 
of expression and protest, is represented in the emergence of bottom-up voices amongst 
the clerics. These bottom-up voices are used here to describe autonomous religious 
scholars. They may be employed by the state at various universities. But they are not 
direct clients of the state as the case may be with the Kingdom’s leading learned 
scholars. One facet about these non-state affiliated learned scholars is their role in 
politicizing religion far more than ever before since the 1990s. I believe there are three 
positive outcomes from the phenomenon of bottom-up clerical voices of peaceful and 
discursive protest. Firstly, they communicate to the state a different set of opinions 
about clerical and sometimes societal concerns about all kind of issues. In the 1990s the 
burning issue was the presence on Saudi soil of US troops and bases. Secondly, their 
communication, even if publicly dismissed, privately it is taken seriously and studied by 
the State and its officials, including the state-affiliated clergy. Thirdly, these peaceful 
communications partly empower society to seek dialogue and the search for a common 
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ground with the King, his ministers and the state clergy. For instance, the popularity of 
petitions, (see the following chapter) in seeking dialogue and sending messages of 
counsel to the state is popular in the Kingdom. 
 
3.4 Understanding Saudi Political Culture 
First I shall try to formulate a simple working definition of this complex and 
controversial term as Michael Hudson and Lisa Anderson find out in their works on 
political culture.
181
 The definition provided by Anderson is a good guide for the 
examination of Saudi political culture. According to Lisa Anderson, the term means 
“precisely the values that might support or undermine a particular set of institutions.”182 
Quoting Almond and Verba, she defines the term further: “the particular distribution of 
patterns of political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its various 
parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system.”183 
As mentioned above, little or no work has been undertaken on Saudi political 
culture. One exception is a good piece of work done by two American scholars. It 
approaches the topic of ‘political culture’ from the perspective of a practical field of 
research, health. The article by Eugene Gallagher and C. Maureen Searle recognizes the 
importance of Islam and the people’s religious norms of behaviour, which tend to 
influence how they see the world, and this has inevitably affected even a domain such as 
medicine.
184
 However, the article is not deeply concerned with the kind of inquiry a 
political scientist would examine. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the article 
tends to fall in the trap of repeating stereotypes about the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. For 
instance, the idea of Saudi Arabia having a culture that segregates males and females, 
large family units often with extended membership, and the nature of the political 
system viewed as monarchical and autocratic. Even if some of these features mentioned 
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seem to exist in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, they do not, in my view, tell the reader 
much about deeper links to Wahhabism, which I shall try to conceptualize here. Plus, 
they do not tell us about non stereotypical features such as positive features. As in 
Orientalism, male-female segregation, the extended family or the type of government 
discusses in relation to Arab Muslim countries and societies are used to highlight 
negative and not positive features. The discussion below initiates a different type of 
discussion about Saudi ‘political culture’. The aim is to look at features that come from 
Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s thought as well as stressing their positive 
role in transformation and reform. 
What is of importance here is the parallels between the state and these bottom up 
voices seeking dialogue with the state. They tend to share one significant political value, 
in fact a feature of Saudi political culture on which confirms what has been argued thus 
far. That value is the tendency to use religion in politics and apply religious arguments 
in support of political positions. The bottom-up voices of Islamic protest defend their 
positions and justify their counsel and arguments on religious grounds. And the state 
itself has adopted the Wahhabi doctrine as its guiding politico-religious framework. It is 
important here to stress the strong linkage of Wahhbasim and politics from the 
beginning when Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab began his renewal in Arabia 
in the mid 18
th
 century. In fact, Al-Dakhil credits Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab with the early rise of nationalism in Arabia. “The Wahhabiyya initiated the 
process of nation-building in eighteenth-century Arabia. Indeed, this was declared 
objective of the shaikh all along. That the movement embarked on such a mission is 
related to the fact that it was the product of a hadari (urban) movement.”185 
Furthermore, Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s central message regards the 
issue of tawheed, Oneness of God or Unity of God. It can be argued that the Kingdom is 
still shaped by a tawheedi political culture. The concept has religions and political 
meaning. Religiously, it means that God’s sole authority – through stress of reference to 
the Qur’an – is final and sacred. Al-Dakhil suggests, and I agree with him, that there is 
also a tawheedi political culture based on obedience to a single ruler or system. So the 
religious and political notions of Oneness in  Wahhabism “come together, with the 
political unity being a precondition of the divine unity. If worship is to be directed 
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solely to God, then political obedience is to be unconditionally given to one...ruler.”186 I 
agree with Al-Dakhil but I also disagree. The other side of this tawheedi religio-political 
culture is that of equality before one God. Politically, this should mean equality of all 
before the central figure or central ruler. Obedience may, however, be reflected in the 
allegiance voices of reform have generally given to the central government or the 
monarchy. As I will argue below, most reformists support the state and therefore 
produce a discourse of reform that prefers an advisory approach not an oppositional role 
in a Western sense. I would claim that instead of obedience, which has negative 
meaning, Saudi political culture tends to be deferential. They recognize and respect the 
importance of the Saudi royal house and central government and tend to accept their 
role as rulers of the Kingdom. Deference is found even in Western political systems 
such as the UK. But again I agree with Al-Dakhil that perhaps the stress on Oneness in 
Wahhabism has led to a non-participatory political culture: 
The catch phrase in the Wahhabi literature says: ‘There is 
no religion without a jama’ah [community], and no jama’ah 
without an imam [a ruler], and no imam without obedience.’ 
One sign of being faithful to God is to eb faithful to the 
community. And to be faithful to the community is not to 
indulge in its public affairs for this could lead to disobeying 
the ruler, something that could lead to fitna, or disorder.
187
 
However, one must be critical towards this and not read it outside the historical 
context. The Prophet’s hadith, which Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab treats as 
sacred, offers so many examples enjoining the ummah to participate and be interested in 
public affairs. What worked for Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in his time 
when there was a high level of illiteracy may not apply to modern-day Saudi Arabia. 
What Al-Dakhil ignores is the Wahhabi notion of community, which gives Wahhabism 
a strong communitarian content. 
Regardless of how one interprets Wahhabism, it has a vision in which all aspects 
of the political include the religious, and this is reflected today in Saudi political culture 
and society: support and opposition, communication and dialogue, protest and advice. 
All find expression in religious form and religious logic. Basically, in line with the 
state’s reliance on religion in seeking political legitimacy, society or at least the 
autonomous religious intellectuals use the same technique. They use religion not in 
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order to oppose the state as much as to contest some of its decisions and policies as a 
way of initiating dialogue with the state, especially a ‘strong state’.188 Thus informal 
political channels of state-society communication are created. These lines of informal 
and indirect communication may look ‘dissident’, but they are also interactive and 
inquisitive and above all else peaceful. This assessment speaks to the ideas of 
Eickelman and Piscatori in Muslim politics about the ‘fragmentation of religious 
authority’ and the various bottom-up forms of ‘Muslim politics’ that seek to contest 
‘power’ in a variety of ways given the changing nature of both politics and religion.189 
Indeed, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the rise of the bottom-up voices of Islamic 
peaceful protest, the state-affiliated clergy is faced with some a degree of contest over 
religious authority. This is positive both for the official clergy as well as of the state, 
giving both opinions that would otherwise not be available without this new 
phenomenon of political protest. The upshot of this is making both political and 
religious life more entangled and more engaged with one another. This process of non-
systematic politicization, as the Kingdom has no political parties although it has today a 
parliament, creates a shared arena, even if informal and non-continuous, between the 
state and society. Closing or inhibiting these channels can lead to crises of confidence in 
the state and even the rise of radical voices not interested in dialogue with the state. Al-
Qaida is a good example of how terrorists take advantage of the absence of peaceful 
communication between state and society. Perhaps it worthy observing here is that the 
innovations undertaken by King Abdullah as noted in the previous chapters, namely, the 
creation of a National Commission for Dialogue, may be considered an effort to make 
communication more organized, official and continuous. Also, the increasing role given 
to the Consultative Council, especially in its questioning of the policies of various 
ministries is another sign of how the monarchy is being responsive to society and 
widening the margin of state-society dialogue and communication. It can therefore be 
said that politicization is itself adopted by the state and used in an organized and 
centralized way, increasingly, to allow for some kind of ‘loyal opposition’ but from 
within the system. In varying degrees, issues ranging from education to military affairs 
get to be debated. However, and this is the facet all Saudis share with their state. The 
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contest is not to take place outside the framework of God’s law or the Shari‘ah, which 
is state law in the Kingdom.  
Even the so-called ‘liberals’ do not seek to undermine the Shari‘ah law as law of 
the land. I will show this when I begin the discourse analysis in chapters 5, 6 and 7, by 
looking at state and society’s prominent types of discourses in Saudi Arabia. What is 
contested is never the place of Islam. It is the way Islam is understood as my analysis in 
chapter four will show. 
It would be an exaggeration to suggest patterns of opposition do exist in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. That would be misleading and incorrect. The Kingdom has 
yet to develop a political system that fully accommodates fully-fledged opposition, 
whether in the form of political parties or other constitutional institutions.
190
 Another 
feature of Saudi political culture is incremental and gradual transformation. What must 
be always stressed is the fact that the emergence of a Saudi centralized state involved 
progression over a long period from the 18
th
 to the early twentieth-century. This 
progression involved even collapse in 1818, and unification of Najd and Hijaz took 
sometime before it was realized. This preference for gradualism is also a reflection of 
the gradual renewal led by Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Al-Rasheed argues 
that Wahhabism is not without pragmatism,
191
 which I will return to when discussing 
dissidence during the 1991 Gulf War. But the point I want to make here is this 
pragmatism is evident in gradualist approach to the spread of renewal, and the whole 
Saudi-Wahhabi project to create central government. A third feature of Saudi political 
culture, which derives from Islam as well as the Wahhabi doctrine, is the institution of 
consultation (shura).
192
 Cohesion and stability have been largely driving forces in the 
evolution of the Kingdom’s still new and evolving political system.193 In this system 
there are informal channels of political communication through which the mercantile 
and middle and upper classes get their messages across to the state. These classes share 
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with the state the concern for stability.
194
 It is not as if the pattern of political 
communication is entirely top-down and from the state to the society. The majlis 
(meeting forum, council for meeting) of the various governors and royal officials, for 
instance, have for a long time established the practice of direct contact with these 
societal representatives and interests. Already, as mentioned in chapter 1 major reforms 
under King Abdullah which were unthinkable before have been introduced. Instead of 
‘opposition’ one finds evidence mostly of peaceful protest or ‘dissent’.195 The 
exception, of course, is the terrorist attacks on civilians and the state by al-Qaida. This 
protest, mainly by bottom-up religious voices unaffiliated with the state, forms the 
substance of the drive or the process of politicization in the Kingdom. Examples of 
these with focus on the Gulf War will be given below. The question of how political 
culture influences political discourses, of both dissent and loyalty to the state, is looked 
at through examples since the occupation of the Grand mosque in Mecca in 1979 up to 
the 1991 Gulf War period. The key feature is the predominance of ‘advisory dissent’ but 
without the absence of types of ‘radical dissent’.  
 
3.4.1 The Gulf War and Rise of Dissent in the 1990s 
When considering politicization, the illegal invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 
and the war to liberate it in 1991, in which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia contributed 
logistical support, troops and funds, no modern event since the founding of Saudi 
Arabia has probably contributed as much to this process. The contests, dissent, and 
mostly debate displayed by society, and even from within the state and the royal family, 
are unprecedented. These contests, dissent and debate were not aimed at toppling the 
existing system. They were instead intended at engaging with the state for the purpose 
of reform. I am of the view that had not for this period of dynamic debate and dissent 
the Kingdom would not have resulted in the current reforms under King Abdullah. 
Therefore the kind of process of politicization I am trying to conceptualize revolves 
around the idea of istinsah and nush (counsel-seeking and advice). This is one Islamic 
value revered and practised widely since the time of the Prophet. It is noted by 
voluntarism: voluntary advice-seeking and giving, and informality of communicating 
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such advice. My argument here is that officials in the state, even they acted at times to 
limit or ban dissent and debate, they have mostly and deliberately allowed them a role 
in expressing views from below. This is vital in that the state knew how to benefit from 
these un-official societal inputs as well as having a form of informal ‘public opinion’, 
which Orientalists call ‘Arab street’ according to Sadiki.196 This dynamic is still under-
researched as it tends to escape the attention of scholars who tend to assume the 
monarchy to act through oppression and proscription, missing these subtle instances of 
engaging with society.
197
 In the Kingdom’s still undocumented ‘political culture’, for 
which I am piecing up features I happen to be familiar with, this brand of 
communication may be categorized as ‘voluntary advocacy’. More correctly, one may 
point out two other Islamic traditions, practised by the learned scholars, official and 
unofficial, of maw‘idah (religious reminding) or irshad (guidance). They are means, 
which are not binding on those who receive them. The learned scholars are bound to 
practice guidance. But the guidance received is not obliging on those in the seats of 
power, for instance, to act according to its content. Of course, in the case of the 
Kingdom, since this guidance is unbinding, un-official, and largely coming from voices 
and forces that do not counsel an overthrow of the existing system, it gets some 
reception, be it informal and never confirmed. This is, as the analysis below will point 
out, one reason why petitions have become vital in registering in a semi official way 
that communication of guidance has taken place, and that the obligation of guidance has 
been observed. So the aim of dissent is not entirely about agenda-setting on behalf of 
political ends per se, such as changing policy, but also on behalf of religious dutifulness 
of through the enacting of guidance. Nonetheless, through these activities politicization 
is widened and deepened, opening an informal arena, almost a ‘drop-box’, where 
society leaves messages to the state.  
The analysis now turns to the Gulf War of 1991, which was the main event that 
led to some dissent by establishment or state-affiliated Wahhabi scholars as well as 
voices from within society. This ‘dissent’, as I have mentioned above, is both guidance 
and protest. Nonetheless, it has provided a form of’ loyal’ challenge. Overthrowing the 
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monarchy, for instance, was never one of its political objectives in spite of presence of 
US bases in the Kingdom.
198
  It is the US bases that mobilised religious voices against 
that particular policy. What must be understood here is that very policy became at the 
time a convenient tool for airing criticism of the government and a number of other un-
related policies, communicated as part of the duty of religious guidance. Here religion 
and politics are mixed. Justifying criticism as guidance to the political rulers made it 
difficult to punish, ban or reject. However, some of the leading voices leading the 
movement of dissent were jailed or fired from employment, especially at the Saudi 
state-funded institutions of higher education.  
What is noticeable here is not only that there was a blurring of the political and 
the religious, which was accepted as a long practice inaugurated by Ibn Saud and bin 
Abd al-Wahhab in the 18
th
 century, but also the opening of a window of opportunity 
from which to push a reformist agenda. That is, the agenda of islah (reform) and even 
tajdeed (renewal). There is a subtle message in this agenda: reclaiming the mission of 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself. Thus the state cannot turn against this agenda without in a 
way rejecting Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s own message of renewal, and the resulting 
Wahhabi puritanical creed and persuasion that shaped the state’s won identity,  or the 
marriage of politics and religion concluded by the early founders of the Saudi State.  
I wish to make a few observations here about the nature of dissent and how it 
intertwines with reform.  
The notion of reform can mean different things in different contexts and 
different types of political systems and states. Advocacy of reform in the Kingdom is 
largely focused on the aim of communicating guidance and, in many examples, valid 
criticism. Dissent itself can be divided into two types. The first one is radical, and this 
is the least prevalent in the Kingdom, and aims at questioning the entirety of the 
political monarchical system led by Al-Saud. The second one is ‘advisory’, and it aims 
at establishing dialogue and channels of communication for giving guidance to the 
rulers. One observation that must be made here is that the second type is accepted, 
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contrary to the views of many Orientalists who dismiss the Kingdom as a closed and un-
responsive and authoritarian system. Moreover, this second type of ‘dissent’, which is 
‘advisory’ in nature and even ‘loyal’ since it shares with the state the value of gradual 
reform, has had tremendous success and influence. Were it not for this type of advisory 
dissent, the Kingdom would not have had a parliament today and other important 
reforms introduced gradually under King Fahd and after him King Abdlullah. Plus, one 
must not fail to mention the increasing participation of business elites in state affairs in 
the Kingdom, another reform introduced quietly and through gradualism.
199
 I must 
recall my own observation about reform in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia being 
incremental. The Kingdom’s ‘political culture’ is not in any way ‘revolutionary’ in 
terms of transformation. Indeed, the input of the Kingdom’s founder200 who was 
successful in moderating in the 1900s the early zeal, fanaticism and revolutionary way 
of the Wahhabi Ikhwan (brothers) forces points to a historical appreciation of gradual 
transformation.
201
 Madawi Al-Rasheed makes the point that Wahhabism can be both 
‘quietist and revolutionary’.202 I would argue that the revolutionary phase in the 1800s 
during the short expansionism that was ended by the Egyptian-Ottoman invasion and 
the end of the first ‘Saudi-Wahhabi’ state, which lasted from 1744 to 1818.Central to 
this ‘revolutionary zeal was the joint Saudi-Wahhabi effort to spread Wahhabism 
outside the Arabian Peninsula, and well into Iraq and Syria. Habib describes the early 
zeal with which the Wahhabi persuasion was spread in these conquered territories. He 
says that they “...destroyed mosques and shrines, punished practices that were anathema 
to Wahhabi teachings, and imposed Wahhabism with a zeal that surpassed anything the 
region had known before or has known since.”203 The quietist period began properly 
after the founding of a centralised state in the 1900s combining Najd and Hijaz.  
Radical dissent was used by forces who were not interested in a dialogue with 
the state. Their aim was to change the system completely. Those who planned and 
implemented the terrorist occupation of the Grand Mosque in the late 1970s are a good 
example of the type of radical dissent that does not hesitate to use violence against the 
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state. Al-Rasheed uses the term ‘jihadis’.204  Today, and after the terrorist attacks of 
9/11, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia itself came under terrorist attacks by yet another 
form of radical dissent but this time by Bin Laden’s al-Qaida, the same group that 
attacked the US on the 9
th
 of September 2001. Of course, the 9/11 events showed how 
the Kingdom was allied with the US, its leading strategic and economic partner, as well 
as with the Taliban.
205
 What we know about this type of radical dissent is that they do 
not hesitate to use violence, that they blame the Saudi rulers for corruption, and that 
they use takfeer (practice of excommunication)
206
 to justify fighting the state, fellow 
Muslims, non-Muslims and, in the case of the Kingdom, Saudi citizens. This was 
demonstrated both in the occupation of the Grand Mosque in 1979 and the attacks done 
inside the Kingdom from the 1990s. So what was the justification given by Johaymen 
Alotaiby, the man who masterminded the occupation of the Grand Mosque?
207
 Amongst 
Alotaiby attacked the learned scholars, the class of ‘Ulama associated with the state as 
well as the state itself. His accusations included the whole question of the learned 
scholars being dependent on the rulers. He mentioned to blame them for turning a blind 
eye to the rulers’ ‘impiety’. For him this constituted corruption of the class of religious 
leaders whose role was to guide the rulers not work with them and depend on them. 
Thus the learned scholars are accused of not doing their job properly, by ignoring 
corruption, alliance with the ‘infidel’ Western powers as well as financial corruption.  
All Muslim rulers must be from the Quraish. Present 
Muslim rulers are co-operating with infidels and those who 
deny God…The royal family is corrupt. It worships money 
and spends it on palaces not mosques. If you accept what 
they say, they will make you rich; otherwise they will 
persecute and even torture you. The ulama have warned the 
royal family about its corruption but Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz is 
in the family’s pay and has endorsed their actions.208 
What can be taken from the above quote is the stress placed on the elements of 
piety, corruption, the Western alliance, the squandering of the Kingdom’s wealth that 
seems to occupy the forces of radical dissent, in the past but also currently as similar 
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challenges have not faded. However, the state is engaging with its own radical plan to 
eradicate radical dissent, and the process of ‘reintellectualization’ of Saudi society 
which I will be discussing in chapter 4 will focus on this aspect in a focused way. 
But no event politicized religion like the 1991 Gulf War when Saudi Arabia, the 
home of Islam’s holy shrines fought alongside the US in support of Kuwait, a 
neighbouring Gulf state invaded by Iraq in 1990. The politicization created lots of space 
for ‘advisory’ dissent, which made non-state affiliated scholars more outspoken about 
reform than ever before. In particular, the phenomenon named as ‘fundamentalism’, 
which I avoid using in this thesis, and the participation within it of voices of 
‘Islamization’ is at once a by-product and a producing dynamic of this politicization.209 
But it eventually also mobilized the forces of radical dissent against the state in the early 
1990s, especially after the US and its Arab and Western allies succeeded in defeating 
Saddam and freeing Kuwait. In particular, the fact that the US forces failed to keep its 
bases in the Kingdom after the ousting of Saddam became a focus of challenges against 
the state from a new phase of radical dissent that showed its will and capacity for using 
terrorist attacks against the Kingdom to send political messages to the rulers. This 
politicization must be critically assessed in two ways. At one level, it was positive in the 
sense that it enabled peaceful, moderate and concerned voices of ‘Islamization’, or 
‘political Islam’ according to Dekmejian,210 to participate through guidance, mild 
criticism, and petitions, which I will look at in this chapter. In my view, the state itself 
gained some kind of un-official but loyal opposition. It needed to hear views from 
outside the state and its official arms and institutions. This eventually paid off even if 
the mid-1990s the state faltered and did  not know who to react and many of the leaders 
of this highly politicized segment of the voices of ‘advisory’ dissent and ‘Islamization’ 
were banned, jailed or punished but never with death or banishment.  At a second level, 
the phenomenon of politicization by the forces of radical dissent was not genuinely 
interested in political solutions. It lacked pragmatism and the skill for negotiation. All it 
was interest in was issuing accusations, threats or acting on its threats through terrorist 
attacks. In terms of ‘politicization’ there was no participatory value gained through their 
actions. To an extent, the term ‘puritan’ used by Abou El Fadl more or less applied to 
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them as they tended to misuse the Qur’an and the Hadith to justify killing and violence. 
This practice of politics must not be associated with Wahhabism, which has pragmatic 
elements that are ignored by many Orientalists and observers of the Saudi state and 
society.  
 
3.5 Reflection: Specificity of ‘Reform’ in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
This section is important as it ties together ideas from the discussion coming 
before and the discussion of the ‘Islamization’ and reform movements of the 1990s in 
the next chapter. Discussion of specificity aims at understanding reform or discourse of 
reform as constructions happening within a broader historical/political context (since 
the 18
th
 century) as well as an intellectual context (the influence and impact of 
Wahhabism on nation and state-building). When discussing ‘reform’ in the Saudi 
context, one must keep in mind the historical and intellectual backgrounds that continue 
to shape how Saudis understand, talk about and practise reform. 
Religious reform in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia may be seen by Wahhabis 
themselves as well as by other Muslims as a form of Islamic rebirth,
211
 one which 
sought to eradicate heresy and decadence, two of the ills Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
blames for the decline in puritanical worship of Allah alone. I argue here, is marked by 
conservatism. In fact, it is this conformism, even conservatism, that defines the 
Kingdom, socially, politically, and religiously. Therefore when addressing the question 
of specificity of reform in the Kingdom one cannot ignore its conformist nature 
conservative tenet and constant of the politico-religious and social orders. What Shaykh 
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s legacy has been is that orthodoxy is the framework 
within which reform itself is conceived, contested, and adopted or discarded. In other 
words, there is no reform outside religion. As I noted above, the renewal initiated by 
Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab has produced a puritanical exegesis. This purist position 
has had spill-over effects into the political realm. As a result the notion of political 
reform that may or may not be possible in the Kingdom is shaped by Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab’s legacy. I argue that this legacy is defined by five tenets:  
a) reverence of God’s power as the sole source of authority and its exclusive 
centre; this is related to the idea of Oneness of God, tawheed; 
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b) a purist understanding of Islam, favouring literalist reading of the textual 
sources of Islam;  
c) a practice and reasoning in the realm of jurisprudence (fiqh) that accords the 
sayings and the deeds, the Sunnah, the Prophet’s example, as unquestionably 
foundational;  
d) the Shari‘ah or Islamic Law as a foundation for law-making; and 
e) gradualist-pragmatist approach to nation-building  
Thus Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab defines a fivefold system of Islamic 
authenticity that for him represents for a genuine Muslim a non-negotiable set of 
commitments, obligations and acts central to true faith. Nowhere does Shaykh Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab apply a historicist approach or methodology to the corpus of hadith, for 
instance. Post-colonial trends of renewal, in the Muslim world have produced many 
forms of exegetical reasoning via ijtihad (independent reasoning) that tend to treat the 
Prophets’ sayings, hadith, as historical texts that must be re-read within their specific 
context. In a way, this is the problem Abou El Fadl attacks most about Wahhabism.
212
 
No invitation to scrutinize the hadith as a text of lesser sanctity and reliability than the 
Qur’an exists within Wahhabi practice of jurisprudence. Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
fivefold system, in my view, results in a normative framework that since the 18
th
 
century continues to define the balance of religion and politics in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. This system’s implications for the rules that govern reform remain deep-rooted 
in Saudi society and polity. The question is how? 
Firstly, the overall ‘political culture’ may be considered to be non-Secular. The 
language, the messages, and the political objectives, even of the so-called today 
‘liberals’ in the Kingdom, do not seek secularization of politics and society even if they 
tend to advocate a less visible and intrusive role by religion in the public sphere. 
Separation of religion of politics would lead to a crisis of identity for the Saudi state, 
which since its founding has worked in partnership with Wahhabism as a legitimating 
ideology and creed. This politico-religious identity can be directly attributed to the 
Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s legacy and impact on state formation, 
legitimation and survival from the first alliance back in the mid-1700s in Dir‘iyya with 
Muhammad Ibn Saud. As Habib argues, the partnership has been inseparable in the 20
th
 
century during three phases of state formation as well as in the 1700s:  
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...the period 1902-1932, when the territorial conquests were 
completed and consolidated and the Saudi-Wahhabi 
hegemony was imposed upon them; the period 1932-1945, 
when the tasks of forming a rudimentary Saudi-Wahhabi 
central government, unifying the disparate regions of the 
country, and creating a national Saudi-Wahhabi identity 
were undertaken, and the period 1945-1953 when the 
Kingdom defined its strategic foreign policy objectives in 
the context of its Wahhabi mission.
213
  
Again, the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance must not be understood in terms of political 
use of the Wahhabi creed, which endured after the overthrow of the first state in 1818. It 
was a genuine commitment between two forces that complemented each other: “Had the 
Saudis intended to exploit Wahhabism only as a vehicle to expand their political power 
in the Arabian Peninsula, they would not have, they would not have continued their 
conquests, or riding the crest of Wahhabism, they would have extended their conquests 
beyond the peninsula while imposing Wahhabism only nominally or not at all.”214 The 
bond between religion and politics is an historical continuity, which is very hard even 
for the liberal voices, who may be sympathetic with secularism, to challenge. It would 
be a challenge against the state’s own identity.   
However, and related to the question of Politico-religious identity of the state 
and opposition to secularism, is an important political feature that still defines Saudi 
reform: moderation and pragmatism, two traits which are hardly associated with 
Wahhabism. Al-Rasheed notes how Wahhabis have learnt to be pragmatic since the 
Egyptian invasion and destruction of the first state and its Wahhabi partners in Dir‘iyya 
in the early 1800s. As a result Wahhabis, Al-Rasheed says pragmatically chose survival 
over confrontation with the superior invading forces. From this point in time, Wahhabis 
have learnt to accommodate political power and live with it. Moreover as Al-Rasheed 
points out “it seems that Wahhabis learned a serious lesson from the Egyptian 
annihilation...in 1818: they learned to be pragmatic. Wahhabis survived afterwards 
because they supported political power, which meant moderating religious zeal. Since 
then, Wahhabi scholars have accepted a subservient position. They lived in the shadow 
of the sultan.”215 This moderation, and against some of the more excessive Orientalist 
accusations against Wahhabism, is the moderation or wasatiyya that made Shaykh 
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Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab preach co-existence even with non-Muslims. He did 
not preach killing them or getting rid of them (as for instance, some ‘jihadis’ do as 
Madawi Al-Rasheed describes in her book). Delong-Bas argues that Shaykh 
Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab distinguished between a kafir (infidel, non-believer) 
and a mushrik (polytheist); did not make the death penalty automatic against non-
believers who must be given guidance and the opportunity to correct their ways; 
objected to collective punishment, stressing that the individual responsible is to be 
punished; and did not support declaration of holy war against infidels. He went even 
further than this by accepting the principle of Muslims living amongst them if their 
rights to free worship are not threatened: “Not only did Shaykh Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab not 
automatically declare Jihad against kuffar, but he also permitted Muslims to live among 
them under the condition that the Muslims were permitted to practice and study their 
religion.”216 The stress of tolerance by Delong-Bas is a good response to Abou El FAdl, 
for instance, who blames holy war and violence against the Western world and Muslims 
on Wahhabism, which he considers a ‘heresy’.217 This value of tolerance is upheld by 
Shaykh Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab in line with his belief and advocacy of ‘public interest’ 
(maslaha a’amma).218 Delong-Bas adds that this belief made Shaykh Ibn Abd Al-
Wahhab more interested in truce (houdnah) with infidels than war.
219
 
Finally, it must be remembered that all of the elements of non-secularism, 
gradualism, pragmatism, tawheedi culture, advisory tendencies, traits that find strong 
roots and practice in Wahhabism, have all shaped the evolution of the Wahhabi creed as 
well as of the rise of the ‘Saudi-Wahhabi’ state. These have in turn shaped the type of 
discourse of reform found in the Kingdom and provided an important background to the 
advent of the ‘reintellectualization’ of Saudi Arabia. In chapter 4 I try to examine these 
questions.  
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CHAPTER 4 
REINTELLECTUALISATION: A CONTEXTUALISATION OF DISCOURSES AND 
COUNTER-DISCOURSES IN SAUDI ARABIA 
 
A new sense of public is emerging throughout Muslim-
majority states and Muslim communities elsewhere. It is 
shaped by increasingly open contests over the authoritative 
use of the symbolic language of Islam. New and 
increasingly accessible modes of communication have made 
these contests increasingly global, so that even local 
disputes take on transnational dimensions. These 
increasingly open and accessible forms of communication 
play a significant role on fragmenting and contesting 
political and religious authority. Muslims, of course, act not 
just as Muslims but according to class interests, out of a 
sense of nationalism, on behalf of tribal or family networks, 
and from all the diverse motives that characterize human 
endeavour. Increasingly, however, large numbers of 
Muslims explain their goals in terms of the normative 
language of Islam.
220
  
 
4.1 Focus  
In this chapter which opens up section two of my analysis, including discourse 
anaylsis in chapters five and six, I have two aims. Firstly, I argue here that the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia has been undergoing a quasi ‘revolution’ of intellectual renewal. I have 
here used the term ‘reintellectualisation’ coined by Dale Eickelman to describe this 
phenomenon. The discourses and counter-discourses and the intellectual contests taking 
place in the Kingdom are not only shaped by this phenomenon, but they equally shape 
and construct reintellectualisation. The first section of my analysis considers the 
dynamics behind the emergence of this process. In particular, I look at the new media 
and technologies as well as the dynamic of education and how they have refashioned 
Saudi society, in particular leading to fragmentation of religious authority. Following 
analysis of the dynamics behind reintellectualisation, I shall in the second section 
attempt explain three moments, communicative, interpretive and fragmentary, which I 
consider to be inherent to the process of reintellectualisation in the Kingdom of Saudi 
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Arabia. The aim of this exercise is to provide as a contextualisation in a comprehensive 
way about the rise of new currents of discourse in KSA. It is impossible to understand 
the variety of ideological contests in the Kingdom without understanding the overall 
context within which they take place. In particular, I examine reintellectualisation in a 
twofold fashion: as politicisation of intellectual discourses in the late 1980s and the 
1990s, and as discursive contests, that is, discourses and counter-discourses amongst the 
Saudi intelligentsia. Prior to this analysis of this new-found process of 
reintellectualisation, I begin my analysis with an a brief analysis of the dynamics of 
education, new media and technologies in order to to understand the cultural and 
intellectual evolution of Saudi Arabia in the late twentieth-century and at the turn of the 
new millennium.  
 
4.2 The Dynamics of Media, New Technologies and Education in the 
Saudi Context 
I shall begin this section by returning to the above quote, which is from New 
Media in the Muslim World, co-edited by Dale Eickelman and Jon Anderson. A few 
ideas advanced by Eickelman and Anderson are useful for describing the emerging 
‘public’ in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. May be, and given the focus of my thesis, 
even talking today about ‘one public’ united by ideas in KSA may be inaccurate. It is 
not at all imprecise to refer to diverse ‘publics’ with diverse ideologies and debates as 
how the Kingdom should develop religiously, culturally and politically. Whether one is 
discussing the ideological line battles between ‘traditionalists’ and ‘modernists’ or 
‘conservatives’ and ‘liberals’, the idea is that it is no longer appropriate to talk of a 
single ‘Saudi public’. There is today a degree of sophistication and diversification 
derived from the process of reintellectualisation as I will be explaining in this chapter. 
In this respect, I find in the work of Eickelman and Anderson evidence of how kind of 
‘new publics’ are emerging not only in KSA but also in the Muslim World at large.  
There are four connections, which explain the emergence of ‘publics’ or ‘discourses’ in 
the Kingdom. These are relevant for the analysis I am trying to develop in this chapter. 
These four connections are also relevant to the idea of ‘reintellectualisation’ I am using 
in the analysis. 
First, there is today in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia contests and disagreements 
over the use of ‘the symbolic language of Islam’. The history of discourse whether 
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religious or political has been predominated by the use and may be even over-use of the 
symbolic language of Islam. As I have explained in the preceding chapters the link 
between religion and politics has defined a large role of religion in terms of legitimation 
of politics and justification of the state’s birth and continuity. That role has in return 
meant that politics itself is coloured by religion at least in terms of language in matters 
such as education, law, media, and public morality. Under this paradigm the learned 
scholars of Islam have, as employees of the state, doubled up as preachers and, at the 
same time, defenders of the state and the Kingdom – in times of peace and war, in 
discussion of private and public matters. The defenders of the state from the religious 
hierarchy have thus earned protection, livelihood and, more significantly, monopoly 
over the use of the symbolic language of Islam. The scene was then one of unity and 
uniformity and not diversity. Of course, there were those who adopted different views, 
even before the arrival of new media. Largely, these different discourses have remained 
marginalised, which is changing today. This is exactly where the connection made by 
Eickelman and Anderson between increasing contests over the use of the symbolic 
language of Islam and the emergence of new media has relevance to the Saudi context – 
and of course to the Arab context as a whole. The Internet, Satellite TV, private new 
media, including print media, have diversified the ‘public’ and empowered new 
discourses to compete by disseminating their own ideas about religion, politics, culture, 
gender issues, relations with the Western world, and about public morality. The 
dimension of new media and more open communication is the second idea I borrow 
from Eickelman and Anderson. Education has a role too. I shall go back to this point 
when I discuss the dynamics of reintellectualisation in Saudi Arabia.  
So what is the relevance of these new media? The answer leads me to stating the 
third idea which is important for our understanding of the nature of the ‘public’ and of 
‘discourse’, in relation to religion and politics in KSA. This third idea is that of 
‘fragmentation’ of authority, politically and religiously. We cannot understand the 
different ideological and intellectual debates in the Kingdom without understanding this 
new dynamic. The Kingdom used to have one type of discourse heavily influenced by 
religion and the input of the country’s clerical authority. This is no longer the case. This 
contest is today visible in the Kingdom and my own study of two ideological and 
intellectual currents in the Kingdom attempts to describe and understand the content and 
the nature of contest. So the fragmentation of authority is at the centre of the discussion 
and analysis I am trying to develop by comparing two trends of thought in KSA. The 
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final and fourth idea I find useful in the above quote is the relevance of Islam in these 
opposing contests as a normative framework. This is really important in explaining how 
the new ideological trends of thought contest each other and get entangled in all kinds 
of debates of how to address public issues and affairs with reference to Islam. The 
religionists do this; so do those advocating intellectual trends of thought inspired by 
secular thinking. Thus Islam is both a subject of debate in which the traditional religious 
authority is being fragmented and a source for the references of those seeking to 
influence public debate.    
 
4.2.1 Education and Media in the Saudi Context 
It is impossible to understand the emergence of contests and challenges to 
religious authority without understanding two key factors that, in my view, have made 
all of this possible: the revolution in education and the media revolution.  
Firstly, by the revolution in education I am referring to the massive development 
that has been registered in higher education in the Kingdom. Contests and challenges 
must be linked to advances in this field. Literally, we cannot talk of 
‘reintellectualisation’ of KSA without considering education advances. Higher 
education has become the centrepiece of State welfarism in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the 
state is still the main provider in all domains ranging from housing to health. But the 
area where state public investment manifests itself in society, culture and politics is in 
educational acquisition. The ongoing contests one sees today in KSA, in the discussion 
of religion and politics, point to the increased role of education and educated publics. 
This increased visibility does not come from a vacuum. It results from two decades of 
huge investment in the upgrading of education. Today KSA has the largest Middle 
Eastern and Arab graduate population overseas. According to a figure given in 2010 by 
the Saudi Higher Education Minister there were 109,000 bursaries allocated to Saudi 
graduate and postgraduate students in overseas universities, mostly in the Western 
world.
221
 This prompted the Kingdom’s Minister of Higher Education, Khalid Al-
Anqari, to describe the thousands of Saudi citizens studying abroad through government 
bursaries and loans as “ambassadors of their country.” Given the huge number of Saudi 
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graduates abroad he additionally views them as obligated to “portray their country’s 
religious, cultural and national values” in the countries where they may be receiving 
their university training.
222
 This is precisely what I am trying to argue here: the fact that 
Saudi officials miss the point about these students acting as what I might describe here 
as ‘double ambassadors’. I mean by this that these students are at once agents of 
representing and exporting Saudi values, as claimed by the Saudi Higher Education 
Minister, and of the values of the countries where they go for university education or 
other graduate training. Thus they become agents (not in a negative or conspiratorial 
sense) of dissemination of culture from the ‘West’ (where they live and study for a 
number of years) to the ‘East’ (in this case the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). I am not here 
insinuating that they disseminate, as claimed by some religious leaders, negative 
cultural values that threaten local culture and religion. To the contrary, what I am trying 
to express here is the fact that these graduate students bring along, when they return 
home for good, new systems of thought, management techniques, innovative and 
critical thinking skills that are not necessarily hostile to the local culture or religion. To 
the contrary, educational know-how allows for a quiet ‘modernisation’ of society. My 
reference here to ‘modernisation’ is not based on the ‘modernisation school’. I do not 
agree with its assumptions such as “the passing of tradition” or increased secularisation 
as a result of influx of ideas and systems of technical and intellectual know-how that 
lead to the transformation of tradition.
223
 Nor do I agree with its stress of sequential 
phases of development.
224
 I think society as a whole benefits from the influx of 
innovation, and this includes even religious discourses which make full use of high-
tech, new media, satellite TV, new ideas and modes of critical thought. I do not agree 
with the assumption by the modernisation school’s argument that ‘tradition’ passes and 
that is the area where modernisation gains ground, publics, and transformative 
momentum. The works by Ronald Inglehart The Silent Revolution and Culture Shift, 
mostly written based on research done in the industrialised countries of the West. In the 
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latter he makes a good case for intergenerational change as younger population learns 
and applies new ways and take its place in society instead of the older population.
225
 In 
the former, published in 1977, he advances the thesis that younger generations close the 
cultural gap, moving societies upward along the path of cultural transformation.
226
 To 
an extent, and further studies in the future, could address whether there is a ‘silent 
revolution’ of a ‘cultural shift’ in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In this study I am 
proposing ‘reintellectualisation’ as an important dynamic that is taking KSA along the 
path of discursive, cultural and intellectual shift as a result of higher levels of education 
acquisition amongst the country’s youthful population, and a more open media scene. 
The link between higher education and social capital or citizenship has been affirmed in 
research such as by Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry.
227
 In a way this is what is happening in 
Saudi Arabia, and which I consider to be an important factor in the process of 
‘reintellectualisation’, the social capital in terms of greater know-how of critical inquiry, 
in spite of censorship, is today resulting in increased contestation by Saudis of the way 
religion is represented and managed and in the way they view government. These 
contests are positive as they are creating new discourses and new trends of religious and 
political thought, which no longer limit their roles to deference towards authority, 
whether religious or political. To the contrary, the new trends of thought through the aid 
of the new media and satellite TV are creating a kind of ‘new public’ according to Marc 
Lynch in his work on the impact of Al-Jazeera on Arab audiences.
228
      
 
4.3 Explaining ‘Reintellectualisation’ in the Saudi Context 
I shall stress the idea of ‘moments’ in my explanation of the concept of 
‘reintellectualisation’. Generally, and from what I can glean from my reading of Dale 
Eickelman and Jon Anderson, my take on this concept is that it is tied to what I describe 
here as three important ‘moments’. The discussion here of these moments and of 
reintellectualisation in the Saudi context is at the same time conceptual in that it is based 
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on definitions provided by Eickelman and Anderson. I call these moments as follows: 
‘communicative’, ‘re-interpretive’, and ‘fragmentary’. In describing them thus I am not 
in any way assuming that these moments are independent of one another. To the 
contrary, reintellectualisation makes sense only when understood in terms of co-
dependent moments beginning with a revolution in the sphere of communication which 
in turn gives rise to dissident discourses, in the spheres of politics, religion and culture, 
and as a result of dissidence intellectual authority, especially religious, becomes 
fragmented. I use the adjective ‘fragmented’ here in a positive sense with emphasis on 
the pluralising effect of the ‘fragmentary moment’.  
 
4.3.1 The ‘Communicative Moment’ 
I shall begin this section with a quote from the book New Media in the Muslim 
World, by Eickelman and Anderson: 
Some new media seen as innovative even in the 1980s are 
now almost taken for granted. In countries such as Saudi 
Arabia, the same fax machines that rapidly disseminate 
criticisms of the regime are also essential to the conduct of 
business. The state is powerless to limit their use without 
disrupting the economy. Audiocassette tapes spread the 
sermons of Ayatollah Khomeini and others in the pre-
revolutionary Iran of the 1970s, just as videotapes of anti-
regime preachers and demonstrations today circulate in 
some countries of the Arabian Peninsula. One such video, 
showing employees of the Saudi embassy in London 
videotaping masked demonstrators while the demonstrators 
videotape the embassy (1994), indicates both how 
commonplace and how flexible the new media have 
become.
229
 
The above quote underscores the end of state monopoly over the use of new 
media. The new media, even in their early and more elementary forms, were used by 
dissidents and the public at large to counter information fed to society by the state. 
Eickelman and Anderson give a powerful example of how the same media used by the 
state to spy on demonstrators is used by the public to challenge state authority. That was 
in the 1990s, and in the 1980s when the audiocassette tapes were in fashion. Moreover, 
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they correctly make the point of how states are increasingly powerless to control the 
availability and use of these new media. To do so would hamper economic activity as 
well as have dire consequences for economic development and modernisation in 
general. So what I consider to be central to the new media’s communicative moment is 
the kind of ‘parity’ created by the new media. The state, which in the Arab context, is a 
non-democratic state, has been weary of presence of rival ideas, information or political 
projects within Arab societies. This ‘parity’ – and I am not in any way claiming Arab 
societies to rival their states in access or use of the new media – looks more credible 
after the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions of 2011. This is one reason why some 
analysts have called what happened in both countries ‘facebook revolutions’.230 To an 
extent, this shows the extent to which this intellectual contribution by Eickelman and 
Anderson has been ‘visionary’ and correct. Thus the communicative moment heralds a 
challenging context for state and society, leading not so much to tension as to greater 
ability of societies to discuss taboo subjects, oppose false information, disseminate rival 
viewpoints, and open up all kinds of debates between those who advocate the state’s 
political and cultural project and those who oppose them. In this sense, the 
communicative moment refers to two dynamics. One is the dynamic of social media 
(facebook, twitter, blogs) and other new media (satellite TV, offshore press, media 
cities) being more widespread and accessible to the wider publics. This empowers these 
publics to have the means to contest states and their policies and overall information. 
The second dynamic is the actual counter-discourses (often rivalling state information 
and discourses) that enrich public debates and provide new viewpoints. I want here to 
stress how these debates are not necessarily between the state and society only. They 
also take place within states as well as within societies in addition to being between 
them. As a result, the communicative moment can be described as a discursive moment, 
producing lots of debates as well as enriching them through diverse contributions – 
liberal, religious, traditional, radical, feminist, postmodernist and extremist. 
In the case of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it must be pointed out that the 
media outlets owned by Saudi media tycoons in the Middle East region as well as in 
Europe, particularly Great Britain, have strengthened this communicative moment. This 
has prompted Saudi-born academic Madawi Al-Rasheed to call the phenomenon of 
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Saudi media expansion, along with global political and religious influence, “Kingdom 
without borders.”231 Madawi and her co-authors makes a good case for Saudi 
expansionism through the global media network owned by Saudi media barons and 
found in Europe, North America and the chief media centres in the Middle Eastern, that 
is, Beirut and Dubai. The key argument that the three elements of religion, politics and 
media push the Saudi project of spreading influence across some kind of a ‘global 
umma’ may be true. However, by focusing mostly on the global frontiers they have 
missed the point that the real transformation is happening locally, within the national 
frontiers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and not necessarily without. The second oil 
boom has enabled KSA to expand globally. But the same boom has produced forces of 
change, and this is touched upon only marginally in the book by reference to the rise of 
local leaders and voices inside KSA. For instance, Al-Rasheed’s authors talk about how 
Saudi expansionism through media, money and politics. One co-author is of the view 
that these factors have contributed to the “Arabisation” of Islam in Indonesia.232 
Another describes the ‘export’ of Saudi Salafi trends in Yemen a kind of form of 
“Saudi-isation”.233 In the tradition of post 9/11 Orientalism about KSA, one contributor 
to the volume edited by Al-Rasheed speaks of “transnationalisation of Saudi 
jihadism.”234 In spite of these perspectives with a global focus, often critical of Saudi 
Arabia seeking influence through use of money and religion in the Muslim World on 
the grounds that it leads to ‘radicalisation’ of Muslims, there is an element of truth in 
the questioning introduced in al-Rasheed’s volume by Noha Mellor. Particularly, she 
raises the question as whether the Saudi vast media empire has a liberalising effect.
235
 
Mellor’s analysis is not conclusive at all but correctly asks a very important question of 
relevance to my own analysis, but she does this by reference to the context outside 
Saudi borders. The point to be stressed again is that the communicative moment has far 
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more implications for the reintellectualisation of the Saudi domestic context that has 
been recognised by scholars so far.  
Furthermore, the communicative moment cannot be split into global and local. 
Al-Walid bin Talal’s media empire, which includes some of the most liberal media 
outlets in the Muslim and Arab World, impacts on how people behave and think, and 
this is becoming more obvious within KSA. The media then is less and less playing a 
role in responding against threats from overseas, hostile intellectual trends, and crises of 
legitimacy. In addition to doing these, even if marginally as they are privatised media 
geared more towards entertainment, they address the local audiences, Saudi and Arab. 
Thus post the second Gulf War and the liberation of Kuwait, the existing Gulf and 
particularly Saudi media empire changed in terms of function and role.
236
 For instance, 
the Middle East Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), one of the first private TV outlets 
created in the early 1990s became more entertainment-focused. When it was first 
launched by King Fahd’s brother-in-law, Waleed al-Ibrahim, it had a different agenda as 
an arm of the Saudi state’s propaganda. Now it is a leader in entertainment. The same 
today applies to the Orbit TV network. Al-Waleed bin Talal has expanded his media 
propriety, now owning the Arab Radio and Television entertainment network (ART) in 
addition to Rotana, Arab MTV, and part ownership of major TV networks, including 
Murdoch’s Fox network. Similarly, Prince Khalid bin Sultan owns the liberal London-
based ‘Al-Hayat’. His cousins, Riyadh governor Prince Salman’s sons, own ‘Al-Sharq 
Al-Awsat’, the other liberal newspaper produced from London. The extensive media 
outlets owned by Saudis and Gulf Arab media tycoons almost led to the production of 
“instant nationalism” and “McArabism”, according to one observer.237 The satellite TV 
revolution, using the medium of Arabic, and benefiting from petrodollar largesse, 
expanded through use of state of the art new technologies, linking Arabs living in 22 
countries. Andrew Hammond’s fine article on the Saudi media empire analyses how 
these media outlets more or less keep the masses entertained and “at home” to be 
precise.
238
 “At home” I believe carries a double meaning: firstly, sitting in their 
entertainment rooms in front of television screens consuming Western music, films, 
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talk-shows and comedy; and secondly, meaning in their place away from politics, 
basically apathetic. Hammond in another article advances the argument that KSA has 
built an extensive media empire to “counter opposition” against the monarchy.239 There 
is an element of truth in this, and the state uses the media to ‘sell’ its own values, and 
package a positive image within the Saudi public. However, the media revolution has 
impacted on the political and the intellectual: The communicative moment largely made 
possible by the media revolution, whether producing news and current affairs or 
entertainment, has partly contributed to the process of reintellectualistion of Saudi 
society in a way that has made it today less apathetic, more vocal and even more 
political as can be gleaned by the debates and counter-debates about all matters 
religious, political and cultural in the Kingdom. Hence one must consider the second 
‘interpretive moment’.  
 
4.3.2 The ‘Interpretive Moment’ 
The post-colonial tendency of the state to unify society around a set of centrally 
designed policies, moral edicts or interpretations of Islam have become difficult to 
sustain in the present time. Mass education and the spread of new social media and new 
communication technologies have weakened the capacity of the state to command 
monopoly over ideas. In Saudi Arabia, as I will explain in chapters six and seven, even 
the previously loyal clerical class dependent on the state for income and existence is no 
longer united. The rise of opposite discourses by dissident clerics has led to 
diversification of points of view and interpretations of religious orthodoxy. As 
Eickelman and Anderson argue, the old order of total state monopoly over the 
fashioning of “a publicly expressed code of competencies that all citizens or subjects 
should assimilate and practice in order to achieve modernity”240 is much weaker today. 
Instead, one finds – again thanks to the revolution in new media and communication 
technologies as well as mass education – challenge to the “legitimacy of state claims to 
monopolize” interpreting the ways of achieving of modernity or what should modernity 
mean.
241
 In another book Eickelman and Piscatori make a similar point, linking the role 
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played by new communication technologies in the production of challenges to 
centralised religious and political authority. This explains today the diversity of views, 
such as in Saudi Arabia, and the Muslim World as a whole, which point to Muslims’s 
ability to air difference of opinion, but also enter into dialogue over it in some instances. 
In others, societies face conflict because of the rise of multiple interpretations that often 
contradict with formerly authoritative views monopolising the task of explaining 
modernity, Muslim identity or the right moral conduct in a given Muslim society.  
The greater intensity of open communications, combined 
with higher levels of education, also challenges and 
confronts local religious ideas and practices long taken for 
granted and understood as Islamic. It has also led to the 
increased scrutiny of received ideas as Muslims realize the 
diversity of the Muslim world and the multiple “Islamic” 
ways of doing things. New communication technologies 
play a major role in the foregrounding and questioning of 
local practices, so it is not just traditional religious scholars 
who have a say in debates over how to be a Muslim and live 
a good life – although such voices remain strong and have 
resilience in adapting to the modern world and civic debate 
and public life.
242
 
Again, the elements of education and technology are put forth by Eickelman and 
Piscatori as originators of diversification of opinion and of diversity in the sphere of 
ideas and interpretation of Islam. This new model whereby Muslims are producing 
challenges to central authority be it religious or political is today found in the Saudi 
context as it is in the context of countries such as Egypt or Turkey, and these are 
societies where a higher level of development is always assumed to exist because of the 
history of the state and state institutions.
243
 Madawi Al-Rasheed presents an innovative 
thesis of contests and counter-contests within the Saudi state as well as between it and 
the various centres of power who operate locally and globally, and address both local 
and global audiences. For instance, she gives the examples of billionaire and global 
financier, Al-Walid bin Talal, as one face of the ongoing dynamism of the Saudi State 
and the late Osama bin Laden as another. Both address through their activities and ideas 
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local and global audiences, becoming effectively, in the 1990s, new centres of influence 
and challenge to central authority. According to this analysis, Al-Rasheed does not see 
the contests and discourses within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in terms of centre-
periphery. Rather, for her, and owing to the reign of King Fahd (1982-2005), the state 
was consolidated in such a way that new centres, that is, state actors (princes, financiers, 
state-affiliated networks) and non-state actors (media barons, charity organisations, 
unofficial preachers, terrorists, etc.) operating more or less autonomously and 
sometimes serving opposing agendas. Accordingly the multiple discourses and counter-
discourses are active in ways that have the potential to both support state dogma and 
vision as well as oppose its policies and interpretation of political or religious 
competencies, as noted above. In this sense, Al-Walid bin Talal is a prince who has vast 
wealth that would have been unachievable without connections with royal house and the 
state. Yet this global figure’s activities, financial and entrepreneurial, have political 
implications, for and against the state, as Al-Rasheed explains: one the one hand Al-
Walid “consolidates the new model of the Saudi businessmen, and promotes the 
economic liberalisation adopted by the state. Yet he can thwart state ideology and vision 
with satellite television promoting Western programmes, pop culture and female 
emancipation, in defiance of strict Wahhabi preaching condemning such 
innovations.”244 Al-Rasheed is right in pointing out the example of bin Laden who at 
one phase of his activism more or less represented the policy preferences of the Saudi 
state with regard to realisation of Muslim solidarity through organising Arab and 
Muslim fighters against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Yet in another phase in the 
1990s, after the mujahideen’s victory in Afghanistan, he called for autonomy from the 
US, which contradicted official royal policy.
245
 Even the materials used by Saudi 
preachers to global audiences tended to reflect local political configurations within the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for and against the state. For instance, Al-Rasheed argues, 
the materials used by these preachers sometimes “carried the official Saudi religious 
interpretation to distant cultures”246 and at other times they “developed dissident 
religious tradition that challenged official Saudi Islam.”247    
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The result is that, even if somewhat exaggerated, but original, Al-Rasheed’s 
view of Saudi society sums up the emergence of diversity and challenge as an inherent 
dynamic within Saudi society: “...there is no one Saudi state, one Saudi religious 
establishment or one Saudi media empire. Today there are multiple actors with 
contradictory agendas within Saudi Arabia itself.”248 Robert Lacey paints a very 
Orientalist view of this diversity, unlike Al-Rasheed’s sophisticated sociological 
analysis. However, Lacey also provides many examples of the forces that pulls the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in opposing directions, modern and traditional, liberal and 
puritanical. Nonetheless, despite the oppositions one finds in his book, there are 
examples pointing to the diverse influences in a country not solely ruled by a single 
dogma or thinking despite sustained Saudi control over the Kingdom.
249
  
 
4.3.3 The ‘Fragmentary Moment’ 
These aforementioned challenges and contests are now embedded within Saudi 
society, both at the top and amongst the non-state sphere of activism and discourse. As 
my analysis in chapters five and six will show Saudi society, amongst the elite, the 
learned scholars, officials, and journalists, is in the midst of a dynamic experience 
through which there are multiple discourses about religion and politics. This brings me 
to the impact the communicative and interpretive moments are having on Saudi society. 
That impact is one of fragmentation. I fully agree with the argument advanced by 
Eickelman and Anderson that the media such as desktop publishing and video and 
audiocassettes, and today new media through use of the Internet or facebook or cable 
TV, “contribute to the fragmentation of political and religious authority by bypassing 
established channels. When recast as differences between senders and receivers, 
distinctions between centre and periphery become far more ambiguous and porous as 
the senders become multiple and shifting.”250 In their much acclaimed work, Muslim 
Politics, Eickelman and Piscatori argue how higher levels of literacy amongst Muslims, 
including access to new technologies and travel, have led to fragmentation of religious 
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authority, amongst other types of control over Muslim societies.
251
 This caused 
monopolies over interpretation, which has for a long time been monopolised by elites of 
learned scholars, to cease and shift from the trained ‘alim (scholar of Islam or judge) to 
the literate and educated Muslim anywhere. In their words, these processes of challenge 
of central authority, religious and political, has enabled Muslims to engage in new 
processes of protest, bargaining and redefinition of authority, diminishing the status of 
single and authoritarian channels of information dissemination.
252
 So textual access and, 
more pertinently to my study, educational and media access, has similarly contributed to 
breaking monopoly over how Saudis understand and interpret not only the discourses 
coming from multiple formulators of opinion and knowledge producers but also the 
very agents of dissemination and knowledge production. In this sense, the link of 
knowledge production and power that Michel Foucault describes so well is relevant 
here. According to Foucault, “what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is 
simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it 
traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces 
discourse.”253 When knowledge production itself stops to emanate from a single centre, 
then power itself stops being monopolised by one discourse, a single ideology or a 
single authority. The fragmentary moment is not used here as a negative force. To the 
contrary, and I refer to Al-Rasheed here, contesting authority in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, religious and political, is a new dynamic, empowering in that it diversifies the 
source of information, and its agents. Moreover, the passive recipient has closed the gap 
with the traditional sender of information or producer of knowledge: as Eickelman and 
Anderson point in their quote the receiver has been able through use of new media and 
new technologies to reverse the role thus rendering the distinction, as they put it, 
between the centre and periphery porous and ambiguous. This is the central benefit for 
public debate and the rise of new voice and a new public, to paraphrase Lynch. Again, 
quoting Eickelman and Anderson, I agree with the view that “asymmetries between 
senders and receivers, and between producers and consumers, are reduced as more 
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people participate in religious and civil discourse.”254 One might call this the 
democratising effect of the new media and wider access and participation. The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is no exception in this respect. Further to this benefit, one 
finds the interpretive value embedded in the new media, itself a democratising value: 
In this sense, the new media are more participatory, whether 
by the access they give for the uninitiated to join the 
conversation or by the implicit invitation to interpret that 
accompanies more generic, less personalized messages 
bound to particular contexts. This incompleteness that 
invites the further interpretation of messages is the mirror of 
more symmetrical, more interactive sender-receiver 
relations that characterize the newer media to which these 
messages migrate.
255
 
It is thus, these new interactions increase the interpretive input of the various 
publics, intellectual, religious or political, fragmenting them whilst bringing them 
together into a common arena of public debate, thus “transform[ing] the social 
imaginary and the idea of the public.”256 In order to understand much more deeply the 
process of reintellectualisation, I shall in the analysis below look at two inherent trends, 
firstly looking at reintellectualisation as ‘politicisation’ in the 1990s, and, more 
pertinently to more recent times, as a more sophisticated phase of discourses and 
counter-discourses. 
 
4.4 Reintellectualisation as Increased Politicisation, the 1990s 
The usual stereotype held about Arab Gulf societies in general and the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia in particular is that there is no politicised public or opposition. If 
politicisation and opposition are measured in terms of political parties, and institution-
building, then the stereotype holds true. However, if these terms are not associated with 
such institutions, then one can find many examples of how KSA is indeed a country 
where politicisation and forms of ‘informal’ opposition have always existed. But the 
1990s is particularly productive for politicisation. This is due to two factors: the first is 
the arrival on Saudi soil following the liberation of Kuwait of thousands of US troops 
who were redeployed with the purpose of strengthening the Saudi-US strategic alliance 
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against Saddam Hussein in Iraq as well as giving the Saudi state and Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) states a sense of added security. The second factor is linked to the 
redeployment of US troops from Kuwait to Saudi Arabia, causing a huge reaction 
amongst the intellectual elite, namely, the religious scholars, who were totally opposed 
to American presence in KSA, considered to be sacred Islamic territory forbidden to 
non-Muslims. This second event opened up a huge debate amongst the elite, eventually 
involving the non-religious elite as well as state officials and the public at large. The 
communicative moment facilitated such large scale discussion about the US base in the 
Kingdom as well as the nature of government. With the availability of new media 
technologies from desktop publishing, fax machines, computers and cassettes, the 
public debate took larger proportions than in previous periods when the Kingdom was 
still ‘traditional’ and aversion to use of modern gadgets was widespread. The resulting 
reintellectualisation and its manifestation in public was through the emergence of early 
forms of organised, but not licensed, politicisation, opposition or more appropriately 
dissidence against the state. This dissidence was interesting in the sense that it realigned 
both establishment and non-establishment scholars for and against the state’s approval 
of the presence of US troops in the Kingdom. This is one instance where one finds the 
earliest forms of opposed discourses amongst the elite – initiated primarily by the work 
of non-establishment scholars’ petition of the central authorities. 
This context is very significant when understanding the roots of 
reintellectualisation as specifically politicisation in the 1990s. Indeed, Saudi society 
seemed to be undergoing a shift from passive approach to public affairs to one of active 
participation and even dissidence. The communicative, interpretive and fragmentary 
moments all combined in the 1990s in the most obvious signs of reintellectualisation 
that contributed to tension in state-society relations as well as to elite-elite relations, 
causing a rift in the interpreters of religion and producers of information, those allied 
with the state and those opposing it. Here the notion of the “social imaginary and the 
idea of the public”, referred to by Eickelman and Anderson, undergoes tangible 
transformation. This transformation is manifest in the attempt by society to assume the 
role of “sender”, as opposite “receiver”, of information or messages from those in a 
position of authority, be it religious or public. Through wider interaction and 
participation in public debates, society formulates positions of approval and disapproval 
towards all kinds of issues concerning the public. Thus the ‘public’ becomes more than 
deferential subjects onto whom messages, discourses or information are relayed and 
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disseminated. Additionally, this transformation takes the form of more systematic 
approach towards political organisation and expression. This is evident in the early 
forms of associational and civil life. A very relevant example is the organisation created 
to defend public liberties, which features in the public domain in the 1990s. 
 
4.4.1 Reintellectualisation as Opposition, Questioning or Guidance 
Historically, Saudi state-society relations have sought quiet channels in order to 
consult over controversy, disagreement or tension in general. These relations have never 
been marked by equality. The state maintained the upper hand in control over society 
through expenditure and social welfarism (the state is the key employer and distributor 
of welfare goods, including subsidies of education, health and housing). This is the 
function of most rentier states, which redistribute to society a portion of income from oil 
rent in the international market.
257
 To an extent, this factor might have caused society to 
engage with the state through political deference, given the dependency of the populace 
on the state, and thus delay the rise of a new public capable of participatory politics. No 
doubt the role of religion, as I discuss below, has for the greater part of Saudi history of 
state and nation-building a restraining force for concerns over national unity, religious 
solidarity and, no doubt, patronage-clientelism dynamics that have rendered the 
religious elite loyal to the state. Even if patrimonial in nature, there is has always been a 
degree of mutuality whereby the Saudi state on its turn depended on society for support. 
From this regard, the Orientalist notion of “client feudalism” ignores the complexity and 
even subtlety of the two-way relations of support and dependence.
258
 Saudi Arabia is 
not ruled by the Qur’an, money and guns. The role of tribal alignments is important. 
The internal politics of the royal house is another dynamic not easy to research or 
gauge. And as Fred Halliday, through his Marxist perspective, correctly argues there is 
the supportive and stabilising role of the American umbrella or “US imperialism” as he 
calls it in his work Arabia without Sultans.
259
   
However, the order of total deference that marked state-society relations since 
the founding of the state by bin Saud in 1932 has gradually weakened in the 1980s and 
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1990s.
260
 The entry into the Kingdom of US troops more or less opened wide the 
possibility of challenge from society. The 1992 mudhakkirat al-nasihah (‘Reform 
Memorandum’)261 was the first society-based discourse questioning the state, and by 
extension, casting doubt about the existing state-society relations, which allowed for 
little or no expression of autonomous political opinion, much less political organisation. 
In one sense, the ‘Reform Memorandum’ marked a new political departure, with higher 
degrees of tension, for state-society relations. Legally, the system’s theological 
underpinnings have framed a very loose or weak contractual relationship between the 
subjects and the monarchy. Royal decree and royal whim govern all aspects of the 
regime of governance of the modern state to the detriment of development.
262
 The 
‘Reform Memorandum’ or mudhakkirat al-nasihah primarily marks the rise of a new 
type of interrogative discourse directly addressing the monarchy, namely, the king of 
day, Fahd.  It is akin to the kind of leaks that take place in a modern democracy when 
top-ranking civil servants wish to embarrass the government of the day over an issue of 
utmost concern to the whole of society. This is one way of looking at the ‘Reform 
Memorandum’: a call to the king to revise or rethink his permission for US troops to be 
stationed in the Kingdom. In taking that decision, not a light one by any standards, the 
King most probably acted as the ‘Custodian of the two Holy Shrines’, a reference to his 
role as defender of the faith, Islam. However, in so doing, he ignored the counsel of 
society, including public opinion formulators and non-establishment scholars or even 
low-ranking establishment learned scholars.  
Here lies one important factor: the blurring of the boundaries of the religious and 
the political in the content and text of the ‘Reform Memorandum’. Again, this underlies 
the significance of religion in the shaping of public affairs, if not quasi interplay of the 
two. Textually, mudhakkirat al-nasihah is noted for its Islamist style and content. The 
signatories more or less have Muslim Brotherhood leanings, and tend to display avowed 
sympathy for an ethos of reform or islah (reform). The drive is politico-religious, 
literally not separating between politics and religion as two separate compartments or 
realms. This is one reason why the signatories of the ‘Reform Memorandum’ provide 
counsel to the state, be it unsolicited counsel. In particular, there is reference to the 
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state’s obligation towards Islamic law or Shari‘ah. They also disclose a discourse which 
views the state as having a missionary obligation, that is, undertaking or at least helping 
with spreading the message of Islam, so-called da’wah. What is noticeable here is that 
“opposition” per say is not part of the Saudi political lexicon and mudhakkirat al-
nasihah is carefull worded not to read as a manifesto of regime opponents. Rather, the 
reliance on religious language and idioms is intended to soften the oppositional contest 
while at the same time legitimising societal questioning of the state elite on a specific 
sensitive issue of great relevance – even embarrassment – to the religious establishment 
and religion as a whole. It could never be conceived under King Faisal or King Khalid 
that US troops enter Saudi territory. That would be sacrilege or desecration of the status 
of Mecca and Medina as sacred territory in Islam. Of course, traditionally, from the time 
of the medieval Shafi scholar Imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali (1058-1128), the fear of 
fitnah (civil war or disorder within the House of Islam) or schism, has played a 
restraining role, almost confining Muslim scholars to non-political duties, sometimes in 
the service of tyrants.
263
 This is what the signatories of the memorandum had in mind: 
advise the rulers without being seen to foment disorder or fitnah.  
There is a political significance. The ‘Reform Memorandum’ met with wide 
public interest and may be even endorsement. Its primary significance lies in a two 
factors: first, society does not need the state’s permission to engage in political 
discourse. Hence it symbolises an important date in Saudi political development. 
Dekmejian is correct in his reference to higher levels of politicization of Islam in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which by any means was limited to this country in the 1990s, 
following the first Gulf War of 1991.
264
 In fact, one notices the intensification of 
politicisation in the 1990s when one compares the ‘Reform Memorandum’ with the 
earlier mild petition, Khitab Shawwal of 1991, adopting a softly approach of voluntary 
advice by establishment religion to the King.  At the heart of the heightened 
politicisation lies an intellectual shift or a gearing up of reintellectualisation in the 
service of higher political participation and expression. The shift is from loyal advice to 
serious questioning, verging on an undeclared oppositional role. The ‘Reform 
Memorandum’ contains between its lines messages of reproach along communicated as 
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guidance, the obligatory role of religious scholars. However, harsh criticism or 
identification of whole list of politico-religious flaws related to the presence of US 
troops in the Kingdom never rises to the level of outright questioning of the monarchy’s 
legitimacy.  
The same goes for the earlier petition mentioned above. It is in this comforting 
knowledge that they were not questioning the King or the royal family’s legitimacy that 
the two highest learned scholars in the land signed So when the highest learned scholar 
in the land signed Khitab Shawwal – the two-page petition is named after the month of 
Shawwal, the tenth month in the Islamic Calendar. What is significant here is that 
petitions, which are rare occurrences, often came from forces unaffiliated to the state. 
Establishment scholars, as in the case of the Shawwal petition, have channels of 
communication with the state. Perhaps the petition was intended as genuinely providing 
counsel while at the same time, more tactically, serving to silence or prevent non-
establishment criticism of the king. The country’s senior scholar and mufti, the late 
Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz, and the man coming second in ranking to him, 
Muhammad Assalih bin Uthaymeen endorsed the Shawwal petition, which carried their 
signatures along with another fifty scholars, intellectuals and reformers. The intention 
behind Khitab Shawwal is to serve a gentle reminder to the rulers, by supportive high-
ranking religious bureaucrats of the state, of the urgency to implement reform. What 
they set in motion, of course unwittingly, is a process of competition amongst the 
learned voices and forces in the Kingdom over how to relay messages of guidance and 
reform: Ibn Baz and his fellow scholars sitting in the country’s High Council of 
Religious Scholars from within the state-affiliated bureaucracy; and the signatories of 
the ‘Reform Memorandum’, a year later, from outside the system. A relevant 
observation is that petitioning the state was also establishment religion’s method of 
commanding good and preventing evil, namely, instability or fitnah. By contrast, the 
‘Reform Memorandum’ signals a new phase in state-society relations, almost testing the 
ruling family’s reaction to greater politicisation through expression of overt dissidence 
that stops short of political opposition. 
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4.5 Reintellectualisation: Discourses & Counter-Discourses, 1990s 
Onwards 
The Shawwal petition and the ‘Reform Memorandum’ represent two different 
grades of upgrading political expression and politicisation. Both seek guidance or 
practice criticism within a religious framework. But their significance primarily lies in 
their difference. The first is a loyalist brand of discourse, shielding the king from 
outside criticism by enacting it from within. The second raises the pitch of political 
opposition, religious but also secular, as Buchan observes.
265
 The emerging opposition 
has since the early 1990s been voicing more serious and harsher criticism, even if so far 
the nature of Saudi opposition does not seek the overthrow of the ruling house. This is a 
Saudi specificity of most opposition seeking transformation via political, peaceful and 
discursive methods. But the discourse of the Shawwal statement and the ‘Reform 
Memorandum’ represent a prime example of the onset of opposing tendencies intended, 
respectively, for guidance and protest. These discursive moments derive from 
intellectuals and knowledge producers, and thus contribute to reintellectualisation in the 
sense of greater politicisation of Saudi society and at the same time deepen such a 
process by making openings for open public debate and intellectual dissidence. Fandy 
credits the “politics of dissent” with making these openings, which have transformed 
Saudi politics since the early 1990s.
266
 Noteworthy in this context is the fact that 
establishment religious scholars came in the early 1990s pressure of political 
mobilisation by a younger and dissident elite of religious scholars. This pressure 
compelled the older establishment religious clergy to enter into the political arena by 
issuing a petition or memorandum of advice – khitab shawwal. They viewed this not as 
political engagement; rather, they saw it as part and parcel of carrying out their duty of 
wa‘th or guidance. This phase of politicisation in the early 1990s was itself the by-
product of communicative and interpretive moments: religious cassettes were being 
circulated secretly all over the Kingdom. They contained the sermons of a new 
generation and religious elite not dependent on the state and therefore not weary of loss 
of income. The scene was set for discourses and counter discourses. Such discourses 
pitted establishment views, messages, knowledge and interpretations of religion in 
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relation to political matters, namely US troops in the Gulf and the Kingdom, Saudi-US 
links, and the conduct of the Gulf War against Iraq against non-establishment 
knowledge producers and religious and civic dissidents. Formerly singular religious 
authority was reconfigured through counter discourses, thus fragmenting religious 
authority and religious monopoly over interpretation of religion. 
This can be illustrated through examination of the antagonism between 
establishment and non-establishment petitioning of the king: two diametrically opposed 
discourses in terms of politics even though both use religion to justify their discourses. 
That is, in both, religion is the framework within which guidance or quasi opposition 
are the intended messages communicated to the king. I explain this antagonism below. 
 
4.5.1 Establishment Religion’s Response to the ‘Reform Memorandum’ 
As the Kingdom’s highest scholar at the time, Ibn Baz did not have the 
manoeuvring capacity to put his weight behind mudhakkirat al-nasihah of 1992. There 
are many reasons for this and one of them was that he would not be supporting a rising 
elite of younger and dissident scholars not only questioning the state, but also his own 
authority. More importantly, this Saudi learned scholar, a man who was during his life 
close to the ruling elite, took the traditional approach of withholding support for the 
petition on the grounds that it was dividing society and contributing to disorder. The 
‘Reform Memorandum’ goes farther than the Shawwal petition in its critique of the 
ruling house. This assessment was dangerous and saw in it the potential for disorder and 
instability. Note here the position taken by Ibn Baz resembles the traditional approach 
of Sunni scholars throughout history to fear disunity or firqah (division). This is 
puzzling of course for the simple reason that some of the ideas found in the Shawwal 
statement or petition were similar to those presented in the ‘Reform Memorandum’. Ibn 
Baz did not sign the memorandum as sign of displeasure at its radical style and the kind 
of division between state and society and, consequently, lead to chaos it in the 
Kingdom. One call this approach Ghazalian, after the medieval scholar Hamid al-
Gahzali who was one of the chief proponents of the idea that unity under even a tyrant 
ruler capable of defending Islam was favourable to disunity within the Islamic 
community and civil war or antagonism. Ibn Baz was attempting to stop fragmentation 
of authority and perhaps he objected to put his signature on the ‘Reform Memorandum’ 
as a statement of disapproval of having interpretation of religion shared with the 109 
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young Ulama or scholars, who initiated and endorsed the petition. At one level, his 
disapproval is along the traditional lines of Sunni thinking that fragmentation and 
division undermine Islam, which he represented through his office as the country’s 
highest-ranking religious leader, apart from the king who was the ‘custodian of the two 
holy shrines’. At another level, his disapproval was calculated to send a message to his 
political masters that he would not support opposition, even if mild and peaceful, 
against the royal house and the monarchy. Even the context of the second Gulf War, 
which contributed to the petitioning activities of the establishment and non-
establishment scholars, did not justify the scholars’ departure from the tradition role of 
guidance into a new one of political engagement and opposition.  
Thus one of the charges Ibn Baz advances against the 109 young scholars in 
support of the ‘Reform Memorandum’ was their failure to see things objectively. The 
‘bayan’ or response written by Ibn Baz as his feedback on the ‘Reform Memorandum’ 
articulates this position clearly. For instance, he accuses the young scholars of not 
mentioning the positive aspects of governance. He notes that advice or counsel coming 
from religious scholars must be balanced, looking at both the pros and cons of 
government or rule in the Kingdom. Thus he questions their failure to make any 
reference to mahasin al-dawla – i.e. the positive aspects of governance in Saudi Arabia. 
In his bayan, Ibn Baz states that “Despite the fact that I and the senior scholars Council 
condemn the Memorandum…we engerain no illusion that al-waqi’ [the reality of life in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia] is perfect.”267 Ibn Baz’s feedback effectively does two 
things: firstly, it gives advice in the bayan to the young scholars to adopt critical 
objectivity criticism; secondly, he does not only send the young non-establishment 
scholars a veiled warning about dividing Saudi citizens and causing fitna, but also casts 
doubts on Islamic grounds on the soundness of the counsel they provide in the ‘Reform 
Memorandum’.268Nonetheless, Ibn Baz’s response was a sign of the trend to strengthen 
and take root in Saudi society, and which this thesis is attempting to address and 
analyse, through the emergence of multiple discourses and voices and a new public. 
Hence considering the early roots of this ‘cultural shift’ towards voicing criticism is 
relevant to the contextualisation I am trying to do in this section in order to explain how 
reintellectualisation of Saudi society has progressed through communicative, 
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interpretive and fragmentary moments. At the beginning of the 1990s, and in the height 
of the political, religious and even cultural crisis that unfolded in Gulf states following 
the Gulf conflict, the communicative moment, as Eickelman and Anderson have shown, 
witnessed extensive use of desktop publishing, audiocassettes, in particular in KSA, to 
spread the sermons, discourses, speeches and viewpoints of a new breed of religious 
scholars and activists such Salman Al-‘Awdah. Plus, the discourse no longer treated 
politics, which establishment religious scholars more or less treated as taboo, as an 
arena not open to criticism or debate. State affairs, defence, human rights, and the whole 
question of governance were subjected to public discursive scrutiny. Below I give two 
examples of these types of activism and reformist discourse, focusing on the Committee 
for the Defence of Legitimate Rights.  
 
4.5.2 Shift from Guidance to Criticism & from Discourses to Counter-Discourses 
There is a context, which must be understood, in order to represent properly how 
the activism of the 1990s deepened reintellectualisation of Saudi society and public. In 
brief, the royal house’s management of the Gulf crisis, which was costly in terms of 
autonomy, divided the Saudi public, thus leaving themselves vulnerable to levels of 
criticism unprecedented in Saudi history.
269
 In fact, the entire GCC region was teetering 
under the pressure of the invasion of Kuwait, the war against Iraq, US and US-led 
forces presence in the Arab Gulf, and the hefty bill of the war, economically. There 
were questions about why this region spends so much money on armament and yet fails 
to protect itself. It led to questions about the absence of citizen rights and incompetence 
of some ruling houses – the Kuwaiti ruling family had to escape and leave the Kuwaiti 
people to face the invasion without leadership.  
This is how the ‘Reform Memorandum’ had to be invented to suit the context of 
crisis. But the ‘Reform Memorandum’ went further than the context of the US-led Gulf 
War, in which GCC states, Egypt and Syria fought against a fellow Arab state. The 
impact has over-lasted the war. The 109 non-establishment scholars who signed the 
memorandum did not intend this. The interpretive moment and subsequent fragmentary 
moment were both part and parcel of ongoing reintellectualisation Saudi society was 
undergoing profoundly. The interpretive and fragmentary by-products led to 
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consolidation of reintellectualisation. Thus the interpreting and fragmenting of 
information, consensus and debate which initially pitted the old religious establishment 
with the younger autonomous religious elite spilled over into other issues and other 
agents of reform. The signatories of the memorandum were concerned with government 
or mis-government. The discourse which evolved from the Committee for the Defence 
of Legitimate Rights expanded public debate into other pressing issues: human rights. 
This is a significant development at the time in a society where human rights were 
taboo. Their discussion in public carried many risks since even the state did not adopt 
such a discourse, which international covenants covered thoroughly and spread to most 
parts of the world. I consider it to be a qualitative shift in Saudi society. Even if the 
ruling elite reacted angrily to this discourse and banned it, the ‘cultural shift’ was 
already noted in the public domain. So the boundaries of what the public can 
experiment with in terms of rights did originate in that context of the early 1990s. 
Despite original denial by the state, single discourse and information decided either by 
the religious or political elite was henceforth no longer possible in the Kingdom.  
To a large extent, the credit for this returns to the ‘Reform Memorandum’. They 
spoke against the state; and they challenged the state-affiliated clergy. For instance, by 
initiating questioning of Saudi foreign policy and alliance with states “undeserving of 
trust”, they were not only questioning the political elite, but also inviting the Saudi 
public at large to consider these issues as legitimate items of public concern.
270
 The 
memorandum was oppositional, in a country without civic bodies and official 
opposition. It questioned the huge expenditure on armament, dependence on foreign 
powers, and placed this into the centre of the country’s political crisis: royal greed and 
the use of national resources, namely petroleum and oil wealth, by those princes who 
are corrupt (note that the ‘Reform Memorandum in its language does not generalise and 
directs criticism at corruption as a problem without naming princes). There is a great 
deal of corroboration of corruption in the Kingdom in the work of Aburish even if his 
style tends in parts to be sensational and lacking in objectivity.
271
 What the ‘Reform 
Memorandum’ does is to criticise the judiciary or politics and political management, 
which led to corruption or misuse of national wealth, and then place them in a religious 
framework for the purpose of critical assessment. The purpose of the memorandum, 
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which is written by religious scholars, is to oppose policy by judging its conformity 
with Islam. The memorandum shows the opinion of the 109 signatories to agree on their 
judgement that rule was not compatible with Islamic law. The intention is to ‘remind’ 
the rulers of their obligation to refer to Islam in order for rule to be accountable and just. 
This is a reason why there is a chapter in the memorandum on financial affairs and 
economic matters in which the signatories stress the necessity of public scrutiny of 
finances, seeing these to be public not private wealth. There is a concern in the 
memorandum with social justice, and a call for rulers to eradicate discrepancy of 
income and poverty in the Kingdom.
272
 
Reintellectualisation is pertinent for understanding the new breed of activists 
from the middle class. They received tertiary training in the traditional curriculum, 
learning the Qur’an and the Hadith or the Tradition of the Prophet, and in modern 
specialisms. Many also had dual education inside Saudi Arabia and in foreign 
universities, which is now more typical of the new middle class in Saudi Arabia. 
Generally, the middle class in the 1980s was still pliant and did not threaten social or 
political stability.
273
 In the 1990s dual education has made their exposure to modern 
ways of thinking instrumental in the evolution of their activism, interpretive skills and 
their belief in diversity, which explains their initiative to address the rulers without 
deference to the Shawwal statement. Whereas the Shawwal statement stresses guidance, 
the ‘Reform Memorandum’ combines both guidance and protest, which has paved the 
way for more radical approaches in political debate and behaviour, namely informal 
opposition. Informal opposition was the stance assumed by the Committee for the 
Defence of Legitimate Rights. Dekmejian is correct in noting that despite their high 
level of education in the Kingdom and abroad did not provide them with the opportunity 
to participate politically.
274
 In one sense, what the ‘Reform Memorandum’ of the protest 
activism and discourse displayed by the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate 
Rights was assertion of the right to criticise government and have public debate on 
matters of concern to all citizens. The background of the new elite of upcoming activists 
helps explain the emergence of the counter-discourses, debates and information against 
the official discourse of politics, coming from society in the early 1990s.These activists 
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learnt their politics and their civil awareness and activism in local mosques, 
neighbourhood centres for charity, qur’anic schools where voluntary teaching was 
undertaken, and newspapers. This elite made of proactive individuals and professionals 
such as Salman al-Awdah or Safar al-Hawali managed to create a following in these 
local arenas of activism, including universities like the Islamic University and the Imam 
Muhammad Ibn Saud University. The same applies to other activist scholars or 
intellectuals such as Abdullah Al-Jabreen Abdullah al-Hamad Al-Jalali who both 
supported the ‘Reform Memorandum’ and signed it. These individuals and their fellow 
activists in a way led the way of protest and began a tradition of coutner-discourse and 
opposition, causing them personal difficulties with the state. All had to spend time in 
jail. What they defied was the will of the politicians and the religious establishment to 
decide matters of politics or religion un-opposed. However, one point is worth re-
stressing here: protest and opposition for the emerging anti-systemic elite in the early 
1990s was to rely on religious interpretation of Islamic law, Qur’an and Hadith to 
justify opinion given on politics or the state.
275
 So it is an opposition from within Islam, 
not through reliance on European ideologies. This of course changed much later as I 
shall point out in chapter five and six as some began to refer to ‘liberalism’, for 
instance. 
The Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (Lajnat al-Difaa An Al-
Huquq Al-Shariiyya) raised the pitch of protest and opposition even further. Again, just 
like religious scholars fragmented when new more vocal and autonomous scholars 
challenged established scholars, so did the Committee, one of the first civic bodies to 
launch a project of human rights in the Kingdom. The two co-founders Mohamed Al-
Masaari and Saad Al-Faqeeh did not see eye to eye as how to organise the committee 
and mobilise the Saudi public to their cause. Eventually, two opposed discourses 
emerged, leading to the committee to split. This mode of fragmentation, I think, was a 
driving force in the strengthening of Saudi society, making it more diverse in views and 
politics. Al-Faqeeh moved on to create Islamic Reform in Arabia, and this on its turn 
led to further splits. But all of these tendencies to fragment produced a dynamic of 
diversity in the bigger number of public scholars, types of discourse and organisations 
contributing to the creation of a new public in the Kingdom. Both the function of 
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politics and of religion was forced to begin gradual transformation. Religion no longer 
limited itself to guidance (except for establishment scholars) and included discourses of 
protest and even opposition, be it still unorganised in the Kingdom where legalising 
these activities is very bureaucratic involves vetting by many departments, including the 
Interior Ministry. For instance, Al-Masaari wrote a treatise which he called Bringing 
Rulers to Account - Muhasbat Al-Hukkam.
276
 This is a departure from the mild style of 
guidance used historically by establishment religion. At any rate, the result is 
consolidation of politicisation unlike before in the Kingdom’s history, a view supported 
by the work of Mamoun Fandy. Fandy also notes that the transformation in the use of 
religion in politics is aimed at greater capacity for public recruitment by the same 
counter-discourses emerging in the public arena.
277
 Moreover, the use of religion 
became more nuanced and sophisticated. The discourse of human rights or of rights in 
general, which is akin to an emerging discourse of citizenship, departed from the 
traditional Hanbali-Wahhabi position which avoids Western borrowings. Al-Masaari 
who was a physicist accepted degrees of Western democratic methods such as elections 
and talked of accountability. However, he did so because he used a religious 
interpreting of religion that stressed good government and public good or maslahah 
amma. This emerging style at the time neither excluded Western ideas nor discarded 
Islamic law or ideas amenable to just and good government.  
Al-Massaari’s treatise values the Qur’an, the Tradition of the Prophet and 
Islamic Law, relating his views on good government and his ideas about social justice to 
these texts and sources of Islamic legislation. He also upholds, for the purpose of justice 
and government compatible with Islam, the Godly command for Muslims to practice the 
principle of al-amr bi al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy ani al-munkar (seeking the good of all 
members of the community, and preventing evil and disorder.
278
 This is one of the key 
contributions of the committee for the Defence of Rights to politicisation and to the 
consolidation of this process and that of reintellectualisation: seeking a mix of Muslim 
and non-Muslim ideas in order to institute Islam’s principles of just rule that conforms 
to the Qur’an and to Islamic law. This is one reason why he saw no problem with the 
adoption of political parties,
279
 something Hanbali-Wahhabi religious scholars would 
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not find support for in their interpretations of religious texts, for instance. He saw in 
political parties models of organisation not too different from Islamic idea of jamaat  or 
associations.
280
  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
What I have argued in this chapter goes against the type of “mythology” 
Westerners seem to have about the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Christine Helms refers to 
this mythology with its many stereotypes, which include association of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia with tribal existence, extremism and with the Saudi royal house.
281
 In this 
chapter, I have indirectly sought to question some of this mythology. I looked at the 
process of reintellectualisation as an important dynamic in the change of the Kingdom 
into a more sophisticated society where one finds diversity of ideas, protest, and 
informal opposition. The examples I gave of this transformation through my 
explanation of three interrelated moments thanks to change in communication and 
social media, bolder and diverse interpretation of ideas, which have produced positive 
fragmentation in religious opinion and in political thinking. Literally, talking in the 
context of the 1990s of the counter discourses trend is not an exaggeration. It was the 
trend that has today resulted in the emergence of various trends of thought, all of which 
contest public issues, including religion, politics and culture, and use the media, 
amongst other forums such as blogs, to express these trends of thought and seek 
followers for them. A remarkable specificity about the emerging trends in the 1990s 
was the use of religion by the activists calling for either limited or radical political 
reform. The two most opposed discourses, liberal and ‘traditional’ which I will be 
focusing on in the following two chapters, are no exception. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONSTRUCTION OF ‘MODERATION’ IN SAUDI ARABIA: A DISCOURSE 
ANALYSIS OF THE ‘PRAGMATIC’ TREND 
5.1 Focus 
I have set as my doctoral task the study of the emerging discourses of trends I 
have called ‘pragmatic’ and ‘puritanical’. The aim is to look at the extent to which these 
discourses are producing a ‘culture of moderation’. At one level, the aim indirectly 
attempts to respond to Orientalist discourses, which have after 9/11 reduced the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia into some kind of ‘factory of terrorism’. I have addressed 
these in chapters one and two. At another level, my study examines under-researched 
discourses, which I believe remain ‘hidden’ or ‘inaccessible’ to outsiders. My survey of 
scholarship on the Kingdom has shown that there is a tendency to associate Saudi 
Arabia with extremism and religious fanaticism or extremism. My intention by 
accessing indigenous discourses, written and spoken, is to provide through a different 
angle the ‘transition’ happening quietly in Saudi Arabia. So my aim in this chapter is 
focus solely on the emerging discourse of ‘moderation’. In the previous chapter I have 
shown the onset of this discursive ‘transition’ aided by the process of 
“reintellectualisation”, the term used by Dale Eickelman and Jon Anderson. In that 
chapter I showed that the beginning of a process of ‘contestation’ and, relative to Saudi 
Arabia, the emergence of a discourse of ‘political opposition’. The emergence of this 
discourse of political opposition or contestation, I added, fragmented and diversified 
religio-political discourse in the Kingdom. Thus it is no longer appropriate either to 
ignore this trend in the study of the Kingdom or to assume there is only one type of 
discourse. These trends of ‘opposition’ and ‘contestation’, which have their roots in the 
process of reintellectualisation, which I have tied to advances in mass education, 
diversification of media outlets, social media, and the fragmentation of the ‘public 
sphere’, specific to Saudi Arabia. That is, the sphere of religio-political debates and 
counter-debates, discourses and counter-discourses. The moderating effect of this 
reintellectualisation needs more following up. This is what I am trying to do in this 
chapter: following up that discursive ‘transition’ with its moderating effects. To do this 
I want to deepen understanding of this discursive ‘transition’ in order to grasp the very 
discourses producing moderation and moderates. 
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5.1.1 Searching for Discourses of ‘Moderation’: Evidence from ‘Khaymas’ 
Very generally, my empirical analysis is concerned with the question of the 
nature of politico-religious discourse in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  after 9/11. We 
are told, as I have shown through samples of Orientalist works, that Saudi Arabia and 
‘moderation’ are opposites. I am not satisfied by this oversimplification. Saudi Arabia is 
not monolithic in terms of discourse, and the nature of the religio-political discourse can 
no longer be confined to the evidence used by Orientalists and others, such as those 
fixed on security issues and agendas. This is not specific to the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. If discourse was single in Europe and the US we would have had a different 
type of international relations run solely by realists whose politics stress use of force. 
Similarly, if discourse was single in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we would have had 
only one voice by religious fanatics who wish 9/11 repeated everywhere thought to be 
infidel or anti-Islam. So my task of finding the evidence about my position that there is 
a process of construction of a ‘culture of moderation’ in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
was challenging. Evidence is vital here. But my problem was not the scarcity of such 
discourses. To the contrary, it was the diversity of such discourses, which today include 
users of social media such as facebook, blogs, chat rooms and all kind of Internet sites 
to communicate the kind of ‘moderation’ and ‘moderate’ discourses, ideas and positions 
I set out to gather for my PhD. I was advised by my supervisor to go after solid 
information which did not go against ethical rules and standards of credibility. 
Since my qualitative methodology seeks to find answers through the use of 
discourse analysis, the challenge I initially confronted was to determine the ‘corpus’ of 
my evidence and its source. The biggest challenge of all was that I had to abandon my 
preference for observational methods. But since there ‘is life after the PhD’, I can 
pursue this later when this method will in the future meet with trust from hosts of the 
traditional forums we call in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ‘khayma’ (literally large tent 
which serves as a gathering place for males and to an extent resembles the Kuwaiti 
diwaniyya). The same forum is known by the more common name majlis, which 
sometimes translates as ‘council’ when it is very formal. My initial research fieldwork 
was all conducted in khaymas and the majlis in cities such as Riyadh, Jedda, and my 
own region, particularly in the city of Burayda. At the end, I was not able to use of the 
material I gathered in these forums for one reason: no one was comfortable with my 
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using of the technique pertinent to observational methods: watching every move, and 
trying to record every idea. I was prevented from doing so given the culture of distrust 
in KSA, as in the rest of the Middle East. Recording what people say is a difficult task 
often associated with intelligence gathering activities. Ethically, of course I could not 
make use of information the hosts of the majlis or the khayma forbade me from 
recording or using outside. The observed were too conscious of my presence seeking 
data that the natural pace and content of information completely changed in some 
occasions. Nonetheless, I found the directness of this method, including participant 
observation, very beneficial and attractive. Basically, one is presented with vast corpus 
of ‘live’ evidence.282 This explains the popularity of this qualitative method amongst 
anthropologists, and others schools of social sciences, etc. Despite being time-
consuming, the data I found here but am not free to use served to confirm one thing: 
Saudi Arabia has diverse discourses, including in informal gatherings, of moderation 
and led by moderates. Yet the association, as I mentioned earlier, is the stress on fanatic 
religious discourse, which itself has become so diverse, fragmented and undergoing its 
own type of ‘moderation’. I found the ‘khayma’ or ‘majlis’ atmosphere very natural, 
and without a doubt a ‘real world’ of information where one comes so close to public 
sentiment and opinion. Jorgensen talks about the benefit of “the World of everyday 
life.”283 Without permission to record I was told by my supervisor to abandon this 
method as it posed an additional problem, on top of the ethics of getting approval from 
the hosts of the khayma or majlis, of validity or reliability of data. There was massive 
flow of information, debate, discussion, exchanges and contests that it was impossible 
to memorise them and therefore their systematic use was out of the question. However, 
it was my dozens of visits and hundreds of hours in khayma and majlis that made me 
confident in my choice of topic. In these forums in the capital and provincial cities of 
the Kingdom I found moderates and discourses that point to a ‘cultural shift’ of sorts 
towards ideas of dialogue, diversity of opinion, and acceptance of opposed views. The 
evidence I found in these forums suggested that the Kingdom had entered in a new 
phase of nation-building. For a long time, the prevalent culture has been described in 
derogatory terms as thaqafat al’m’tawwi ‘ , which in Saudi colloquial language refers to 
the religious police practices and activities that have left an impression of religious 
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extremism and intolerance. The feelings, attitudes, and deeds, especially, in terms of the 
high levels of toleration, orderly contests, and opposing views I observed in these 
informal forums of Riyadh and Jeddah confirmed my ‘hunch’ or intuitive thinking 
about the ‘transition’ of discourse from a state of ghuluww, in Arabic meaning hard-line 
thinking and speaking, to the state of wasatiyya, moderate stance towards politics, 
religion, culture, gender, good government and the West, for instance.  Whilst 
informative, the discourses of these informal gatherings were not sufficient for me to 
build a credible thesis if I could not use evidence from the khayma or majlis to back up 
my arguments and prove or disprove my hypothesis about the move towards a moderate 
culture in the Kingdom. These discourses will remain hidden. But this does not take 
away from their role in deepening dialogue and moderate exchange of ideas. My 
strategy, then, had to change in search for discursive forces and voices, which I can 
document and use as a source of data, data that has validity and credibility.  
 
5.1.2 Searching for Valid Data on ‘Moderation’: Texts & Interviews 
In the second phase of my fieldwork, I moved towards a more structured 
exploratory phase. My aim was to catch up time wasted in testing an observational 
strategy that failed as was not able to observe and document data. I learnt from informal 
observation. But in this phase I needed pre-structure in locating a corpus of material that 
could help me examine the emergence of moderate discourses. For this purpose, 
interviews became very attractive. I was initially considering to use a questionnaire with 
fixed questions. But this is another method that makes Saudi respondents very 
conscious of the content and method, and initial inquiry showed that I would not find 
enough participants to gather sufficient data. Plus, there is the ethical issue of having the 
questionnaire vetted and approved by the Interior Ministry. This would mean providing 
a list of individuals and organisations targeted as respondents by the questionnaire. 
Again, discussion with the supervisor encouraged me to use my experience within the 
country’s political society and aim for interviews instead. The use of interviews for 
collection of data would mean one-to-one and face-to-face exercises for asking a set of 
questions, and I did not plan them to be ‘depth interviews’. I was aware of the cultural 
setting and knew that I had to do with minimum structure (or semi-structured) in order 
to allow interviewees more freedom to speak and give their ideas with maximum 
honesty. Saudi culture is largely oral – in its use of poetry, recitation of the Qur’an, and 
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social interaction. My strategy was to be sensitive to these traits and conduct my 
interviews with minimum intervention, only when necessary for clarification, further 
evidence or making connections between ideas stated during the interview. I also had to 
deal with the issue of names as I had to ensure whether the respondents wished their 
names withheld. Most preferred their names not to appear in any publication, 
commercial or otherwise, which could become a library resource and this includes 
PhDs. I will in this study mention names only where prior permission was given by my 
interviewees. My interviewing strategy was somewhere between the two extremes of 
‘depth interviews’ and ‘non-directive interviews’: some structure coupled with informal 
approach, in my case making advantage of the cultural environment.
284
 I was not in any 
way interested in the “fixed-item, precategorized-response survey interviews”,285 as 
Weiss Describes them, because my aim was from the beginning qualitative not 
quantitative. I was not interested in proportions or percentages. It was meaning that I 
planned to be central to my exploration of evidence of moderate attitudes and thoughts 
in Saudi Arabia.  
One observation must be mentioned here: even the ability to conduct interviews 
is indicative of a new environment which is but reluctantly accepting questioning on 
issues regarding questions of ‘moderation’, acceptance of tolerance or opposing views. 
Until recently there were taboos in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and clearance is 
difficult to receive and respondents practised a form of self-censorship, not accepting 
invitations for interviews. This knowledge made me sensitive to how I approach my 
respondents. Having made sure that my research environment is ‘low risk’ to me and 
my respondents, I set out on a first exploratory fieldwork and used my connections to 
meet very informally potential interviewees. The context is as important here.
286
 I did 
not limit myself to a single category or a specific sample population. I had to ‘slot’ my 
respondents for both the ‘pragmatic’ and ‘puritanical’ strands according to my 
knowledge of their types of discourse on religion, politics, gender, tolerance, and good 
government. It took one month of visits to introduce myself and make my research 
known to the interviewees. I was surprised by the positive response. The two lists of 
ideal interviewees I planned to visit were slightly longer than the final lists of those I 
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ended up interviewing. Those who dropped out mentioned objection to ‘the artificial 
divisions’ I created. A few objected because they viewed the research with suspicion, 
perhaps along the lines of information needed by ‘foreign powers’. A few of course 
objected because they did not wish to be recorded at all. That was useless for my 
research and it was easy to drop them from the list. One invited me for an informal 
discussion which I benefited from but still without approval to use the information in 
my thesis, not even note-taking was allowed. The first meetings were beneficial and I 
must confess they gave me badly needed confidence as I started to despair at gathering 
any information, despite the fact that I conducted a handful of interviews back in 2006. 
The ‘risk’ factor in relation to censorship or government intolerance with free research 
was an inhibiting factor for a dozen interviewees not used in the end.  
Once I was able to surpass this first hurdle, my strategy turned towards the 
design stage which was easy as my ‘semi-structured’ questions were minimal, revolving 
around questions about definitions of moderation, principles and values of moderation, 
and implications of moderation in thought and practice. The remaining questions varied 
from interview to another, largely clarifications about the three criteria ideological 
moderation, acceptance of pluralism, and respect of rules. My plan was to withhold 
from guiding the answers as I was interested in honest responses – with minimum 
influence by my role. I limited my intervention to cases where I felt I needed to know 
whether one or all of the criteria were not covered properly. The other side of the 
interview design stage focused on manageability of data and time. I had to think through 
because my intellectual curiosity about my topic led me to study the question of 
moderation. However, absence of information or lack of co-operation by respondents 
led me to despair. But I did not wish to gather mounds of data that hamper my task of 
transcription, and selection of key excerpts or quotations. To an extent I was successful 
with this as I knew how to handle the interviews and prevented my respondents when I 
felt they were changing the subject or explaining irrelevant aspects. The risk was always 
there because I planned to conduct the interviews with minimum interruptions. The 
interviews varied in length, and some were more difficult to transcribe than others. 
Some were impossible to transcribe because of length. I simply did not have the time 
resource to do that. I had to make do with using the tape counter numbers precisely at 
the points where I thought I needed to listen again to usable statements. The texts I read 
on interviewing in preparation for the interviews were all helpful and some 
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fascinating.
287
 Of the seven tasks ‘thematising’ was the easiest, and transcribing and 
analysing the most challenging. In my case, the interviews added knowledge on the 
subject. The written documents, by actors from the ‘pragmatic’ and ‘puritanical’ trends 
were a very rich source of information. However, I needed the additional material 
obtained from interviews to consolidate analysis and knowledge on the topic of 
moderation derived from written texts, i.e. speeches, articles, books, and treatises.   
 
5.1.3 The Task: Discourse Analysis 
The methodology of discourse analysis is demonstrated using a corpus 
comprising transcripts and/or recordings of interviews and supplementary texts by 
opinion formulators from the two trends, ‘pragmatic’ and ‘puritanical’. One challenge 
was how to make good use of the data obtained without the risk of over or under-
interpretation of the written and spoken texts or data. My objective was to record my 
interpreting of the set of data with maximum representation of the ideas used, whether 
interviews or articles. To reduce these risks my task was to follow a framework based 
on three dimensions which I consider vital for interpreting the understanding of 
moderation and its creation in the discourses of ‘pragmatic’ and ‘puritanical’ trends of 
thought in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Very generally, moderation stands for 
attitudes of toleration, compromise, pluralism, inclusion, consensus, and civility in 
political discourse. I have varied this understanding of ‘moderation’, by narrowing it to 
three specific criteria or dimensions. So my strategy is then to extricate meanings 
related to ‘moderation’ via authorial interpreting through use of discourse analysis 
strategy. My aim, more clearly, is to gain understanding of how the informants 
understand moderation in relation to: i/ acceptance of pluralism, ii/ ideological 
moderation, iii/ respect of the rules of the political game. My stress in the analysis will 
be on acceptance of pluralism as the main criterion of moderation. It is the construction 
of meaning in relation to the concept of ‘moderation’ and how such constructions are 
made that this study focuses on. This methodological strategy of analysis and 
interpreting aims at helping me answer the key question of my thesis: To what extent it 
can be argued that current discourses are helping construct a ‘culture of moderation’ in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia? I raise this query against the background of a Saudi 
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emerging ‘public sphere’ (not secular in the Western sense) which is today moving 
slowly towards more discursive and participative practices, in both traditional forums 
where males gather such as the khayma or majlis, or in the new more modern space 
created by the Internet and new social media. To repeat an idea from the previous 
chapter, the background of my analysis is the process of reintellectualisation thanks to 
the spread of higher education, including overseas, and the media revolution which 
Saudi media tycoons have helped flourish all over the Arab region especially in the Gulf 
region. Without this process of reintellectualisation, I have argued, the rise of new 
moderate discourses or new discourses of moderation with messages of renewal would 
not have been possible. 
 
5.1.4 A Discourse Analysis of ‘Moderation’ in the Discourse of the ‘Pragmatic’ Trend 
In the following section, where I try to analyse and interpret these discourses, I 
mix evidence from the written and spoken texts. I have selected the written texts from 
about 175 texts, all of which are suited to the task of discourse analysis in this section. 
However, given the limitation of scope and time, I have chosen two dozen texts in total. 
Eight of the texts chosen are written by women. This to an extent makes up for the 
impossibility for a male enquirer to conduct interviews with Saudi women. Only one 
interviewee is a female, a diplomat at the Saudi Embassy in London. The difficulty with 
obtaining interviews with women relates to cultural restrictions and not political bans. 
The chosen texts all record in a very relevant way arguments which make a strong case 
for ‘moderation’. They additionally provide a very credible supplement to the 
interviews I conducted for this task. The following analysis is divided according to the 
three dimensions.    
 
5.2 Acceptance of Pluralism  
A term that is bandied out frequently by my interviewees is that of i‘tiraf, 
meaning recognition. The root verb of the term is ‘arafa, which means to know, and as 
one interviewee notes: “In the Qur’an we have a moral code about people knowing one 
another. This obligation to know does not simply mean to ‘get acquainted with’. It goes 
beyond that: it refers to a Godly command to recognise ‘others’ around us, and 
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recognition of others extends to their values, ideas, politics, faith, and free choice.”288 
The statement sounds very liberal for a Saudi audience. But this short statement is full 
of meanings which characterise the stand adopted today in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia by the ‘pragmatic’ trend. When the Honourable member of the Consultative 
Council (majlis al-shura), Ibrahim Al-Belehi, speaks in these terms about recognition, 
he is speaking for entrenching a new moral code for accepting pluralism. For him 
‘pluralism’ is not limited to politics. He says “pluralism is too broad a value to limit to 
politics, religion. It cannot ignore the realm of ideas, and knowledge-making.”289 Al-
Belihi uses a number of synonyms when speaking about ‘pluralism’ – see Table 3. He 
uses terms such as tanawwu‘ and ta‘addud, and for him there is a Qur’anic ethical basis 
for this attitude, and this is why he views ‘moderation’ as strongly linked with 
pluralism. He describes moderation in two ways. Firstly, he says how it should not be 
narrowed: “those who view ‘moderation’ as ‘liberalism’ know neither ‘moderation’ or 
‘liberalism’. I personally find the term ‘liberalism’ to reflect historical values and 
progress, and its economic basis is not found in Arab history of political ideas and 
development. Further, those who use the ‘term’ liberalism’ they misuse it as a label to 
exclude others and accuse them of betrayal of faith, country, etc. Moderation, I want to 
stress this point, is not only Western. It is a human value. Hasn’t our Prophet and the 
Holy Qur’an talk about the ‘moderate umma’ (ummatan wasata).”290 Al-Belihi’s 
definition of moderation rejects the label liberal, used by some extremists to attack 
advocates of reform in the Kingdom. This is one reason why he rejects the use of the 
term. As he says in the same interview: “I oppose being represented as a liberal when a 
more appropriate way is to call me ‘wasati’ [moderation as an Islamic moral trait].”291 
I have deliberately opened the discourse analysis section with the ideas of 
Ibrahim Al-Belihi who is a well-known public intellectual, author and parliamentarian. 
What is unique about Al-Belihi is his history of struggle for moderation and reform in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. His philosophical work Husun al-Takhalluf: Mawani‘ Al-
Nuhudh (The Citadels of Backwardness: Constraints against Renaissance) is the 
leading work in which he tries to advocate acceptance of pluralism as a precondition of 
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freeing citizens, the Saudi and the Muslim nation from obscurantism and under-
development.
292
 This work which reworks ideas he has been contributing to the Arab 
and Saudi press through feature articles can be considered as a quasi ‘manifesto’ of 
pluralism and moderation, stressing the need for new ways of thinking and renewal in 
knowledge-making, culture, the sciences, religion and politics. Al-Belihi in this work 
attacks ‘extremism’ and obscurantism as the basis of intellectual and physical violence. 
He calls this negative tendency which is the exact opposite of pluralism al-fikr al-iqsa’i 
(the exclusionary mentality).
293
 Al-Belihi thus defends pluralism through a set of 
intellectual propositions: firstly, elimination of ‘the exclusionary mentality’. He 
secondly advocates two interconnected values, which for him, are vital for consolidation 
of pluralism and are fundamentally attitudes of moderate thinking: self-criticism (ru’yat  
‘uyub al-dhat) and respect of the ‘other’ (tahtarimu al-akhar).294 Thirdly, Al-Belihi 
voices strong support for a culture of moderation built on commitment to and respect of 
rights (ihtiram al-huquq), including human rights in my first interview with him.
295
 
Again, Al-Belihi who is a champion of a dialogue of civilisation with the Western world 
views the respect of rights not only as the secret of Western renaissance, but also as a 
value which has a basis in the Qur’an and Islam. Al-Belihi as the leading voice of 
pluralism and moderation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia attempts one of the most 
coherent attempts of synthesis between Islamic and Western values. Central to his belief 
in renewal and creating a culture of moderation is in addition to respect of pluralism, as 
he explains it above, is also openness to opposing ideas and continuous revision of 
ideas. Through this synthesis Al-Belihi asserts his strong belief in the tenets of Islam 
and at the same time his confidence in the Western and Greek philosophical traditions 
which reject ‘possession of truth’, as he says in his book (yamliku wahdahu al-haqiqa 
al-mutlaqa) [man cannot possess truth], requiring pluralism of ideas and exchange of 
ideas between human civilisations and cultures.
296
  
Echoes of Al-Belihi’s thinking can be found in the new generation of opinion of 
formulators who voice similar views courageously, despite the risk of being labelled 
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‘libreal’ by some of the religious voices still standing against pluralism of ideas and 
reinterpreting of Islam. Yahya Al-Amir’s widely-read piece ‘Afkar li al-Hayat Al-
Sa‘udiyya...Tatallu‘at al-Mustaqbal al-amin’ (Ideas for Saudi Society: Aspirations for a 
Safe Future) advances values of dialogue as conditions for a culture of moderation, 
which for him is the key to better Saudi life and sound development in the future. Three 
fundamentals are of importance for this to happen: a project of renewal that champions 
pluralism (tanawwu‘), discourse and counter-discourse (niqash), and openness to new 
ideas (ma huwa jadid).
297
 Al-Amir’s stress on pluralism as the route to Saudi 
development encourages legal renewal and the fight against corruption. For him 
corruption stands in the way of genuine pluralisation of Saudi society. Firstly, different 
ideas especially of renewal and moderation are prevented from making an impact. So 
long as there are laws that threaten punishment of dissidence, then diversity can be 
inhibited. Corruption, on its turn, stands in the way of plural institution-building, a 
condition that he views to be necessary for consolidation of pluralism.
298
 Al-Amir is of 
the view that pluralism can be organised around the value of national solidarity (al-
mihway al’fi’li li al-watan wa huwa al wihda). However, national solidarity does not 
deny “belief in diversity and difference of opinion, rights, [prerequisites] for a better 
future and protection of such a future”299 Like al-Belihi, al-Amir expresses respect for 
the cultural heritage and within it Islam. This is the part that links with the politico-
religious discourse within which these discourses of pluralism take place. It is a 
condition for promoting renewal and the new values of pluralism, rights, difference of 
opinion to declare respect for either religion and/or patriotism. Having made his point 
clear about national solidarity, al-Amir moves on to criticise the forces of obscurantism, 
just like al-Belihi. Thus he notes that the task of renewal requires a kind of 
transformation, in all developing societies, including Saudi Arabia. In such societies, 
and by extension the Kingdom, the “pre-state traditional and conservative culture and 
mentality had as a trait mumana’a (rejection/boycott) of all innovation.”300 This 
criticism carries so many meanings. One of such meanings is directed at the discourses 
of religious conservatism in society which seem to stand as an obstacle towards the 
renewal required for development in the Kingdom. Historically, in the pre-state and 
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early phase of state-making in the Saudi Arabia, innovation was treated almost as a 
heresy. Another aspect of al-Amir’s championing of pluralism and developmental, legal 
and educational renewal is directed at religious authority. This links with the ideas 
explained in the previous chapter about the reinterpretive dynamic of 
reintellectualisation, which seeks to propose new ways at looking at the role of religion 
as well as reinterpreting religious dogma.  
The ideas of discourse and counter-discourse, difference of opinion, rights, 
dialogue and renewal are equally expressed in the thinking of female reformers and 
members of the ‘pragmatic’ trend of thought in Saudi Arabia. Halima Mudhaffar who 
writes widely in the Saudi press on issues related to reform highly regards dialogue’s 
place in the process of shifting politics, society, youth and culture towards dialogue. 
Being herself a practitioner of dialogue, she gives one example of the importance of this 
value in any moderate society. In her March visit to the International Book Fair held 
during that month in Riyadh, she criticised the attempt by some members of the Salafi 
or religious-literalist trend in the Kingdom to cause some temporary disruption to the 
book fair, making the point that these youth are easily influenced by the forces wanting 
to cause division and disorder in the Kingdom. This is due to their fair of the influx of 
foreign books and obviously the ideas contained within them. Halima Mudhaffar took 
this as an opportunity to engage with some of the Salafi youth. She was encouraged by 
the disposition of many them to engage in peaceful dialogue and even accept difference 
of opinion. Her advice for further promotion of dialogue with this trend is by spreading 
the message the best defence against extremism and method for its eradication is “to 
instil the principle of dialogue and enlightenment...” noting that “diversity of opinion 
does not impede dailogue.”301 One female diplomat I was able to interview at the 
London Embassy makes a direct link between plural ideas and pluralism in culture and 
moderation. Dr Ilham Yousef argues that the diversity of views has a moderating effect. 
It “gives society a wide range of ideas about all issues of concern to the citizenry. This 
range of ideas thus exposes the community to new ideas and interpretations which were 
not previously available. It is only through different and diverse ideas individuals and 
organisations in a plural society can adjust their thinking on the basis of the availability 
                                                 
301
 Halima Mudhaffar, “Ma Jara fi Ma‘radh Al-Kitab la Yubasshir,” [What Took place in the 
Book Fair is not a Good Sign], in Al-Watan Online, 10 March 2010. 
141 
 
of better arguments and courageous thinking.”302 There is a very powerful gender 
content to the positions of members of the ‘pragmatic’ trend of thought in KSA. Hence 
they tend to accept and defend pluralism. Moreover, they assume a moral position, 
which I find to be courageous, by defining pluralism in terms of inclusiveness of 
women in political, social, cultural and economic affairs. As Dr Ilham notes in her 
interview “it would be morally wrong to speak of reform (islah) and ignore women.”303 
She finds no opposition whatsoever between inclusiveness of women and the position 
of Islam, in both the Qur’an and the Hadith (sayings) of the Prophet. I will go back to 
this point about the reference to Islam in the discourse of the ‘pragmatic’ trend when I 
discuss the third component of moderation, ‘respect of rules’. This notion of 
inclusiveness of women is part of the type of pluralism that the ‘pragmatic’ trend is 
trying to clarify, develop and promote. All of the fifteen (15) interviewees discussed 
gender inclusiveness in three distinctive terms: i/ as an important component of 
pluralism, and that pluralism would be incomplete without inclusiveness of women in 
Saudi society; ii/ all find gender inclusiveness as compatible with Islam, blaming the 
slow pace of including women in all facets of social, political and economic life on 
ignorance and the dogmatism of some religious scholars, but they do not blame all 
learned scholars for the status of women in KSA; iii/ and all view inclusiveness as a 
precondition of reform or islah. An interviewee, serving as a judge in Jeddah, who 
despite his religious training and background, thinks that the inclusiveness of women is 
not only a requirement for reform, but also a condition for speedy development in the 
Kingdom. His view gives further support to the pragmatic trend’s championing of the 
cause of women as worthy of equality. He states:  
My experience as a judge has taught me that social custom 
has contributed in a very negative way to the absence of 
inclusiveness in Saudi society. I preside over so many cases 
where even educated women are made victims of social 
custom that has nothing to do with Islam, the Qur’an or the 
deeds of the Prophet Muhammad. If the Prophet, peace be 
upon him, married a businesswoman from Mecca, why 
should not his example send a message to those standing 
against inclusiveness of women that their wives, sisters, and 
female relatives ought to be given the same equal 
opportunity and right. The problem is social custom and not 
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so much the state. Reform has to come from society because 
you can legislate as much as you wish about inclusiveness 
but if society does not practise inclusiveness in their daily 
life, nothing will change.
304
 
Al-Belihi agrees with this position and offers a philosophical angle on the above. 
He argues that the state of inequality of women is part of a wider problem: absence of 
respect of the rights of the individual for equal participation from which society as a 
whole suffers. He links this idea of human rights for men and women with the Qur’anic 
notion of Godly ennoblement or takreem. Thus in the same interview he poses the 
question of “why males obey stupid social customs and disobey God’s Holy Book, the 
Qur’an, which ennobles men and women equally.”305 His Royal Highness Prince Turki 
al-Faisal agrees with these views. He stresses that “for a reform package to be 
successful in brining speedy and systematic inclusiveness to all Saudi women must 
begin with society but without excluding legal, educational and economic reforms by 
the state. The combination of the two approaches creates an irreversible momentum 
favouring inclusiveness.”306 He also agrees with other interviewees from the 
‘pragmatic’ trend that seriousness on the path of pluralism must address women’s 
inclusiveness. He adds that “a genuine notion of pluralism must treat gender 
inclusiveness as it does other items pertinent to pluralism such as national dialogue, 
municipality elections, free press, financial and economic reform, and equal state-
society relations through legal and representative institutions such as the Consultative 
Council (majlis al-shura).”307 Noting how women have overtaken men in higher 
education in terms of numbers, Prince Turki views this development as conducive to 
granting more rights to women than has so far been the case. Known for his democratic 
stand amongst the royal family, Prince Turki advocates giving women voting rights, 
“adding that if and when elections are introduced for the Consultative Council women 
should be part of the voting population.”308 These rights are for him central to pluralism: 
“Women form half of Saudi society, and to exclude this important half from rights to 
inclusiveness is to shut the door of reform and genuine pluralism.”309 This championing 
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of women’s rights meets with full and unanimous support by all of the interviewees and 
most of the articles addressing the question of pluralism by the ‘pragmatic’ trend. 
Similarly, the eight female intellectuals, including Halima Al-Mudhaffar, and 
reformers from the ‘pragmatic’ trend of thought express similar ideas linking gender 
inclusiveness as pivotal to genuine pluralism. Their articles stress reform, and champion 
pluralism unequivocally. The concepts found in the articles or statements of members of 
the ‘pragmatic’ trend are present in their articles. Their arguments, like the ideas by Dr 
Ilham Yousef, advocate inclusiveness as a Godly right. None of these women take a 
radical feminist view of the status of women in KSA. They enter the public debate on 
female inclusiveness from the angle that is necessary reform not opposed to Islam, and 
that the fault so far belongs to society and not Islamic law and traditions. Hence Dr 
Yousef states that “Islam is the religion of democracy.”310 For her what is needed in 
KSA is “application of the value of independent reasoning on the part of the learned 
scholars (‘ulama) so that society moves forward on the path of reform in the legal, 
educational, financial, and democratic areas so that women benefit from these reforms 
and enjoy their full rights, including voting rights when elections become part of the 
political scene in the Kingdom.”311 For her it is a negative attitude to be going back to 
the fact that women were not given the vote during the 2005 municipality elections. She 
says that “what matters is for reform-minded organisation, individuals, educators, 
judges and ministers to make the case for future inclusiveness. What matters in reform 
is positive thinking and focus on the future not the past.”312 Hatun al-Fasi, another 
woman who has voiced courageous ideas in favour of reform, social welfare, better 
education and facilities for youth, and over all participation for Saudi society, looks at 
gender inclusiveness from a human rights angle. In an article she wrote in 2010 about 
problems of youth and lack of equal opportunities, she views inclusiveness as a right 
whether for men or women, and for youth in particular. She argues in this way as 
absence of equal opportunity radicalises youth, and this is one problem linked in the 
Kingdom to recruitment of excluded young men by terrorists such as al-Qaida. Al-
Fasi’s legal approach and her stress of the human rights agenda places obligations on 
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both the state and society to respect laws which have now become universal.
313
 For 
example, she mentions the human rights conventions banning all forms of 
discrimination against women.
314
 This legal and anti-discrimination approach adds 
moral edge to the discourse of female inclusiveness. Al-Fasi also uses this argument to 
support the country’s two main human rights organisations, the first is a civic body 
entirely autonomous of the state (al-jam‘iyya al-wataniyya li huquq al-isnan), and the 
other is state-led (al-hay’a al-wataniyya li huquq al-isnan).315 Fatima Faqih contributes 
critically and through many articles to support the reform trend and the ‘pragmatic’ 
trend of thought in the Kingdom. She advances ideas more generally about the values of 
honesty, equality and ennoblement of human beings that she sees compatible with Islam 
and essential for pluralism. She takes the issue of female inclusiveness in many of her 
feature articles which have wide readership in the Kingdom. In a critical article called 
‘It is not Disroder’ (laysat Fawda) she follows in the footsteps of al-Fasi, arguing that 
rights today are the value organising them have become universal laws that Muslims 
cannot under the excuse of specificity reject or ignore.
316
 Of these values she adds are 
those concerning “the international conventions for the protection of rights for children, 
women, minorities and human beings” in general.317 Again the legal-universal approach 
looks at pluralism and inclusiveness from the perspective of rights. These rights as they 
exist in international conventions, al-Faqih notes, which Islam contributed to by 
banning slavery, have become part of “a universal culture” of rights.318 Thurayya al-
’Aridh, a well-known female critic speaking for renewal, sees a place for human rights 
in any project that claims to ‘modernise’ and transform the Kingdom. Her many articles 
enter this debate from many angles, social, economic and political. The status of women 
is for her inseparable from pluralism. She champions the rights and the inclusiveness 
afforded women so far King Abdullah, noting the visibility of women in forums such as 
the National Dialogue Association, human Rights organisation, state-led and 
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independent, chambers of commerce and consultative bodies increasingly becoming 
proactive in Saudi Arabia. But for her true pluralism is not only what is given to women 
through the institutional channels, which are opening their doors to women’s 
membership and participation. Rather, it is “when women themselves begin to accept 
the responsibilities [that go with an active role], by displaying equal capability through 
performance at all levels of administration [in the Kingdom]...Only thus can women 
prove to assert their worth and measure up to the challenges facing them as well as the 
new roles assigned to them [by the state].”319 For al-’Aridh this is the only way to 
answer at those who oppose inclusiveness of women. Basically, for her women have to 
work for inclusiveness not just be given it by either the state or society.  
Addressing pluralism in a different way, Badriyya Al-Bishr, takes umbrage from 
the fact that there is absence of inclusiveness such as in the country’s municipality 
elections of 2005. She expresses women’s offence at women-less participation in those 
elections. She states that “...There are those [campaigners] who promised to pay 
attention to libraries of the youth, to cleanliness in the suburbs; all promised to serve 
except for one segment of society: women. The reason, of course, is that women do not 
have the franchise, and therefore carry no voting weight. Do you know now that women 
are absent from [electoral] planning, she also misses on the [promised] services and 
[opportunities] of growth, and are simply dropped [from all calculations] as a worthless 
thing.”320 This explains why she described the Kingdom’s first elections in which 
women were excluded “intikhabat al-rijal” (men’ elections). Al-Bishri contributes to 
the debate about pluralism by alerting society to the flaws of ignoring women. When 
she mentions growth she specifies how could men engage in a process supposedly 
concerned with widening participation and representation and yet ignoring women. She 
thus observes that women were practically turned into a “minority” through their 
exclusion: “Justifying [the non-inclusion of women] on the basis of lack of time is an 
unconvincing excuse to control anger [at]...not recognising a large social segment 
representing nine million women, called [in this case] a minority.”321 This position is 
supported by another female thinker and a strong voice of pluralism in Saudi Arabia. 
Hasna Al-Qan‘eer finds the roots of exclusion and exploitation in social custom. Her 
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famous article of January 2011 shocked the nation in the way she breaks taboo to talk 
about the practices that de-enfranchise women and keep them under the control of men. 
In her article ‘Two Desires Devour Women’s Body and Soul’ Hasna Al-Qan‘eer openly 
discusses who many Saudi men exploit their mothers, sisters and wives by literally 
wanting to possess them, often through the desire to receive the women’s income to the 
point that thousands of fathers prevent their daughters from marrying for this 
purpose.
322
 The idea behind her critical article is that these social practices do not make 
for a pluralist society since women live under the mercy of men. On observation must 
be made in this context. Of course, this kind of guardianship that Hasna Al-Qan‘eer 
describes is forbidden by Islam and has nothing to do with Islamic law. The practice is a 
social custom prevalent in some regions and social stratums of the Kingdom, and Al-
Qan‘eer’s article met with wide interest, sympathy and support, opening much debate in 
chat rooms all over the Kingdom. Her approach looks at pluralism from the angle of the 
dynamics that stand as obstacles against gender inclusiveness. Fawziyya Al-Bikr 
focuses on similar issues regarding inclusiveness in the Kingdom. Like other female 
voices of reform and renewal in Saudi Arabia she is for equal inclusiveness of men and 
women in all sectors of the economy as well as in politics and the social and the cultural 
spheres. For her these are essential for any ‘just society’, in the sense of having the right 
balance to move forward and achieve higher levels of growth and social cohesion. This 
is one reason why she gives pluralism even a wider definition, not limiting herself to the 
debate of gender issues which she addresses in many of her press articles which are 
widely read in the Kingdom.
323
 She views socio-economic differences and the question 
of distribution of wealth or absence of equal opportunity as a key obstacle to 
development. She questions a problem that is remains almost a ‘taboo’ in Saudi society 
and that is the question of poverty in rich Saudi Arabia.
324
 By discussing poverty, Al-
Bikr is not only raising awareness about this social ill, but is also forcing a debate on the 
serious obstacles against political and economic development, and overall participation.  
The focus in the above analysis was on the interpretation of moderation in the 
discourse of a number of female reformers in the Kingdom. The male reformers who 
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also belong to the ‘pragmatic’ trend share these views. Not a single interviewee 
expressed reservations about the inclusiveness of women. This includes Prince Turki 
Al-Faisal,  one of the prominent statesmen and diplomats in the Kingdom, who sees no 
contradiction whatsoever between gender inclusiveness, Islamic teachings and the role 
of religion in the political administration in Saudi Arabia. They are all in favour of 
women gaining the vote, and view this as a pluralising step as well as a mark of the 
ability of Muslims to build moderate societies, plural, peaceful and participatory.   
A specific aspect about the ‘pragmatic’ trend is its role of mediation between the 
old and the new, the Islamic and non-Islamic. Here one notes the conciliation of the old 
and the new as well as of the Islamic and the global. This conciliation is central to the 
project of wasatiyya or moderation promoted by the ‘pragmatic’ trend. Ten interviewees 
association moderation with conciliation. They mention the term ‘bridge’ as a medium 
internally for connecting the forces of religion and the forces of modernity. This idea of 
‘bridge’ in a communicative sense is for respondents such as Salem bin Fahd Al-
Zamam, Muhammad Al-Hassoun, Ahmad Al-Matroodi, and Riyadh Hamdan vital for 
“deepening dialogue” and making it as a “political and moral project” all over the 
Kingdom. They all agree that without dialogue no progress can be made on the front of 
renewal, politically, socially, and culturally. All four consider dialogue to be an Islamic 
ethic used during the time of the Prophet and after him.
325
 One notes here how 
respondents from the ‘pragmatic’ trend find legitimating force in reference to the 
Qur’an and unlike the discourses of protest and quasi opposition in the early 1990s, they 
do not see any gain in attacking the King or the government of the day. The ‘pragmatic’ 
trend is not confrontational in this sense, wanting to gain presence in society through the 
various media outlets, including social media such as ‘Facebook’ and chat rooms, for 
the purpose of sustaining its presence in making the case for reform and moderation 
through discourse and not oppositional political rhetoric as it is not a realistic agenda at 
a time when the Kingdom has a long way to go along the path of institution-building. 
But whilst the institutions are absent or being created, it is useful to have a ‘pragmatic’ 
discourse as one way of pushing the limits of public debate about all kind of issues 
Saudis have until recently avoided, ignored or simply had little courage to face up to 
and discuss. So as a ‘bridge’ between the ruling and the intellectual elites, the 
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‘pragmatic’ trend facilitates discussion in an unprecedented way in the Kingdom. 
Through their discourses, which tend also to respond to radical religious trends, such as 
the Salafis, the ‘pragmatic’ trend contributes to making ‘moderation’ a cultural trait in 
the Kingdom by offering alternative views to the Saudi public and the emerging Saudi 
‘public sphere’. Thus the idea of ‘conciliation’ is hugely popular amongst the trend’s 
intellectuals and the interviewees I was able to speak with. Four Interviewees from the 
civil service and two Islamic judges argue that conciliation goes hand in hand with 
moderation. One of the judges specialising in Islamic law puts value on conciliation for 
its pluralising effect: “Reform and renewal aim at moderation, but for us and given the 
novelty of public debate we do not wish to disrupt this process by making it against 
some ideology or another, a group of another, or against any side in our country. The 
main thing is to understand moderation as conciliation (tawfeeq) between our heritage 
which we need always to renew and know closely and the human heritage that offers us 
opportunities for learning new things. This gives us additional view points and makes 
plurality of ideas and discourses possible in a moderate society aspiring for 
development and justice.”326 Al-Zamam, another voice of reform from the ‘pragmatic’ 
trend, agrees: “I teach this to my own students. The idea of conciliation is what we 
academics do, bringing ideas together to pluralise perspectives and widen our 
intellectual horizon as researchers for ‘truth’. We want the same for our society so that it 
lives up to the God’s instruction to Muslims to build moderate communities and to 
value moderation.” Another academic, Al-Hassoun, says that “pluralism does not 
develop in extremist societies. When people fear for their lives, family property, 
intellect and for their dignity, they develop into a silent society that loses the ability to 
think openly and to speak openly. We do not wish this society to grow in our country. 
We want Saudis to be intelligent citizens who exercise choice through awareness of 
various views, ideas, ideologies and discourses.”327  Al-Belihi has even gone further by 
championing the idea of Tanafus hurr (free competition). He does not limit this to the 
conventional idea of competition in elections. He means by it the competition of ideas 
too. However, this competition according to Al-Belihi ought to respect the standards of 
respect, peaceful debate, honesty, and the free speech. The fact that the very notion of 
free competition has entered the language of the ‘pragmatic’ trend and the Saudi ‘public 
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sphere’ is testimony to the role played by these advocates of renewal and reform from 
the ‘pragmatic’ trend in the Kingdom. I believe that have not only championed 
moderation in Saudi Arabia, but they have also ‘modernised’ the language of political 
debate (See Table 3). The terminology of difference, diversity, competition, or tolerance 
is new to KSA. Here one can say that the ‘pragmatic’ trend has worked at the level of 
discourse but also the language they use for expressing their views on many political 
social, economic, cultural and religious subjects. 
This belief in pluralism suggests that the type of moderation promoted by the 
‘pragmatic’ trend in their discourses is ideological and not simply strategic. 
Table 3 Summary of Language of Pluralism: Meaning & Source 
Language/Concepts Meaning Source/Basis 
Ta’addudiyya Pluralism/ diversity Islamic & Western 
Tanawwu‘ Diversity Islamic & Western 
Tasamuh Tolerance Islamic & Western 
Al-ra’y al-akhar Other opinion Islamic & Western 
Al-ra’y al-mukhalif Opposing opinion Islamic & Western 
Al-Hiwar Dialogue Islamic & Western 
Niqash Calm debate Arab & Western 
‘lakum dinukum wa liya dini’ Freedom of religion Qur’anic verse  
Mujadalah  Discourse and counter-discourse Qur’anic concept 
Munaqasha Debate Islamic & Western 
Ikhtilaf The right to differ Islamic & Western 
Mukhalafa Difference of opinion Islamic & Western 
Hurr fima yudeen Rejection of compulsion Islamic & Western 
Hurriyyah Freedom Western 
Ta‘ayush Coexistence Arab & Western 
Tanafus hurr Free competition Western 
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5.3 Ideological moderation  
All fifteen interviewees express commitment to the idea that moderation is a 
precondition of reform, politically and religiously. In answering two questions of 
whether “moderation is an end in itself” or “where in the scale of political values they 
place moderation” all interviewees agree on the following: 
 A part of King Abdullah’s ongoing process of reform, moderation is 
definitely an end in itself. It is descriptive as a new instrument of including all 
of the forces of peaceful dialogue amongst Saudi citizens, and pluralising the 
public arena so that diverse discourses can get fair exposure and hearing by 
the public. So it stands for the public behaviour of how Saudis think 
collectively about reform. It is prescriptive in that all interviewees consider to 
it to be a value in itself. For the interviewees moderation as a value, which 
has Islamic roots, defines the principle of peaceful cohabitation. This 
principle of cohabitation is important for the interviewees given their 
opposition against the use of force by al-Qaida and radical forces which could 
give excuse to the hardliners to abort King Abdullah’s reform in the name of 
a security agenda for fighting the terrorists. But part of the idea of working to 
deepen moderation in Saudi society as a value is to promote all of the other 
standards the ‘pragmatic’ trends believe in: the respect of different and 
opposed opinion, conciliation of old and new as well as Islamic and global 
ideals, respect of open and peaceful dialogue, inclusiveness of all the diverse 
discourses, ideologies and actors that contribute to pluralism in Saudi society. 
 All of the interviewees contextualise their commitment to moderation. First 
and foremost for them moderation must consolidate as well as respect the 
principle of political solidarity. In this respect, what they mean is that 
solidarity supersedes self-interest. The interest of groups or ideologies must 
not cause chaos and lead to instability. King Abdullah has tolerated open and 
public debate so long as debate is not defamatory, subversive and not used to 
recruit Saudis for violence against one another or against non-Saudis. The 
principle of national solidarity is therefore the guiding principle and the 
framework within which Saudi wasatiyya is defined. Political solidarity 
entails among other things the various actors, trends of thought, politicians, 
not only know certain limits of ‘self-censorship’: such as to abstain from 
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wilfully speaking and acting in a destructive way against the interests of 
others who hold different views and positions, including the religious trend. 
 There is a discourse of moderation as the public skill to join with others, 
including those holding opposed views, in the awesome task of advancing the 
King’s agenda of renewal. This renewal consists not only in deepening the 
process of socialisation, through education, the media, etc. of pluralism or 
dialogue, but first of all in reconstructing a tolerant society that does not fear 
pluralism such as the inclusiveness of women or exposure to other ideas. This 
will only succeed if the heritage of Islam and its laws and rules are accepted. 
The acknowledgment of the principle of moderation is tied to the appreciation 
and even re-interpreting and re-learning of Islam’s traditions of moderation, 
peaceful dialogue, and toleration of different ideas.  
Many of the interviewees affirm commitment to ideological moderation as an 
irreversible type of ‘cultural shift’ in Saudi society. Al-Azam, Al-Belehi, Prince Turki 
al-Faisal, and Al-Hassoun, for instance, express the idea that moderation for Muslims 
ought to be “a way of life”.328 They do not see any contradiction between being 
moderate in Saudi Arabia and the host culture which is hundred per cent Muslim. Prince 
Turki Al-Faisal goes even further by noting that those who are opposed to moderation 
or do not practise it must “re-learn Islam” and they will find in both the Holy Book, the 
Qur’an and the Hadith so much evidence that moderation or wasatiyya is the way of 
Islam. The idea of Islam as an entire system in which Muslims are instructed to adopt 
balance of thought and action in their private and public lives is stressed time and time 
again by the ‘pragmatic’ trend. All interviewees for instance mention the Qur’anic verse 
in which Islam is described to be the religion of the ‘middle path’: “Thus We have 
appointed you a middle nation.”329 For them the idea behind this Godly wisdom is 
firstly a refutation of extremism in thought, speech and action, secondly a direct 
instruction to Muslims to practise compromise or i‘tidal at all levels of the Muslim 
experience, and this for them extends to politics and religious behaviour, and thirdly to 
strive always to maximise balance as a priority in Muslim life when organising all 
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aspects that affect the public’s life. Shatawi al-Ghaythi uses the term “thaqafat al-
Taghyeer” (the culture of transformation) to describe the attitudes such as compromise, 
awareness and dialogue. These traits for him can be very potent when combined with 
the modern technologies of communication making socialisation into the ‘culture of 
transformation’ widespread and not limited to elites.330 Hamad Al-Bahili agrees that 
transformation, upon principles of moderation, produces “a momentum to deepen a 
genuine culture of dialogue in society on the basis of mutual respect...” Further on, he 
makes the point how this momentum towards transformation produces gains in the 
realm of “human rights, civil culture, and advancement in general.”331   
Al-Belehi states that whether moderation is ideological or tactical depends on 
the belief and practice of independent reasoning or ijtihad in any Muslim society. He 
takes independent reasoning to be one of the most important indices of cultural shift 
towards a permanent culture built on the principle of moderation. He views the 
openings in the Saudi ‘public sphere’ today as a good direction made possible by the 
toleration of debate on all issues by the state under King Abdullah. Increasingly, he 
says, Saudi intellectuals are diversifying public discourse and many are becoming 
courageous in the way they address many ‘taboo’ areas. He says that “the tendency to 
break and demolish taboos is the first step a society takes on the path of ijtihad. Today 
our intellectuals talk freely about corruption, call for the inclusiveness of women, point 
to the necessity of a modern understanding of Islam and Islamic texts, and are openly 
championing elections, the right of voting for women, and many even direct polite 
criticisms at religious authorities. These are all positive signs that Saudi society step by 
step believes in the necessity of independent reasoning in the discussion of public 
issues.”332 Even the question of religious legal pronouncements has been put into 
question. This questioning relates to whether they are binding or not. Were it not for the 
increasing reference to independent reasoning, this would not have been the case today. 
Al-Belehi gives this as an example of how innovative, interpretive and inquisitive the 
wave of moderation has been in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He pointed to the fact 
that even the leading religious authority in the Kingdom made a statement in 2010 to 
tell the Saudi public that any fatwa, given to an individual or an institution, is not 
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binding. The Mufti, Shaykh Abd Al-Aziz bin Abdullah Al-Shaykh made it clear that a 
fatwa or religio-legal pronouncement by a learned scholar of Islam aims at clarifying to 
Muslims what is compatible or not with God’s Law. Such a fatwa is not according the 
Mufti binding on the individual or institution receiving it. Hamza Al-Mazini took this 
issue further to argue in a widely read article he wrote in 2010 that “religious authorities 
are humans and have no sacred quality, but like all citizens they have the right to 
express their views [from a religious perspective].”333 For him religio-legal 
pronouncements should not be binding since they are man-made. Al-Mazini’s position 
would not have been possible to state much less say openly in the media even ten years 
ago. Here lies the importance of the ongoing work done by the ‘pragmatic’ trend to 
widen the scope of critical debate, including in their re-interpreting activities even the 
religious authorities which for a long time were above criticism. Back in the early 
1990s, one of the most important treatises arguing for independent reasoning, dialogue, 
tolerance of difference in opinion was written by the late statesman, novelist and 
intellectual Ghazi Al-Qusaybi. His treatise “Hatta la Takuna Fitna” (In Order to Fend 
off Division), argues that no one posses the truth, including religious scholars and other 
learned societies, unless they use independent reasoning, verify and substantiate what 
they say, exercise moderation in though and speech, and remain open to alternative 
views. This treatise by Al-Qusaybi according to Al-Belehi “kind of encouraged 
everyone to think about what kind of Saudi society is required for the purpose of 
genuine renewal and reform.”334 Al-Qusaybi argued then, in response to a religious 
scholar and academic who accused him of disregard for Islam, that moderation compels 
Muslims to be careful about excommunicating those with whom they differ, not to rush 
to judge before ascertaining the full evidence, and to practise independent reasoning in 
light of the change of time and place as instructed by the Prophet Muhammad and 
God.”335 His treatise continues to inspire many scholars and intellectuals, including the 
‘pragmatic’ trend. 
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Table 4 Summary of Language of Ideological Moderation: Meaning & Source 
Language/Concepts Meaning Source/Basis 
Ijtihad Independent reasoning Islam 
I‘tidal Compromise Islam & Western system 
Ta’ddud dhimna Wihdat 
al-Watan 
Plurality within unity Islamic & Western roots 
Tadhamun al-Watani Political Solidarity Islamic & Western roots 
Tawfiq Conciliation Islamic & Western roots 
 
The analysis now very briefly considers the last criterion of moderation in the 
discourse of the ‘pragmatic’ trend. 
 
5.4 Respect of the Rules of the Political Game 
All interviewees list one or two rules that they value as central to the overriding 
principles of moderation. When asked about their response as to what they take to be 
illustrative of their ‘respect of the rules of the political game’, they mention two: 
sanctity of Islam as an eternal frame of reference for religion and politics; and political 
solidarity as an inviolable principle that must be maximised as part of the quest for 
moderation, at the ideological level, and the more pressing general quest for 
advancement and reform in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. I summarise these two points 
below.  
 All interviewees hold Islam to be part of the identity of the state and of Saudi 
citizenship. For them, no notion of legitimacy outside it, religiously or 
politically, is possible. Thus they see no contradiction whatsoever between 
their quest for moderation, and basing such moderation on pluralism, respect 
of alternative arguments and discourses, dialogue, and even peaceful 
competition to openly address the Saudi public by peaceful means to argue 
the case for reform according to their ideological preferences . The language 
they use is not overtly religious. However, they justify certain guiding ideals 
as to be compatible with the Islamic faith. In particular, they take their wasati 
or moderate ideas to be Islamic, and to this end they advance many arguments 
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to substantiate this. One way they do this is to mention Qur’anic verses or 
Hadiths (saying by the Prophet Muhammad) to make their case. They even 
claim to be practising Islam as the ‘middle path’. It is the notion of the middle 
way that they relate to Islam and repeat when making their case for 
moderation. This position does not also defy the identity of the state which is 
built on religious modes of legitimacy. Some interviewees even said that they 
practise and think of moderation from the angle of respect for majority rule, 
and majority rule for them in the case of the Kingdom is the religious content 
of politics, and the overall identity of political institution and citizens. 
 Political solidarity is in one way almost an unwritten contarct with the rulers 
or the state that certain rules of political play will be respected by the 
‘pragmatic’ trend, namely, the sanctity of national unity.  
These two rules of the political game that define the parameters of debate by the 
‘pragmatic’ trend are also evident in the literature published online or in the press by 
intellectuals, activists and voices from within this political group who speak for reform 
on the basis of moderation, pluralism, dialogue, diversity, women’s rights and peaceful 
participation. Their literature talks about al-watan (the Motherland), al-wihda al-
wataniyya (national unity), and the primacy of Islam. Khalaf Al-Harbi,
336
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amongst others, demonstrate through their writings that it is possible to work on the 
basis of an agenda of political renewal and reform, use a great deal of criticism of many 
aspects of Saudi rule, religious management, corruption, discrimination, or lack of 
pluralism and yet conform. Their conformism is proof that reform in the Saudi context 
must be conditioned by overriding principles of respect for Islam and for national unity. 
In relation to patriotism, a number of interviewees refer to the idea of “plurality within 
national unity”. This plurality for Al-Belehi, for instance, accepts diversity within the 
common homeland, the Kingdom.
341
 All views and ideologies so long as they are 
debated through open media and its advocates are peaceful, then they uphold the unity 
and stability of the nation. The same plurality for him regards the question of diversity 
of interpretation of Islam. This is possible so long as these diverse interpretations 
supplement one another and use open discussion to argue or modify their differences. 
The homeland is thus the ‘umbrella’ that unites all Saudis no matter how different their 
ideas, politics, religious understandings may be. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
I have shown through the discourse of the ‘pragmatic’ trend that there is 
evidence that a cultural shift of sorts is under way. The Kingdom is often depicted as 
some kind of a place without any hope for change or political renewal. Through the 
interviews and articles by discourses from the ‘pragmatic’ trend I have shown that there 
are three types of shift. Based on the discourse I have read and analysed, written and 
spoken drawn on interviews, advocates of pluralism promote dialogue, diversity of 
opinion, tolerance of difference, and even free competition. Ideological moderation 
indicates genuine dilution of rigid positions from the past. What can be deduced from 
these interviews and articles used here is that moderation is adopted as a genuine value 
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and an end in itself seen by the ‘pragmatic’ trend as necessary for the process of 
political reform and renewal under King Abdullah and beyond. There is no political 
opportunism evident in the explanations and answers given by the fifteen interviewees. 
Similarly, the articles used confirm this conclusion. Lastly, moderation as understood 
from the discourse of the ‘pragmatic’ trend plays by two chief rules that shape the 
identity of the Saudi state and its people: national unity and its religious framework. The 
discourse of the ‘pragmatic’ trend is rich not only in evidence of how the Kingdom is 
being transformed from a quasi ‘religio-political’ state to a ‘civil-religio-political’ state 
in which the learned societies are becoming active, inquisitive, critical, and more and 
more participatory. One can say a new Saudi identity is being produced. For students of 
democracy these developments at the level of society offer so much evidence of 
political learning. This political learning and the ‘cultural shift’ that is happening in the 
Kingdom remains hidden from both the studies carried out on Saudi Arabia by students 
of the Middle East as we as from the Western public in general. The 9/11 events have 
ingrained a particular view of the Kingdom as a source of terrorism, religious 
obscurantism, and fanaticism. Only by looking at the ‘puritanical’ trend can one have a 
full picture of the state of political debate and in particular of moderation in the 
Kingdom. This is the subject of my analysis in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONSTRUCTION OF ‘MODERATION’ IN SAUDI ARABIA: A DISCOURSE 
ANALYSIS OF THE ‘PURITANICAL’ TREND 
6.1 Focus 
The study of state and society in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as explained in 
the previous chapters, is noted for the mix of politics and religion. Even trends of 
thought driven by a reformist agenda, such as in the early 1990s after the Gulf War and 
more recently at the turn of the new millennium, have not fully shaken off religious 
idioms, considerations and overall influence from their discourse and thought. I have 
shown this to be the case in the discourse of the ‘pragmatic’ trend. In this chapter I use 
discourse analysis to understand the ‘puritanical’ trend’s thought, which points to a 
clear difference between the ‘pragmatic’ and ‘puritanical’ trends. The latter’s 
continuous defence of religion and use of religious arguments, sources, and idioms is 
even more sympathetic to the religio-political framework within which the Saudi state, 
politics and identity are defined and legitimated.
342
 This serves to stress one 
fundamental idea about the Kingdom: the beginning of a modest ‘cultural’ shift’ one 
notices in the innovative themes, language, arguments and intellectual commitments to 
pluralism, gender inclusiveness or moderation is not fully matched in the discourse of 
the ‘puritanical’ trend. Nonetheless, these two trends as I shall briefly explain below are 
not necessarily opposites on everything. They have similarities as well as dissimilarities, 
which I will explain more deeply in the comparative section in chapter seven.    
 
6.2 Introduction 
Politics in the Kingdom is without a doubt changing and the discourses found 
today pay attention to issues of reform and renewal, refuting the long-held Orientalist 
idea of the Kingdom and its ruling and intellectual elites opposing change or reform.
343
 
Since the publication by Abd Al-Aziz Al-Khidr of his important ‘biography’ as he 
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called it in Arabic in 2010, Al-Sa‘udiyya: Sirat Dawla wa Mujtama‘ [Saudi Arabia: A 
‘Biography’ of State and Society], we have learnt more about two fundamentals which 
seem opposed but nonetheless are complementary.
344
 At one level there is the 
unchanged identity of the state’s religio-political canvas and identity. This continues to 
be important for as long as politics and religion are wedded in the Saudi state. To 
change this is more or less a call for a new identity, direction and rationale for the Saudi 
state. Thus no one is yet courageous enough to suggest an alternative to this 
arrangement crated in the 18
th
 century. All discourses that can be described as 
innovative and reform-focused do not try to separate state and religion or put an end to 
the arrangement first worked out by Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and 
Muhammad Ibn Saud in the late 18
th
 century. What is attempted instead is a mode of re-
thinking ways of ‘modernising’ the arrangement, by introducing new idioms such as of 
pluralism and gender inclusiveness amongst other things in the case of the ‘pragmatic’ 
trend. The ‘puritanical’ trend by contrast is loyal to the original arrangement and what it 
seeks to do is to find ways to boost it by revamping its relevance in two interconnected 
ways: it re-uses the old religious idioms to suit change in time, and recognise the 
validity of new themes and questions but still ground them in old interpretations.  
To understand this style one must consider the continuous power of the religious 
discourse as explained by Al-Khidr. 
I begin this chapter with two brief observations. The first regards my use of the 
term ‘puritanical’ to describe the discourse of this trend. The second is about the 
difference between the pragmatic and puritanical trends, which I will explain more 
profoundly in chapter seven. But the brief summary here serves to connect the previous 
analysis with the ensuing section on the type of ideas produced by the puritanical trend 
on moderation. 
In the language that has emerged within the circles of intellectuals and in the 
media in general in Saudi Arabia there is reference to ‘liberals’ and conservative in 
reference to the two trends studied in this thesis. In fact, there is an additional term used 
in reference to the ‘puritanical’ trend: usuli, meaning fundamentalist and this is a term 
that does not translate well in Arabic. One reason is the fact that fundamentalism has 
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Christian origins. Moreover, the term usuli in the Saudi context of al-Qaida terrorist 
activities has very negative connotations, namely the use of violence in the political 
process. By using this term my intention has been to avoid the dualism found in 
Orientalist assumptions that there are only two groups or two discourses pitted against 
each other one accepting modernity and liberal values and the other is traditional and 
tries to apply it to all aspects of life. In additional to this I was concerned about the 
reductionistic nature of competing terms and in the absence of a better term ‘puritanical’ 
makes sense in that the discourses of this trend maintain loyalty to religious values but 
without being fixed. They are dynamic in the way they understand religion, at least in 
some areas which they debate recognising the need for change and reform. A puritanical 
in the early 20
th
 century Arabia is vastly different from a puritanical in the Arabia of the 
early 21
st
 century. The latter maintain part of the religious purity they view as 
fundamental to the identity of the Saudi state and its citizens.
345
 However, these are not 
ikwan-type (the brotherhood of fanatics who interpreted religion in a literalist way and 
tried to impose Islam in Arabia using force) literalist religious voices that exclude others 
from the public arena or from the Islamic faith. This qualitative difference is very 
important to note in order to have clarity about the language used and the discourse I 
shall be studying below in order to find out about its understanding of moderation.     
The second point regards the difference between the pragmatic and puritanical 
trends. Theoretically, there are no values and ideas shared by the pragmatic and the 
‘puritanical’ tendencies and types of discourse which are competing for influence of the 
Saudi public and the state. Part of what I am attempting to do in this chapter is primarily 
analysing how the puritanical discourse looks at moderation. At the same time this 
exercise allows for the highlighting and explanation of the differences between the 
‘puritanical’ and pragmatic discourses. This analysis is significant in that it helps put 
things in order according to the predefined criteria of moderation I have outlined for the 
thesis. The basic assumption of the criteria is that there is a basic core of organising 
political positions according to which moderates produce discourse and can be 
understood within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The differences between the pragmatic 
and puritanical discourses cannot simply be reduced to two broad social and political 
                                                 
345
 For a good account of the deep connection between religion and politics as well as the lasting 
influence of religion in the Arab Gulf States see James Dougherty, “Religion and Law,” in 
Alvin Cottrell (ed.), The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1980), pp. 281-313. 
161 
 
groups, the former speaking the language of ‘liberal politics’ and the second the 
language of politics from the perspective of ‘religious orthodoxy’. In practice, however, 
they both maintain religion as a frame of reference for their positions on numerous 
social and political issues which are debated frequently in the Kingdom such as the 
question of reform, gender relations, and relations with the West. The puritanical 
discourse, however, uses religion more systematically. There is not a single position 
they take on social, political, economic and cultural matters which does not make 
reference to religious orthodoxy. All of this will become apparent in the following 
analysis. The individuals from whom I was able to obtain interviews occupy various 
positions in academia, religious bureaucracy, and the judiciary.  
For ethical reasons I cannot name the individual interviewees who did not give 
me prior permission for publicising their names in this thesis. Members of this trend are 
very sensitive to criticism and understandably the interviewees wish to remain 
anonymous. I have given them pseudonyms as one way of respecting their wish for 
anonymity. The previous several years since King Abdullah has come to power have 
seen the fortunes of the pragmatic trend take a turn for the better, gaining more presence 
in the media, academia, and the public service in general. The puritanical trend has 
more or less been always part of the dominant religious current that has historically 
shaped the politico-religious debate in the Kingdom. However, during the same period 
of King Abdullah, whilst this trend has enjoyed the support of many members of the 
royal house, it has generally come under more intensive and wide scrutiny from both the 
government and the public. This has made interviewees from this trend hesitant, and 
this is justifiable, in giving approval for the publication of their names. They are 
confident about the ‘correctness’ of their beliefs and arguments. However, they prefer to 
keep a low profile, preferring more prominent jurists and learned scholars working for 
state institutions to take the lead in explaining the key premises of their thinking. It is 
my intention, therefore, to suppress the names of individuals interviewed from the 
puritanical trend. The only names that appear in full are of those established writers and 
public opinion formulators, male and female, whose columns and writings are widely 
read throughout the Kingdom. 
As an introduction to the discourse analysis, I look at the so-called ‘fatwa 
society’ (society of religious counsel). This is important in two ways. Firstly, it 
introduces an idea Al-Khidr introduces in his ground-breaking work, which goes the 
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longest in terms of explaining the role of religion in politics, society and culture in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. I make use of his work here for the first time, and in so doing 
I am introducing an important reference which remains ignored in English and Western 
scholarship on the Kingdom.  
 
6.2.1 Discourse and the ‘Fatwa Society’ 
What Al-Khidr calls ‘mujtama‘ al-fatwa’ or fatwa society, a phrase that he uses 
to explain two interconnected aspects of Saudi society and religious life. The first 
relates to the heavy reliance on religious counsels amongst Saudis. Al-Khidr observes 
that the context of this type of quasi deep religious reintellectualisation of Saudi society 
is the emergence of the so-called sahwa (Saudi religious revivalism) and shabab al-
sahwa (revivalist youth). Saudi society had to cope with this context through the 
powerful return to religious life and pious behaviour. This is not to say that there was 
never any kind of reform.
346
 I have used the term ‘reintellectualisation’ to describe the 
deep religiosity and religious observation as well as religious learning that resulted from 
the sahwa phenomenon. The Islamic universities and institutions grew in importance as 
a result of the powerful rise of religious education. The sahwa movement is a movement 
that came into existence in the 1970s and its re-emergence in the 1990s is to an extent 
tied to the period of time when Western presence, namely military, became stronger in 
the Kingdom.
347
 This period set out the ground for a number of subsequent 
developments, strengthening the linking of religion to social life, culture, the media and 
politics. This explains the second facet of the fatwa society: abundance of religious 
fatawa (plural of fatwa, religious counsels and opinions). This religious revival and the 
abundant production of religious knowledge and opinion within it have shaped the 
politico-religious framework within which private and public behaviour and thinking 
are defined. All social, intellectual and political thinking during this period interact with 
one another and within themselves through the sahwa-orientated cultural framework. 
This gave rise to a specific type of Saudi religious identity. This identity resonated with 
the religious forces’ preference for a shari‘a-based society that is tied very closely to 
the thinking and interpreting of religion through the Wahhabi creed.  
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Al-Khidr identifies five features of this the fatwa society which is a significant 
background for understanding the puritanical trend’s intellectual orientation. He 
recognises the importance of the ‘fatwa society’ at a time when Saudi society underwent 
a period of quasi deviation. As a result there was a rise in delinquent behaviour amongst 
the youth and there were manifestations of simplistic and even incorrect religiosity. Al-
Khidr observes the rise of the sahwa and of the fatwa society played a role in correcting 
many of these social and religious ills. It strengthened religious devotion and based it on 
proper teaching of Islam. It entrenched within the country’s youth aspects of Islamic 
religiosity such as strong work ethics, punctuality, good use of free time, voluntary 
work, and spreading of values of learning. A great deal of this corrective trend was 
possible thanks to the role of fatawa and religious guidance through counsel such as 
against use of drugs, idleness or ignorance. The first impact of the ‘fatwa society’ was 
positive.
348
 This however changed, and the five prominent features of the ‘fatwa 
society’ sum up Al-Khidr’s criticism of it in relation to Saudi Arabia. They are the 
following: 
 Reducing the religious experience and knowledge to the body of fatawa 
produced by the growing number of muftis all over the Kingdom. Religious 
knowledge is far wider and deeper than the thousands of brief fatawa 
produced by the graduates of the Islamic universities and institutions.
349
 
 The rise of fatawa as simple and ready-made type of counsel to limit the more 
profound and serious work done by the solid religious elite of learned 
scholars. The fatawa did take the public away from serious learning of Islam, 
turning instead to superficial opinion and religious guidance. Al-Khidr even 
uses the term ‘muhasara’ to describe literally the ‘state of siege’ more 
established and solid scholars found themselves in as a result of the dominant 
position of the sahwa youth and their prominence in the fields of religious 
guidance and counsel.
350
 
 The fatawa did much damage to the practise of two important institutions 
within the house of Islam: a/ the practice of independent reasoning or ijtihad 
as the fatawa became an easy substitute for more reasoned and argued 
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religions counsel and opinion; b/ the practice of religious pluralism in the 
domain of religious interpretation. The ‘fatwa society’ entrenched the sahwa 
youth as the dominant source of religious opinion, excluding inputs from non-
Wahhabi Sunni and Muslim schools of jurisprudence.
351
 
 It prevented society’s capacity for spontaneous thinking, making the sahwa 
youth’s fatawa the major frames of reference in all matters regarding religion, 
society and culture. Al-Khidr goes even further by stating that this loss of 
capacity prevented religious reform or innovation.
352
 
The significance of the above for the analysis of the discourse of the puritanical 
trend is very important. There are two reasons for this. One is the fact that the 
puritanical trend, religious as it might be, does not uphold the notion of the fatwa 
society. To the contrary, it represents a reaction against it for its belief in the practice of 
ijtihad by the learned scholars of Islam and for its belief in religious pluralism within 
Islam. The sahwa youth and the fatwa society closed Saudi society to opinions by non 
Wahhabi learned scholars of Islam. My own use of the term reintellectualisation is 
justified in light of what Al-Khidr says about the ‘fatwa society’. In his opinion, that the 
body of fatawa produced during this period was meant to be “the foundation of a 
cultural revolution.”353 The aim of this revolution according to him is to re-acculturate 
the Saudi society in line with a traditional vision which was enabled by huge financial 
resources and political support. He claims that the ‘fatwa society’ opposed any 
alternative rational thinking and debate of religious and political matters.
354
 It is this 
domination that of the politico-religious scene for so long that has given rise to the 
puritanical trend, a trend which is keen to open up debate and oppose domination by a 
single trend of thought – as was the case when the sahwa youth were able to deny 
alternative thinking in Saudi Arabia. 
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6.3 A Discourse Analysis of ‘Moderation’ in the Discourse of the 
‘Puritanical’ Trend 
The methodology of discourse analysis I use here is a repeat of the exercise done 
in chapter five. The key issue is that of data and evidence. Again, in my discourse 
analysis I am relying on a body of evidence made up of interviews and additional texts 
by key people from the ‘puritanical’ trend. The approach I follow is to record my 
interpreting of my evidence by protecting the integrity of the discourse of moderation 
by the puritanical trend in both its written and spoken forms. My concern is to ensure 
that the ideas contained within them are given maximum representation. The analysis 
looks into the three dimensions which are considered in this thesis as integral to my 
understanding and interpreting of moderation. Stress is placed on attitudes towards 
values such as pluralism and inclusion, and this where I begin the discourse analysis. 
The other two dimensions regard the issues of ideological moderation, and the value of 
respect of the rules of the political game. The meaning given to ‘moderation’ through 
these three dimensions is what I try to extricate in the following section through the 
exercise of discourse analysis.  
In the following section, where I try to analyse and interpret these discourses, I 
mix evidence obtained from the written and spoken texts. I have selected nearly a dozen 
written texts from about 100 texts, all of which are suited to the task of discourse 
analysis in this section. However, given the limitation of scope and time, I use only a 
limited number of these texts in this section. Eight of the texts I use here are written by 
women. This to an extent adds an important component of opinion by Saudi women. 
Six interviewees are also female, and a seventh, a diplomat at the Saudi Embassy in 
London did not wish her material to be included in the thesis. The difficulty with 
obtaining interviews with women relates to cultural restrictions and not political bans. 
However the females’ names are made anonymous using pseudonyms to protect their 
identity and comply with their choice to remain anonymous. The chosen texts record in 
a very relevant way arguments which make a strong case for ‘moderation’. They 
additionally provide a very credible supplement to the interviews I conducted for this 
task. The following analysis is divided according to the three dimensions.    
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6.3.1 Acceptance of Pluralism  
The ideas that shape and inform the thinking and practice of the puritanical trend 
all derive from the canons of Islam, namely, the Qur’an and the tradition of the Prophet 
Muhammad. No idea is perhaps more relevant than tawheed or monotheism, the 
concept that sums up the primacy of the unity of God, and to an extent it also explains a 
major theological framework and concept upon which Wahhabi doctrine revolves. As 
an anchor of identity for Saudi Sunni Islam and a framework for the understanding of 
divine scripture and Islamic traditions, monotheism partly refutes the long-held view 
that the Wahhabi doctrine opposes human input and interpretation of texts. Nothing 
proves human capacity to engage with scripture and to offer a type of renewalist or 
revivalist thinking on religion than Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s notion of 
monotheism. It is part of the body of interpretive accretions that over hundreds of years 
necessitated the practice of ijtihad (use of human independent thinking) to ensure 
Muslims know how to make most of use of their religion according to change of time 
and place. There are those who hold a condescending and even Orientalist view of the 
Wahhabi doctrine, considering it to offer no more than a literalist interpretation of 
Islam. Regardless, the monotheistic input of Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is informed by 
his skill to interpret how Islam should be lived, practised, and comprehended. Partly, 
and more relevantly for my analysis here, it is the normative significance and substance 
of monotheism that matters in this context. Shaykh Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s interpretation 
of the Qur’an and the tradition informs how Muslims in general and Saudis, since 
Wahhabism affects them more directly, the question of should be in Islam: the practical, 
moral and legal substance of Islam that on its basis Muslim identity should be 
maintained for the purpose of proper existence in this life and the accounting awaiting 
Muslims in the hereafter. Central to this normative system produced by Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab’s doctrine is the place of Islamic law or shari‘a in Muslim life and for Muslim 
identity. The central idea here is not only that legal government is important, but also 
that legal government through the implementation of Islamic law is vital and binding for 
the rulers and the rulerd. Well-known puritanical intellectual Nasser Al-‘Amr explains 
this in a typically religious way: “If [Muslim] communities did not implement Islamic 
law, not only at the level of government, but also at the level of individuals and peoples, 
[Godly] punishment befalls them.”355 This emphasis on the primacy of the Islamic law 
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is universal amongst voices belonging to the puritanical trend of thought. This emphasis 
is tied to the idea of al-dawla al‘adila (the Just State). Abdallah Al-Hamid considers 
this type of state charged with the function of maintaining justice to be a precondition 
for Muslims’ ability to fulfil their role of vicegerency, governing as  Allah’s shadow on 
earth.
356
 
Hence, Abu Hamad clearly and eloquently refers on the normative content of 
Islam and the primacy of shari‘a to explain his reservation about pluralism, which he 
views as a hollow Western luxury. He states that  
In Islam the key frame of reference is tawheed or unity of 
God. To borrow a Western system of pluralism interferes 
with the Muslim duty to know Allah as single, absolute and 
eternal and to live by that system as revealed to the Prophet 
Muhammad and later on codified in the Holy Qur’an, and 
then explained over time in the canons of Islam and the 
body of fiqh (jurisprudence) and tafseer (interpretations of 
the Qur’an). To identify any other system which deviates 
from the monotheistic teachings and substance of the 
tawheed as revealed to the Prophet is to confuse Muslims. I 
believe this would be sending the wrong message to 
Muslims, by telling them that man-made ideologies which 
worship the Gods of power or money or human intellect are 
equal in terms of value to the message of the Prophet and 
the word of Allah.
357
 
Discussion of pluralism for the voices speaking within the puritanical trend this 
tawheedi normative system is binding. It does not allow for consideration of alternative 
sources of morality, identity or legislation. Thus monotheism is viewed narrowly as a 
fixed substance. For all interviewees from the puritanical trend this fixity is not 
negotiable. The reason behind this for most of the interviewees relates to the whole idea 
of faith or what is called in Islam aqida. Any system of thought or practice that 
interferes with aqida is opposed as a polluting factor that can destroy the community of 
Muslims built around pillars of belief the compromise of which is a dilution of faith and 
of the whole system of the Islamic religion. They are binding, and closed – they are not 
open to modification by human input through independent reasoning into the texts of 
Islam. Historically, the Muslim community and its traditions of scholarship and 
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jurisprudence have varied in the extent to which they debate and contest each other’s 
interpretations of Islam. The Shafi‘i school of jurisprudence for instance is considered 
to be more rational than the Hanbali school which informs the Wahhabi creed. 
However, this does not mean that the former has abandoned monotheism as normative 
to Islam. Rather, in countries where the Shafi‘i school operates, Godly monotheism is 
maintained but without for instance opposing political pluralism or the presence of 
political parties and competing political ideologies. In our case, the rigid understanding 
of monotheism within the puritanical creed views the unity of God as a foundation upon 
which they assess political ideas, practices and accept or oppose them. It can be said 
that the way they view both the realm of ‘ibadat (matters of worship) and of mu‘amalat 
(profane dealings) is based on a strongly theo-centric view of life and its purpose.   The 
theology they adhere to, in this instance Wahhabism, preaches and revolves around 
monotheism, largely through suspicion of human systems of morality or legislation. 
There is no circumvention of this issue. One interviewee from the puritanical trend 
offers this view:  
The search for other ideas has always to come from within 
Islam and that, when necessity arises, Muslims can turn to 
the Muslim rites of jurisprudence for additional sources of 
moral, legal or political guidance. But to turn to Western 
liberals or communists or their mouthpieces in Muslim 
countries is to compromise the monotheistic substance of 
Islam. I am not against pluralism because I find plenty of it 
in Islam where our jurists give guidance and example of 
how Muslims can adopt pluralism within their own religion. 
I have four rites of fiqh (jurisprudence) to refer to, and all 
four share the value of monotheism. So I do not 
comprehend why a Muslim would turn to communism, a 
God-less creed for political or moral inspiration.
358
  
Another interviewee, Abu Iman, shares this argument finding it to be logical and 
reasonable. He notes that “there is nothing wrong with looking for pluralism within 
Islam instead from outside Islam. The problem is not that Islam is not pluralistic, and 
this is a view held by Muslims who describe themselves as liberals and communists. 
Rather, the problem is that these public activists insist on ignoring pluralist formulations 
within Islam, and furthermore find it easier for some reason to borrow all kinds of non-
Muslim systems than to re-work existing formulations to make their fellow Muslims 
pluralist. There is a big difference between borrowing Western and foreign pluralism 
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and developing Muslim pluralism (ta’adduiyya Islamiyya).”359 The interviewee 
expresses a very important idea. He does not reject pluralism altogether. He opposes 
pluralism when it means borrowing it from the West. Moreover, he is of the view that 
there exists a form of pluralism within Islam which has four different schools of 
jurisprudence. He prefers Muslims to make use of the Muslim heritage instead of 
seeking Western forms of pluralism whether they come for Western liberalism or 
communist ideology. A female writer from the puritanical trend writing in the ‘Medina’ 
newspaper criticises Saudi liberals for failure to articulate a clear set of ideas on what 
they mean by liberalism in the Kingdom. She states that they “repeat all of the 
references to the known liberties...thus denying a role for religion...as well as ignoring 
the flaws of Western liberalism” which, in her view led to conflict and exploitation all 
over the world. Her criticism points to wholesale adoption of Western ideas that denies 
the local culture and the Islamic faith a place in society or in political affairs.
360
 
Abu Salman, a legal expert from the puritanical trend, views this tendency to 
look within and to rely on the juridical insights and intellectual resources of Islam as 
relevant today as it were during the time of the Prophet. Additionally, for him this 
exercise in turning to Islam and not to liberalism or any other foreign ideology for ideas 
of how to organise Muslim life, spiritually, politically, socially or culturally must not be 
narrowly viewed as rejection of pluralism. As he puts it “I do not selfishly and 
arrogantly accurse the American or the Japanese for rejecting Islamic pluralism since 
neither of them knows much less uses the resources of Islam, discarding an alternative 
way of how to go about nation or state building or the organisation of spiritual life, for 
instance. To the contrary, I respect them for using their national resources and borrow 
from the rest of the world only ideas that do not threaten their identity. Here in the 
Kingdom we already do that and borrow a great deal from the rest of the world in the 
organisation of our economic, industrial and technological systems. But to borrow 
liberalism in the name of pluralism is to turn our back on our religion. My religion is 
my identity and the way through which I know Allah and relate to my community here 
in the Kingdom and in the entire Muslim world.”361 The operative term introduced here 
is the idea of indigenous cultural or intellectual resources and indigenous identity. 
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Whilst there is a point here that must not be underestimated about this tendency to argue 
for indigenous identity, there is equally the historical tendency of manipulation of this 
argument to oppose change in the name of this type of self-determination. In fact, this 
applies to most Arab societies where in the name of cultural and religious self-
determination the state rejects all reform and pluralism in general. This remains in my 
view an obvious weakness in the defence by the puritanical trend of their position 
towards pluralism. However, one must not, on the other hand, reject this argument since 
there is some value in the argument that pluralism must be sought from within Islam in 
order to produce a type of Islamic pluralism or ta’adduiyya Islamiyya both within the 
Kingdom as well as within the entire Muslim community or umma.   
For another legal expert, Abu Omar, this debate over pluralism and where to 
find it is not new and has always marked the defining of Muslim identity and its 
discussion since the time of the Prophet. He is right in defining the problem more 
clearly when he points out that these debates and counter debates occur within all 
transitional societies where quarrels over the right mix of local and borrowed ideas 
never end. He is of the view that this is not only the case in Islam. He even considers 
this to be proof that Islam has always witnessed discussion over these matters from the 
time of the Prophet and the beginning of revelation in Arabia in the 600s. He presents a 
powerful viewpoint by saying that:  
Muslim identity is more important than pluralism. 
Monotheism is its foundation and to turn to other sources of 
ideas or ideologies in the name of pluralism will never 
succeed. Nasser, Bourguiba, Saddam Hussein, Gaddafi, the 
Ba’thists and Arab communists all tries this path. All 
produced dictatorship in the name of secular politics and 
Western liberalism or socialism. All ignored Islam even if 
they manipulated it when it suited them. They missed one 
thing: authenticity does not come from overseas. Authentic 
pluralism is not a product one easily borrows or buys in the 
international market. This is a quality that has to be found 
by sifting through the traditions and renewing the local 
religious and cultural heritage.
362
 
To an extent, the idea of Muslims opening up a debate about their claims and 
counter-claims of authenticity and looking within the religious heritage and canons to 
create Muslim pluralism has some appeal for other interviewees within the puritanical 
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trend. Several express the view that this is one way of creating a debate within the 
Muslim umma. The disagreements, debates and counter-debates become enriching, 
noting how this was done in Europe itself before Western societies created their own 
local forms of pluralism. This for the interviewees from the puritanical trend would 
make the resulting pluralism authentic and local instead of being a fashion that is 
borrowed for a short time and then abandoned once local and external audiences are 
manipulated. They find in the history of Arab national-secular regimes plenty of 
evidence to produce rhetoric against secular politics and their false pluralism as well as 
against adopting any type of pluralism that they consider being contradictory to tawheed 
and unity of God. What they object to, with some justification, is adopting outside 
pluralism or looking for models of pluralism from outside without actually giving Islam 
a chance to develop its own pluralism. With his long experience in the field of Islamic 
law, Abu Majid argues that the Holy Qur’an and the Islamic faith with its monotheistic 
norms must guide the exploration of pluralism. For him this must be done by 
considering the rationale for which pluralism is adopted and under what circumstances 
and in what context. Along these lines he says that “if by adopting pluralism in name 
only is all that is required to enter into the club of the so-called civilised or the liberal, 
then Muslims do not need this superficiality. I wonder about this pluralism when Islam 
is mostly denied the right to provide Muslims with ideas of how to go about their 
spiritual lives and the organisation of their worldly affairs. The context of seeking 
pluralism and adopting foreign ideologies and these are mostly secular has been used 
since the attacks of September 11 to limit the influence of Islam not in America or 
Europe, but here in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as well as in other Muslim countries. 
This has caused unnecessary bloodshed, divisions amongst Muslims, and even conflict 
between Muslim states and their peoples.”363 This is where the idea of tawheed is given 
an interpretation or reformulation, which makes it conducive to pluralism, political 
reform and stability as well as religious piety. Hence the notions of tawheed ruhi 
(spiritual monotheism) and tawheed madani (civic monotheism) try to harmonise 
between the political/mundane and the religious/sacred spheres.
364
 
Six female interviewees, working in the field of education, criticise the narrow 
focus on gender equality as pertinent to pluralism under all circumstances. They express 
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the idea that this is not a local agenda championed by all Arab and Muslim women, and 
that this focus on gender inclusiveness is due to Western influence. All six refused to 
address the issue of pluralism from the angle of gender inclusiveness. The reason for 
them is that this focus is not only Western, but it also ignores more important issues that 
if dealt with properly would lead to gender inclusiveness without Western meddling in 
Arab and Muslim affairs. Their responses can be divided into three broad themes. The 
first theme is that the Western focus on gender inclusiveness never goes far enough to 
consider the Muslim heritage. All agree that if this heritage is properly used and referred 
to the conditions of women as mothers or citizens would be much better than is 
currently the case, including in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. All six are of the opinion 
that the fault lies with the legal system and the misuse of Islam by states and by 
establishment scholars. Umm Khalid and Umm Muhammad argue that both have not 
known how to manage the women question. Instead of genuinely activating Islamic 
values of equality, protection of women’s rights and enhancing their security as citizens, 
the establishment scholars tended to respond in reactionary and defensive ways. 
Through defensiveness to the Western agenda which pushed unrealistic programmes of 
gender inclusiveness which many Saudi and Arab women were not ready for, 
establishment scholars tended to react by subjugating women to the protection of men, 
husbands, brothers and fathers. They all argue that this type of protection which left 
women at the mercy of the private sphere undermined both Islam and the quest by states 
to realise even development for men and women. In any case, for these women the 
losers of this defensiveness, which was in response to aggressive Western promotion of 
liberal gender programmes, continue to be women, especially illiterate women who do 
not read the Qur’an and are not familiar with the Hadith of the Prophet. Raqiyya al-
Muharib is a very well established writer known for her gender stance from an Islamic 
perspective. She views the gender positions of secular women are not suited to females 
practising Islam. The agendas differ, according to her. The secular agenda is concerned 
with government on earth. By contrast, the religious agenda pays attention to two 
intertwined elements: a/ government on earth by striving for justice and the common 
good, and b/ to life after this world through equipping Muslim women with knowledge 
on theological matters.
365
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The second theme for these women is that there are more important issues that 
the notion of gender inclusiveness overlooks. They argue that genuine pluralism does 
not begin with the form, that is, equality or gender inclusiveness when women are not 
empowered in practice. One of the respondents, Umm Naïf, states the following idea: 
“You can declare all Arab and Saudi women equal and that you have your ideal pluralist 
society. But declarations are something, and the reality is something else. How do 
illiterate women fare through these declarations of liberal policies? How do women who 
do not work fit into these declarations? Pluralism is starting by more urgent questions 
and programmes so that women and men find themselves living in a pluralist society 
that they both build through active programmes where they work for the same goals, 
build the same nation with the same convictions and the same effort. This is how Islam 
works by starting with the people, the community of Muslims through education, hard 
work and self-change.”366 Her colleague, Umm Badr, agrees with this idea and prompts 
a very useful discussion that reveals that women from the puritanical trend are not 
“enemies of gender inclusiveness, this is built in the spirit of Islam.”367 What is at issue 
is rather the many problems that make women live unequal lives with men: the question 
of security, through education, employment and participation in society as they do 
within the Saudi family. For this interviewee, Umm Mariam, the question of security 
goes to the heart of Islam’s moral compass, in that it recognises that women are 
“shaqa’iq al-rijal” (women are equal to men in the eyes of God) and are accorded the 
same dignity, strengths and abilities that should be used to enhance their security. 
“When I mention amn (security) of the Saudi women I am talking about the obligation 
to make women use their potential in nation and state-building but this potential cannot 
be realised until women are first secure in education, in the family, and above all else 
secure in their understanding and practice of their faith. Through knowledge and 
practice of such knowledge they can empower themselves and their communities. The 
aim is not gender equality as a pluralist condition, but rather Islamic faith should be the 
aim. It is this faith that can be turned into a force to upgrade women’s security as a 
precondition for communal security and equality in security of life, intellect and 
worthiness for men and women.”368  
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The third theme that these women raise concerns what they regard as the cliché 
reference to gender inclusiveness that does very little in practice to reduce or eliminate 
the insecurities that stand as obstacles against real inclusiveness. And for them this 
hollow “liberal ideology” is imposed not to serve genuine equality of men and women, 
but rather to show that Islam is inferior to Western values. For these Muslim women  
this line of argument ignores the ethical principles of Islam which they consider not to 
divide equality along lines of gender, colour or status. As one interviewee notes 
“musawat (equality) in Islam is musawat. It is one and the same for men and women. 
Those who pretend they know better and can teach Saudis about the value of 
inclusiveness do not pay attention to other insecurities that prevent men and women 
from fulfilling their duties towards God as good Muslims and their duties to nation and 
country as good citizens. These insecurities partly stem from the unequal economic 
system Western countries have imposed on developing countries like Saudi Arabia.”369 
Another female interviewee notes that real equality that leads to real inclusiveness is 
possible only when Muslim women are treated as equals. In her view “that would mean 
that women are intelligent enough to choose Islam and its core ethical values for 
seeking inclusiveness, and not an alien form of equality that finds full fulfillment only 
in specifically Western social, political and economic power relations that capitalism 
and the inequality it causes are not open for discussion.”370 The opposition is not against 
gender equality but against gender equality as a component of Westernisation. 
For these women, what ultimately upholds women’s right to inclusiveness is a 
God-given right that cannot be issued by a politician. At the core of this right to 
inclusiveness is to serve the cause of da‘wa (preaching, call for Islam) in Islam, which 
is central to puritanical thinking as will be shown in the following section.
371
 
Two themes come up in the discussion of pluralism by the puritanical trend: the 
notion of freedom of worship in Islam, and the concept of muwatana (citizenship of 
Muslims and non-Muslims in an Islamic state) in Islam. They discuss both as two core 
principles that define the position of Islam in relation to pluralism. All the informants 
value these two as an arena where Islam led the way in asserting the God-given right to 
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free worship under an Islamic state and the right to protection under the system of 
muwatana.  
The first point explained here regards freedom of worship and how the 
puritanical trend considers it to be fundamental to Islam’s system of pluralism. 
Members of the puritanical trend all agree that there is a doctrinal content to any 
religion. Monotheism or tawheed is, for instance, a fundamental principle of the Islamic 
faith. Under this tawheedi system of belief, God’s message to the Prophet Muhammad 
through the medium of the Qur’an has been to promote the principle of religious non-
compulsion (la ikraha fi al-deen). Various Qur’anic verses mentioned by the 
interviewees confirm the importance of this principle in Islam. Abu Iman and Abu 
Hamad, for example, repeat the sanctity of this principle by making numerous 
references to a verse in the Holy Qur’an and a Hadith (authentic saying) by the Prophet, 
in particular.
372
 To them this is a freedom of religious choice that Islam accords to all 
people living under an Islamic state, Muslim and non-Muslim. This freedom is never 
interfered with so long as the well-being of all is not threatened, such as working to 
offend Islam or other faiths or undermine their core values. “To you be your religion, 
and to me be my own religion.”373 This is a direct reference to a verse that sums up the 
idea of the freedom of respecting people’s choice of religion. Umm Mariam links this to 
the Qura’anic reference ‘la ikraha fi al-din’ (there is no compulsion in Islam). Like Abu 
Abdullah and Abu Nasir, she finds this principle which Muslim rulers respected 1400 
years ago proof of how advanced Islam is over religions which during the same period 
lacked Islam’s tolerance and protection of free worship.374 In agreement with her, other 
interviewees from the puritanical trend express how Islam’s support of pluralism is not 
new and yet is never taken seriously or researched deeply enough to show how 
historically Islam upheld principles of tolerance long before Western systems of 
political pluralism were practised.
375
   What the puritanical trend is not prepared to 
defend freedom of religion if it means worship of satanic objects or objects of nature. 
Equally, and in accordance with Islamic teachings they do not extend their 
interpretation of freedom of choice in religious matters to Muslims leaving the Islamic 
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faith as all agree that this is sinful under Islam. Their understanding is a doctrinal 
principle of Islam is that Muslims remain in the Islamic fold and renouncing the Islamic 
faith takes on public significance as it could send the wrong message to other Muslims. 
In this way, this act of ‘apostasy’ (ridda) defies freedom of worship as it threatens the 
unity and cohesion of the entire community of Muslim adherents. When and how this 
becomes a public matter to be referred to the judiciary or remains a personal matter of 
no consequence to the public is another matter beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nonetheless, what is at issue here is the fact that freedom of religion or of worship and 
Islam’s insistence on non-compulsion has relevance to the promotion of pluralism, at 
least in theory. The history of Muslim government, of course, is different from what the 
theory of Islam is. There have always been violations of these principles and possibly 
this is one reason why Islam’s image is tarnished. Of course, Orientalist scholarship is 
another factor that contributed to this image. The main thing is that as Abu Abdullah 
notes: “Islam rejects the use of force in the building of a harmonious Muslim society in 
which peoples of the book may exist. This spirit of tolerance comes directly from 
Allah’s commands to the Prophet and the umma to champion freedom of worship and 
allow non-Muslims peaceful existence. This command obligates Muslims to protect a 
system of pluralism demanded by Allah.”376 Umayma Al-Jalahima’s writings stress the 
ideas of tolerance through the exercise of dialogues amongst the world’s cultures and 
civilisations, and inter-faith dialogue, considering it to be perfectly compatible with 
Islam’s morality of co-existence.377 Umm Naïf makes the additional point that 
throughout its history this tolerance never threatened Islam. She states that threats to 
Islam never came from freedom of worship or tolerance, saying that “the abode of Islam 
was prosperous and strong when it knew high levels of tolerance and religious pluralism 
(ta‘addudiyya diniyya).”378 However, one aspect of this debate where the puritanical 
trends tends to regress in relation to acceptance of pluralism is the excessive fear of 
Shi’ites. Hassan Al-Huwaymal, one of the key writers representative of the puritanical 
trend, speaking about the 2011 Arab revolts, expresses reservation that they could lead 
not so much to pluralism as much as to divisions that Shi’ites and neighbouring Turks 
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would exploit to impose their ways on the Arab world.
379
 In particular, the over-
sensitivity by the puritanical trend’s sensitivity to sectarianism within the Kingdom and 
without, more generally in the Arab world as a whole, is a particular flaw in their 
position towards pluralism when it concerned Shi’ites. This is a position that the 
interviewees did not wish to explore at any length except by stating that they did not 
mind Shi’ites in Saudi Arabia so long as their loyalty was with Saudi nationalism and 
Islam in general. 
On the second issue regarding muwatana, Abu Majid, Abu Ibrahim, and Abu 
Iman note the following on the question of muwatana. They affirm that muwatana in 
Islam has its foundation in the obligation expressed throughout the Muslim faith to co-
exist with ahl al-kitab (peoples of the book). They explain that this concept is found 
only in the Muslim faith, which is distinguished by the commitment to allow non-
Muslims to be part of a Muslim society. They observe that the only condition of 
muwatana is the respect of Muslims and to desist from the same actions Muslims 
forbidding Muslims from doing in order for society to function without harming social 
peace, faith, and unity of the Muslim community and those accorded protection in its 
territory. Umm Loay, Umm Mariam and Umm Naïf add an important idea in this 
respect: the concept of muwatana in Islam is closely tied with the whole system of 
monotheistic divinity. This means that Muslims are obligated to share their societies 
with the followers of the three monotheistic faiths. This co-existence may not mean they 
all live as equals since Muslims have the added citizenship of the Islamic faith; and this 
gives them the special status and right to free (or un-taxed) protection under any 
Muslim ruler.
380
 However, Umm Mariam and Umm Naïf explain that because 
muwatana is tied with divinity in Islam it does two things: a/ allows non-Muslims to 
expect and receive special protection in any Muslim realm as they are believers and not 
heathens; and b/ makes them and Muslims worthy of the same right to protection in 
Islam.
381
 Abu Abdullah goes further by stating that the relationship between muwatana 
and divinity in Islam means protection cannot be refused to non-Muslims, obligating the 
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Muslim community to accept pluralism.
382
  This notion of pluralism for all of the 
respondents from the puritanical trend is not a function of politics: it is a God-given 
right that Muslim rulers withdraw only if serious breach of the community’s rules takes 
place. Abu Salman, Abu Majid and Abu Omar agree with this interpretation, noting that 
what counts in the Islamic view for pluralism to function is piety and communal 
obligation to mutual tolerance, and mutual respect which do not oppose God’s laws.383 
Abu Nasir distinguishes between the Western concept of pluralism and the notion of 
muwatana in Islam. He states that muwatana in Islam is simply an affirmation of 
Allah’s creation of all people as equal and worthy of the gift of life. The “only 
discrimination is determined by acts and faith; if the acts are Godly and if the faith 
respects God’s law then muwatana is a sacred right.”384 Umm Badr observes that the 
fact the Holy Qur’an uses the term insan (human being without stress of gender or 
colour) is the best affirmation that muwatana is a God-given right and gift to all. The 
notion of insan has no gender, and may be a man or a woman, may be white or black, 
and may be Muslim or non-Muslim. It sums up the commitment to plural co-existence 
under God’s law. She says “this is not the same as the pluralism the Westerners talk 
about, and which has many flaws: rich and poor are not the same, the black and white 
are not the same, and men and women are not the same despite the fact that liberals 
claim they have such as system of non-discrimination.”385 Abu Ibrahim mentions an 
important term which is also prominent in the Holy Qur’an: ennoblement or takreem. 
“When we mention the word muwatana in Islam we should remind all that human 
beings are honoured by the Almighty who gives them the gift of life, equally to Muslim 
and non-Muslim. If Allah created life in a pluralist way, no one can deny that sunna of 
life (God’s way). Therefore muwatana goes with God’s design of life and of humans are 
different.”386 In this respect, interviewees such as Abu Abdullah, Abu Majid, Abu 
Hamad, Abu Nasir, Umm Mariam, Umm Loay, Umm Badr and Umm Naïf mention the 
Qur’anic verse: “O mankind, We have created you from a male and female, and made 
you into nations and tribes, that you may know one another. Truly, the noblest of you in 
the eyes of Allah is the believer who possesses piety.”387 Umm Naïf stresses that 
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muwatana is the way of Islam since one of Islam’s chief Godly maqasid (divine 
sanctions) is for religion to ensure dignity and well-being for all. All agree that 
muwatana is a God-given right amongst Saudi compatriots. They give a nationalist and 
pragmatic meaning to citizenship, and this meaning supplements the predominantly 
religious meaning. According to the nationalist meaning citizenship obligates citizens to 
direct loyalty towards the motherland. Failure to do so, states a high-ranking religious 
learned scholar from the Saudi establishment close to the puritanical trend, justifies 
stripping “traitors” of their nationality.388 
 
6.4 Ideological moderation  
The puritanical trend expresses views that place moderation at the centre of its 
ideals and values. Here too the concepts of moderation and divinity are linked. 
Moderation is viewed as a chief tenet of Islam and without it the Islamic community 
would not be what it is: a community obligated and expected to practise moderation and 
champion it for the well-being of its members. Thus all interviews use the term 
‘wasatiyya’ (moderation) and the adjective ‘wasati’ (moderate) in reference to their 
position towards ideological moderation. One thing is established in the thinking of this 
trend and that is moderation being Islamic or religious and not ideological. They have 
preference for a usage that describes ‘moderation’ as ‘Islamic’. Abu Hamad and Abu 
Majid assert this by noting: a/ Islam equates with moderation, and b/ moderation comes 
from Islam. To an extent, this is a view held by all interviewees. They argue that this 
moderation is possible to be exercised today and emerge to the surface of Saudi politics 
instead of being hidden. They are optimistic that this is possible because there is a 
highly educated society receptive to wasatiyya, arguing that the changes introduced by 
King Abdullah help the trend towards moderation. These changes promote moderation 
and moderate engagement with the Saudi public.
389
  
One observation must be made. Moderation is strictly defined as a “capacity to 
strike a balance between worldly and spiritual matters and lives in a way that ensures 
continuity of the Islamic community, within the parameters of God’s law.”390 This 
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needs to be clarified further. Abu Abdullah, Abu Majid, Abu Nasir, Umm Mariam, 
Umm Loay, and Umm Badr convey the idea that Islamic moderation is not the same as 
the type of moderation exercised for the purpose of short-term benefit. Umm Loay 
states that Islamic moderation “does not compromise God’s law and the imperatives of 
maintaining the unity and well-being of the Muslim public in a given context. The 
pillars of Islam do apply. The morality of Islam applies too. And the values of justice 
and equality cannot be compromised because Muslims are commanded to adhere by 
them and implement them.”391 Umm Naïf, Abu Salman and Abu Omar, for instance, 
speak of the confusion of moderation with “making deals”.392 They all agree their 
interpretation of moderation carries a meaning that neither negates nor dwells on the 
idea of “making deals”. Rather, the idea is to further the Godly instruction to build the 
just society, that is the idea of wasati umma (just and balanced nation or community) 
described in the Qur’an. According to this notion, Abu Salman explains, the principles 
that must guide the Islamic community’s work and morality are the practice of justice, 
and he notes how “justice is Godly and is placed amongst the top objectives for man’s 
vicegerency [khilafa] on earth or in life.”393 In the design of God, human beings are 
charged with the task of instituting justice on earth according to His law. The value of 
justice is repeatedly affirmed in the Holy Qur’an and the Prophet’s Sunna (ways of the 
Prophet, sayings and deeds). Ziad Aldriss, a known Saudi journalist form the puritanical 
trend, sums up the nature of Islamic government, by stressing justice and dignity. This 
he ties to divinity: “Islam represents [the values of] justice, trust (amana) and dignity 
(alkarama), however these ideas about good government are not served by empty 
slogans, but with practical and detailed programmes that can realise the objectives of 
Islam, just government.”394 Abu Ibrahim notes how Islamic moderation is embedded in 
divinity because “Allah is the Just and the institution of justice is one way of affirming 
Allah’s law and His attribute as the Giver of Justice.”395 This idea is not the same, she 
says, as the widespread common meaning given to ‘moderation’ in today’s world, 
which implies compromising important values for the sake of short term-benefit.  
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What is of importance here is the fact that the interpretation of ideological 
moderation for the puritanical trend is based on moral substance. At the heart of this 
moral substance is the stress placed on justice as a divine attribute obligating Muslims 
to uphold, practise and preach. Reference by the interviewees to various Hadiths and 
Qur’anic verses is used to stress the moral basis of moderation in Islam as they 
understand it. For instance, Abu Hamad, Abu Abdullah and Abu Nasir refer to the verse 
“When you do judge, judge between people justly. Allah likes those who are just.”396 
All three, and there is a general agreement about their viewpoint, express the opinion 
that justice in Islam comes first as the value most relevant for the organisation of all 
affairs from politics to economic management. They point to the prosperity of the 
Muslim community during the golden age of Islam thanks to the prevalence of justice, 
noting at the same time that absence of justice wrecked havoc in the lives of Muslims 
and Muslim communities over hundreds of years because of the absence of justice and 
its regression as a value in Muslim rule everywhere. For them the fundamental question 
is that ‘moderation’ as a moral value of practising and implementing ‘wasatiyya’ is 
about justice-giving.
397
 Abu Hamad puts it clearly: “a moderate Muslim, citizen or ruler, 
is the one who is just. That is the message of Allah and his Prophet. I cannot be a 
moderate if I turn away from upholding justice in my society.”398 Abu Omar agrees: 
“the only criterion of moderation in Allah’s eyes is justice. Moderation in this sense 
cannot mean compromise on such an important Godly value. God’s law preaches justice 
and a ‘wasati’ Muslim community is moderate only if it gives justice and lives by 
justice.”399 Abu Salman gives a similar opinion that “in Islam there is moderation for 
the sake of Allah’s cause in the pursuit of justice, and not superficial moderation for the 
sake of moderation. For us this is a question of observing God’s law and living by the 
teachings of our religion, and the cause of justice in our religion is noble and no one can 
deviate from it. Plus, all cultures support the idea of justice.”400 His reference to the 
acceptance of justice in all cultures reveals a form of Universalist thinking. 
This notion of moderation as a Qur’anic and Godly value has echoes in the ideas 
expressed on this theme by the female interviewees. Umm Loay, Umm Naïf and Umm 
Mariam refer to another Qur’anic verse to further stress the centrality of justice as the 
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way of moderation in the thinking of the puritanical trend. The verse is from ‘Surat Al-
Nisa’ and it is, in their view, further evidence of the divinity of justice in Islam. “O 
believers! Be supporters of justice, witnessing for Allah alone, even if against 
yourselves, your parents and relatives. Whether they are rich or destitute, Allah is able 
to look after them. Do not follow your own temptations and negate truth, if you deviate, 
Allah is aware of your deeds.”401 Umm Khalid observes that the kind of moderation that 
may be possible in a secular order does not apply in an Islamic order. For her the divine 
obligation is clear that moderation is to be upheld via the practice of justice and for the 
sake of justice. To compromise on such a value is to deviate from a Godly command 
which is clear as in this verse which instructs the believers not to give in to the 
temptation to corrupt the pursuit of justice even when it harms them or their family.
402
 
Umm Khalid says that Islam’s concern is to prevent harm to the entire community and 
that harm can be prevented only by upholding justice. She says: “If justice is 
compromised according to interest or ideology or political party of king, then there will 
be harm for the entire society and that is the one thing Islam instructs us to avoid.”403 
Abu Ibrahim sums up this argument by stating that “what counts in moderation in Islam 
is the qeema (the value) and not al-maslaha al-khassa (private interest). In Islam values 
of justice reveal Allah’s wisdom in desiring for the believers an order where al-maslaha 
al-‘amma (common interest) is above all other interests.”404 Having said this, he adds by 
drawing a comparison with the West. He states that “in the Western system, moderation 
may happen to advance the public interest but it is always done through ideas, 
ideologies, institutions, political players or parties who have their own interest in 
wanting to see moderation prevail. This comes from Islam’s moral order and the 
importance of moral decency in Islam.”405 The concern with morality is one feature that 
stands out in the interpretation of moderation by members of the puritanical trend. The 
notion of moderation they have in mind is based on understanding of Islam as a system 
of morality intended for the wellbeing of the entire community and not as tactical 
instrument which may be used to realise short-term benefits.  
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6.5 Respect of the Rules of the Political Game 
The thinking of the puritanical trend on this issue is equally based on the Qur’an 
and the Sunna (Prophet’s Tradition) of the Prophet Muhammad.  In this respect, the 
interviewees express how important to look at the Tradition of the Prophet and the 
glorious Qur’an in order to have clarity as to what are the most important values that 
should organise the political game. One idea that seems to enjoy wide support amongst 
the interviewees is the obligation to have such rules documented and agreed upon. The 
example most have referred to is the so-called saheefa or agreement (some take it to be 
the first Muslim constitution) that the Prophet devised after his victory the battle of 
Badr in 622 in Medina.
406
 Abu Majid, Abu Salam and Abu Omar explain the 
importance of “rules of the political game”. They stress that the example of the Prophet 
who authored the charter or constitution of Medina is evidence that rules and laws in 
any political community must be clear and agreed upon as a condition of stability, order 
and legitimacy (shar‘iyya). Note that any claim to shar‘iyya by the Saudi state is put 
down by an intellectual from the puritanical trend to the “long history of commitment to 
the true acts of religion, by following it strictly in government, political development 
and social affairs not through the borrowing [foreign] ideas.”407 A puritanical 
intellectual agrees with this view, criticising the tendency of Saudi Westernisers’s blind 
faith in Western civilization. Mohsen Al-‘Awajy argues they have a tendency to 
“worship Western civilisation despite its values failed the tests of Guantanamo Bay, 
Abu Ghraib…”408 Further to this in the same article, he adds that “we do not oppose 
openness, freedom of publication, but they must conform to Islamic law.”409 Abu Iman, 
Umm Mariam and Umm Khalid note how rules of the political game is an old Muslim 
tradition since the time of Prophet, and therefore all Muslim rulers and communities 
should follow this example.
410
 Basically, as Umm Loay explains this strongly “the first 
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rule of the political game is to have rules clarified and documented. This is the whole 
point of Godly revelation to all messengers and prophets: to lay down rules and laws to 
tell people about their rights and their obligations. The constitution of the Prophet is the 
best example of this practice in Islam.”411 According to Abu Iman the Prophet prepared 
the document “so that social peace prevails amongst Medina’s mixed population, the 
various feuding tribes, Muslims, Christians, Jews and Sabians. The Prophet wanted all 
of them to know their rights and their duties towards their community which they 
shared in order to maintain order.”412 Umm Khalid presents a similar argument based on 
the idea of rules and laws organizing inter-community relations being proof of 
“dusturiayyat al-hukm al-islami” (the notion of constitutionality in Islamic 
government).
413
 Umm Naïf argues that this has been the case in the Kingdom since 
King Fahd introduced in 1992 “al-nizam al‘amm (The Basic Law) to commit Saudis to 
common rules for organising politics.
414
 She thinks that this is a practice that points in 
the right direction and that the responsibility of “Saudis is to follow the steps of King 
Fahd, which King Abdullah is precisely doing through modernisation of laws, economic 
affairs, culture, administration and education, to set the Kingdom on the path of rule by 
God’s law.”415 This notion of devising rules of the political game is again explained 
within an Islamic framework through reference to the example of the Prophet and the 
first charter devised to formulate laws for the mixed population of Medina. What is 
noticeable here is the fact that the interviewees from the puritanical trend do not express 
any kind of criticism against the presence or absence of laws governing the political 
game in Saudi Arabia. They support efforts made so far, since the time of the late King 
Fahd, to institute a legal framework for the political game. But they only indirectly 
point to the desirability of consolidation of King Fahd’s form of elementary 
constitution, since the Kingdom does not have a constitution. This perspective sheds a 
thinking that finds the example of the Medina nearly 1400 years ago to have relevance 
in terms of having rules or a kitab (document), saheefa or watheeqa (charter), that is, a 
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form of constitution resembling that of the Prophet.
416
 The idea is that they express 
support for a form of ‘constitutionality’ but from an Islamic and not a Western 
perspective.  
The element of da‘wa is given strong support in the views by interviewees from 
the puritanical trend. For them da‘wa is binding on all Saudis as a an important 
institution that cannot be ignored or compromised. It is considered to be part of the 
tawheedi or monotheistic theological programme of the Wahhabi movement. Thus the 
Oneness of Allah is considered as a fundamental rule of any political game. This is 
relevant at two levels. The first – views expressed by Umm Khalid, Umm Mariam, 
Umm Muhammad, Umm Loay, Abu Majid, and Abu Ibrahim – is the obligation to 
ensure that propagating Islam is a common value on the basis of which the unity and 
viability of the Islamic community and of Saudi society and state can continue to 
progress and consolidate. Abu Majid views “the love of Islam and the love of the 
motherland (al-watan) to be inseparable, and commitment to Islam in the Kingdom is 
related to commitment to the wellbeing of the motherland.”417 The idea of al-watan or 
motherland is related to Islam and commitment to the practice of da‘wa. The two are 
considered to be intertwined. Umm Khalid states that “Islam gives us the umma which 
is for every committed Muslim the big watan and loving and serving one’s small watan, 
the motherland, Saudi Arabia.”418 For her patriotism for a Muslim citizen is part of the 
same ideal of seeking the wellbeing of Muslims so that they can worship and fulfill their 
duties “as Muslims and as Saudis in the best conditions of freedom, safety, respect, 
tolerance, unity, morality and piety.”419 Umm Muhammad explains this further by 
pointing that the place of da‘wa as a common norm is that it functions “as an institution 
and a value for renewing the believers’ contract with Allah.” In her opinion, the aim of 
da‘wa is to ensure Allah’s law is supreme. Plus, she sees a further value for da‘wa, a 
means through which Muslims “renew their contract of community amongst the society 
of believers” to help and protect their faith and one another as well as committing to 
“respecting just-giving rule.”420 Umm Naïf observes that without the moral system 
provided by the practice of da‘wa and the obligation to seek to establish a moral order 
through the institution of da‘wa, the whole project of politics would be incomplete. As 
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an important norm, it cannot be left out of the main rules that govern the political game 
in a Muslim society.
421
 For Abu Omar it is da‘wa that teaches Muslims the values of 
neighbourly behavior, mercy, tolerance, non-violence, respect of different opinions 
which do not harm community, moral obligation, love of one’s country and 
solidarity.
422
 This idea of nationalist patriotism religious patriotism as part of the rules 
of the political game is unique to the puritanical trend of thought. On the subject of just-
giving rule, one of the most prominent puritanical intellectuals, Salman al-‘Awda, in a 
treatise he wrote under the title “Causes behind the Fall of States,” gives a twofold 
interpretation of this norm.
423
 Firstly, there is an obligation on a Muslim state to “enjoin 
the good and forbid all evil” (al amr bi al-ma‘ruf, wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar). This 
function serves this life and the hereafter. This is at the heart of the whole idea of 
‘moderation’ for the puritanical trend, finding the balance between the two so that 
Muslims find fulfillment for the mundane and sacred aspects of life. Secondly, there is 
the duty to rule by Islamic law, and this he ties to the politic-religious nature of the 
Saudi state. In addition to this, he refers to the practice of consultation (shura) as the 
norm that must be used in the organization of political activity, considering “despotism, 
singularity of opinion, and the absence of consultation in government” to be detrimental 
to the viability of politics as a whole.
424
 According to his thinking on shura he argues 
that it is part of the norm of free thought and expression.
425
  
The other issue the interviewees link with da‘wa is the obligation to seek socio-
moral renewal under an Islamic order, and this is a function which cannot be upheld 
without calling the believers to the cause of Islam through education. A female blogger 
from the puritanical trend, Asma bint Rashid Al-Ruwayshid, writes that true “reform 
must be built on solid ground: righteous education which is vital for the Muslim 
family.”426 The political dimension of da‘wa is to use education as the best means for 
the realisation of reform in a gradual and peaceful manner. In this way, da‘wa is double-
edged: it targets the general community of the believers in order to maintain close links 
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between private and public morality. The general rule is that which harms the individual 
harms the public, and the role of da‘wa is help the Muslim public maintain a balance as 
citizens and as believers. At the same time da‘wa is used to indirectly remind and 
pressure Muslim rulers of their obligation to commit to socio-moral renewal and reform 
so that Islamic teachings inform political activity and policy-making. It is this link 
between faith and politics as well as other aspects of life that makes da‘wa a natural 
norm to be included in the rules of the political game. Feminist Intellectuals belonging 
to the puritanical trend such as Raqiyya al-Muharib accords da‘wa high importance and 
insists on a role for women in the propagation of Islam in society.
427
       
 
6.6 Conclusion 
The thinking of the puritanical trend on moderation makes use of Islam’s 
language and institutions. Moderation in this trend is holistic and looks at moderation as 
part of a wider socio-moral scheme that conforms to the politico-religious nature of 
Saudi society. However, this interpretation must not be mistaken for a traditionalist 
literalist tendency specific to groups and forces who were not open to sharing the social 
and political arenas except on the terms of their strict Wahhabi dogmas. Their discourse 
points to an incremental rethinking of Islamic orthodoxy and not a departure from its 
chief tenets and foundations, namely the usul al-din or dogmas of Islam. Their discourse 
gives rise through this gradualism to a synthetic process. In this synthesis they mix 
revelation and reason through some use of ijtihad or independent reasoning . they 
clearly privilege Islam and its dogmas in thinking about moderation. In this scheme 
God’s law or Shari‘a, justice or ‘adl, and da‘wa are fundamental to how they 
reformulate Islam’s dogmas in a way that opens up ways for values that exist within 
Islam but not so pronounced and practised to be adopted in order to reconcile faith with 
Muslim societies in which tolerance, pluralism, and justice have been largely absent 
from politics. In rethinking these dogmas they use tawheed as an anchor that solidifies 
Muslim identity and Islamic values of equality, ennoblement and Godly justice. This 
tawheedi framework is in the puritanical discourse constructed not only as an anchor, 
but also a kind of line that separates out the Islamic way from the Western way whether 
in thinking about moderation or the whole project of political community. There are 
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signs of renewal or innovation but components of the Islamic orthodoxy still dominate, 
grounding political practice and political thinking clearly within the Qur’an and 
Tradition of the Prophet. But what is clearly emerging is the beginnings of an exposition 
of ideas which are seeking flexible mu‘amalat (human relations and dealings) that make 
use of the immutable tenets of Islam order to build a wasati or balanced socio-moral 
order. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE PROBLEMATIC OF ‘MODERATION’ IN SAUDI ARABIA: A REFLECTION 
7.1 Focus 
This is a chapter that attempts to reflect on the problematic of moderation, which 
has been analysed in this thesis through the discourse of two types of discourse: 
‘pragmatic’ and ‘puritanical’. The main objective is to reflect by comparing and 
contrasting the positions of these two discourses. This is aimed at understanding what 
the two types of discourse tell us about moderation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Two sections will be used to meet this objective. The first looks at the language used by 
the two discourses. The second reflects on the content of the interpretations of 
moderation. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of moderation and reform in the 
Kingdom. 
 
7.2 The Problematic of Moderation & Reform 
Moderation is not a term that is associated with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
The most frequently used term by media in the West when describing Saudi Arabia is 
conservative. It is an adjective that sums up the Orientalist view of a country, whose 
image will not recover from the 9/11 fallout for a long time. The idea of ‘confrontation’ 
is prominent, and Fred Halliday was one of the very few this criticised this Orientalist 
tendency.
428
 This direction in research is part of a general undertaking to explain the 
phenomenon of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, which Lebanese scholar Ahmad Moussalli 
addressed very critically.
429
 It is the idea of opposition to change most Orientalists 
writing on Saudi Arabia highlight when writing about the Kingdom. In the writing of a 
Western ‘Saudi-ologist’ the country appears to be outside ‘history’, expressing amazing 
how it still exists. “In theory Saudi Arabia should not exist – its survival defies the laws 
of logic and history. Look at its princely rulers, dressed in funny clothes, trusting in God 
rather than man, and running their oil-rich country on principles that most of the world 
has abandoned with relief. Shops are closed for prayer five times a day, executions take 
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place in the street – and let us not even get started on the status of women. Saudi Arabia 
is one of the planet’s enduring – and for some, quite offensive – enigmas...”430 The mix 
he presents in this quote is intriguing to most Westerners and even Arabs. The ‘funny 
clothes’, ‘God’, ‘oil’, ‘prayer’, ‘executions’, ‘status of women’ and ‘enduring’ nature. 
Nothing in these elements communicates the idea of moderation. That is one reason that 
the word that comes to mind is ‘enigma’, as the Robert Lacey states. This is precisely 
the problematic of seeking to understand ‘moderation’ in a country never associated 
with such a value. To use Robert Lacey’s words, ‘one of the planet’s enduring’ 
stereotypes is the idea of Saudi Arabia is not a place of ‘moderation’. One notes that in 
the mix of ingredients mentioned by Lacey there is ‘God’ and ‘prayer’. To go back to 
the excerpt with which Lacey begins his book, ‘man’ and ‘God’ are presented as central 
to another stereotype: the two are mutually exclusive. They are not meant to co-exist in 
the modern world. The evidence I have tried to analyse in the previous chapters points 
to a different direction: trust in God does not exclude the trust in man. If there is any 
definition for the Islamic notion of moderation, it is precisely this: reconciling the trust 
in God and the trust in man. It is the challenge of finding a balance in the relationship of 
God and man that defines the quest for moderation in this Islamic context. Once upon a 
time this was the same challenge faced by religion in the West; defining acceptable 
balance for Caesar and for God. In Islam of course, the two realms are not thought of as 
‘separate’, a discussion initiated more than 30 years ago in a solid article by the well-
known Middle East scholar R. Stephen Humphreys. His key finding was that in 
countries such as Saudi Arabia politics was thought of as a matter of religion, not 
separate from it.
431
 They form two components of the same scheme that combines the 
religious and the political, or the sacred and the mundane. This is the meaning of 
wasatiyya (from wasat, which means the middle) the middle path that medieval and 
present jurists of Islam consider to be the way of Islam. But as Enayat discovered some 
time ago, the way of Islam is diverse when it comes to responding to modernity.
432
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Edward Said warns against making sweeping generalisations about the ‘Orient’, 
which is not unitary.
433
 In my attempt to address moderation, I have tried to get away 
from generalisation, by discussing two prominent discourses of moderation. Moderation 
is not itself unitary. There are various ways of thinking and practicing it. This 
moderation does not always look like the moderation known in the West to be the 
opposite of ‘extremism’ or ‘terrorism’ or politics of ‘radicalisation’.434 When and if the 
subject is at all considered it is in relation to security.
435
 I sought through three criteria 
(pluralism, ideological moderation, and respect for the rules of the political game) to 
address ideas that do not reinforce the stereotypes through a defence of Saudi Arabia 
against accusations of being a hotbed of fanatical extremists or a medieval backwater in 
politics and democracy. Saudi Arabia has its share of extremists, fanatics and forces that 
understand jihad only as ‘holy war’ against Muslims and non-Muslims they do not 
approve of their ideologies, politics, or cultural outlook.
436
 These facts, which exist in 
many other countries around the world, did not compel following a stereotypical 
research agenda which understands ‘moderation’ as the opposite of ‘militancy’437 or a 
discussion that should take place in relation to ‘terrorism’. Stephen Schwartz’s work 
represents a good example of works that discusses Saudi Arabia by linking Wahhabism 
and terrorism. This leads him to make subjective observations about the “fascistic” 
nature of Wahhabism. It is the kind of work that leaves the reader thinking that 
moderation has no place in the Kingdom.
438
 I sought to get away from this type of 
gloomy and biased accounts about so-called Saudi ‘fundamentalism’. My intention was 
to indentify and follow a more creative and broader research agenda, an agenda that 
would indirectly address Orientalist stereotypes of the Kingdom by looking at aspects 
that point to ‘change’, not the endurance of negative features that have been so widely 
debated since the tragic events of 9/11. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the twenty-first 
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century is not the same Arabia ruled by the 19
th
 century fanatic brotherhood or Ikhwan 
of Najd.
439
 Many aspects may have resisted change but others have changed or are in 
the process of dealing with change. This includes politics where ‘moderation’ or 
wasatiyya is gaining a wider public. In one way, the problematic of ‘moderation’ 
addressed in this thesis looks for additional ingredients for understanding the 
transformation of political identity in the Kingdom. The good work done by Christine 
Helms in her book from the early 1980s relies too heavily on ingredients of ‘tradition’ 
in its account of political identity in the Kingdom.
440
 Moreover, the examination of 
moderation opens up debates concerning Saudi society and not the House of Saud’. This 
is another type of writing about the Kingdom that communicates different types of 
stereotypes concerned with the rulers and not the people of the Kingdom.
441
    
My approach is to seek evidence from Saudi activists’ views on moderation is 
also intended to show that there is a dynamic of change, politically and culturally. The 
existing library of books on the Kingdom does not suggest that scholarly attention is 
concerned as yet with this issue. This is despite the fact this dynamic of change is 
obvious today through the increased lobbying capacity of the Saudi public such as the 
professionals to express disaffection, political preference and even criticism. This is no 
doubt different from institutionalisation of change or of reform at least in politics.  It is 
the fact that moderation is being deepened in Saudi society that even the ruling house 
pays attention to pressure from scholars for sweeping reforms.
442
 As part of this 
pressure, the call for a constitutional monarchy has become widespread, but not of 
course as yet taken seriously by the rulers. Part of that pressure is produced by the type 
of discourses I have sought to analyse in this thesis. Change in the Kingdom has always 
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come gradually. For instance, of late and in the context of the Arab revolts seen in 
countries like Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen, public expenditure was raised to 
create stable employment for thousands of unemployed Saudi graduates, and employees 
of the public sector had their contracts converted from temporary to permanent 
contracts. But more importantly, women were given the vote in September 2011 by the 
King not only as a response to Arab revolts, but also because women, such as those 
whose evidence of political activism on behalf of equality, citizenship, dialogue and just 
government have made themselves heard.
443
 Orientalist scholarship ignores the role of 
these discourses in the gradual transformation of the Kingdom. 
There has been an undercurrent of tension simmering for a long time in the 
Kingdom, since the 1980s when the first petitions for reform began. However, the 
current context in which there are plural discourses and types of activism who seem to 
be moderating their views of politics helps the agenda of reform and transformation. 
Discourses of moderation are important in this context where pragmatist and puritanical 
groups and forces seem to acknowledge the need of reform even if they do not agree 
about the pace and substance of reform. However, the fact that they seem to be directing 
the various publics towards accepting formerly unthinkable ideas and positions (e.g. 
equal forms of muwatana, just government, and pluralism) about how to organise 
politics in relation to man and in relation to God may be considered a form of preparing 
the right background for sustained reform. In one way, this is a form of continuous 
social pressure and lobby to be considered by the rulers in the present and the future. 
This is a major gain for the Kingdom and the discourses of moderation have become so 
prominent in this regard that they cannot be excluded from the public sphere when 
reform policy is considered and made. In the past, Saudi Arabia had petitioners who 
lobbied the rulers only in times of crisis such as during the first and second Gulf wars. 
This pressure is now sustained as well as coming from different sources: the puritanical 
forces, the pragmatic groups, and the hard-line clergy. This is a new trend in itself, 
allowing the Kingdom to follow a new route in its development as a political unit and as 
a society. It can no longer be claimed that Wahhabism is the only dynamic that defines 
Saudi Arabia.
444
 Or perhaps, it is not easy today to make the case that Wahhabism does 
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not produce different ways of thinking or it stays fixed. The presence of  various trends 
of thought in the Kingdom such as the two under study in this thesis points to change, 
which remains slow when seen from outside. But for those viewing it from the inside, it 
is cause for optimism.  
 
7.3 Reflection I: The Language of the Pragmatist &Puritanical 
Discourses 
The analysis in the previous two chapters of the pragmatist and puritanical 
discourses produce two styles of language. Each style is typical of the worldviews 
considered in this thesis. It is the meanings that produce the various expressions and 
concepts used by the pragmatists and puritanical speakers. Therefore the language is not 
incidental here but rather deliberate. It is characterised by the use of very specific 
phrases or concepts. Some are Qur’anic, the puritanical trend, and some are derived 
from non-religious sources, in the case of the pragmatists. By reading these concepts 
and phrases used by the two trends one can discern two processes of thought about 
moderation. Each makes use of different sources and tools. These sources and tools in 
some instances belong to the same Islamic tradition, and this is common. What differs is 
the interpretation each trend gives to the concepts and language used. Other times, they 
use different sources. The pragmatists, for instance, rely in some instances on Western 
sources. However both are motivated by the same socio-moral imperative to reform 
Saudi society and politics.  
In terms of language, content and the prospects of change, the discourse of 
moderation is part of this overall gradual movement for  redefining or reinterpreting the 
values, Islamic and Western, of constructing community, politically, socially and 
culturally in the Kingdom.  The pragmatists’ political language points to an attempt to 
reach a synthesis between the traditional repository and the Western repertoire of ideas 
and values. They use terms very carefully and in a way that makes them sensitive to the 
context of place and time. In terms of place, Saudi Arabia today is undergoing a 
profound process of ‘reintellectualisation’, which I introduced and explained in chapter 
four. The capacity of the Saudi public to receive and accept, or at least consider, the 
ideas communicated by this language is greater now than any other time in the past. 
King Abdullah’s own speeches speak of national dialogue, reform, tolerance and the 
195 
 
drive to fight corruption, until 2005 a taboo subject.
445
 His initiatives include as I have 
mentioned above new laws which allow women to vote and run as candidates in future 
elections. There is a context which makes these reforms acceptable now thanks to 
higher levels of education, and deeper connection with the rest of the world and the 
neighbouring Arab region which has seen greater reforms, politically, culturally and 
economically. Some argue that there is a middle class which did not exist before.
446
 The 
pragmatists’ language is timely too. It builds on a foundation of struggles, which are not 
researched thoroughly by students of Saudi politics and society, and pressure of reform 
begun in the 1980s and continued through the 1990s, culminating in the famous 
Mudhahikkart al-Naseeha or Memorandum of Advice from scholars to the King of the 
day.
447
 Fandy has documented how these struggles involved dissent which led to 
increasing social pressure for reform on the state.
448
 I have mentioned these in my 
background chapters. If anything the emergence of this type of synthesis in the language 
of moderation and reform is the result of gradual pressure and change. The timing is a 
logical result of this gradualism, which is a major feature of Saudi political culture. It is 
evolution in social, political and cultural arenas that define the Saudi approach to 
change. This synthesis today has a public which did not exist in huge numbers a decade 
ago. Moreover, the relaxation since 2005 of censorship by the religious police and 
authorities has facilitated the emergence of this discourse into the public arena. As 
mentioned in the discussion of ‘reintellectualisation’ the media and Internet revolution 
have been important factors in the rise of new political communication and language. It 
is less censored and may be even more complex to police or ban. Censorship of the 
Internet has implications for overall development that perhaps explains the reluctance of 
the state to rely on it for interfering in the political evolution of society and groups not 
directly affiliated with the state. Under King Abdullah there is an atmosphere of ease 
with these new groups and their political discourses, which he contributed to as well as 
capitalised on to introduce his own reforms. In this respect, one can say that there is a 
two-way communication of political ideas, and language itself is part of this flow of 
information in Saudi Arabia today. 
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The puritanical trend’s own language points to making use of the inherited 
repertoire of another generation of petitioners and struggles for reform on behalf of 
religion, in particular the moderate sahwis whose forebears were the likes of Shaykh 
Naser Al-Omar, Shaykh Salman Al-‘Awda and Shaykh Safar Al-Hawali.449 These 
forces of resurgence
450
 of a quasi Muslim Brotherhood trend in the Kingdom must be 
distinguished from the radical sahwis which took this trend into a different direction 
under the influence of Osama bin Laden and others.  Their language reflects a degree of 
the moderation found in the transnational Muslim Brotherhood movement, which 
stresses today full political participation and acceptance of many civic values and the 
principle of muwatana, citizenship of non-Muslims under an Islamic state (see Table 5). 
However, the synthesis attempted by the puritanical trend is internal: mixing 
specifically Saudi politico-religious values and features with Muslim Brotherhood 
values. The pragmatists’ synthesis is external, by trying to marry Saudi specificity with 
Western democratic values and ideas. For instance, the idea of shari’a or Islamic law is 
still accorded a major place in the language of puritanical trend. There is no consensus 
within the Muslim Brotherhood movement today about the idea of shari‘a in politics. 
North African Islamist movements tend to delay it or ignore it, and Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood since the time of Hassan Al-Hudaybi, who tried to minimise the influence 
of Sayyid Qutb and radical political Islam, has differed on the question.
451
 The 
pragmatists by contrast seem not to be concerned with the institution of Islamic law. It 
is as if they have moved beyond it as an item on their agenda. The chief concern for 
them has more to do with the approach to institute moderation. Thus they stress the 
values that organise moderation: respect of difference, dialogue, religious diversity, 
tolerance, deliberation, pluralism, competition, co-existence, and freedom. The 
terminology they use (Ta’addudiyya, Tanawwu‘, Tasamuh, Al-ra’y al-akhar, Al-ra’y al-
mukhalif, Al-Hiwar, Niqash, lakum dinukum wa liya dini, Mujadalah, Munaqashha, 
Ikhtilaf, Mukhalafa, Hurr fima yudeen, Hurriyyah, Ta‘ayush, Tanafus hurr) is only 
partially religious. Of the phrases and concepts listed here only the phrases “lakum 
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dinukum wa liya dini” and “Hurr fima yudeen” have religious source. In particular, 
“lakum dinukum wa liya dini” is a Qur’anic verse, and incidentally this is the only 
phrase common to the discourses of by interviewees from the puritanical and pragmatist 
trends of thought. The influence of religion is still present in the pragmatists’s language 
of moderation. But overall their language seems to reflect concern with civil matters and 
values, which to an extent can be considered part of a global platform of values shared 
by groups and discourses whose political activisms are about pushing the agenda of 
equal citizenship and democratic government. As in the discourse of modernisation by 
their intellectual forebears,
452
 the notion of ‘free competition’ (tanafus hurr) has no 
place in the language of the puritanical trend. Just as the notion of Islamic law is absent 
from the pragmatists’ language. In the context of Saudi Arabia, the concept of 
‘competition’ is so new given that the country has no political parties and municipality 
elections are very recent having been introduced by King Abdullah. What is striking 
about the pragmatists’ language of moderation is the emphasis of respect of difference. 
They use six different terms to make the point about their commitment to this value: Al-
ra’y al-akhar (the opinion of the other), al-ra’y al-mukhalif (different view), Al- lakum 
dinukum wa liya dini (to each his/her religion), ikhtilaf (difference) mukhalafa (right to 
disagree) hurr fima yudeen (freedom of belief). This is an important feature of the 
pragmatists’ discourse. In a way, this perhaps reflects their defensiveness and the effort 
to defend their outlook and project of moderation as the basis for reform. Another value 
which is represents an important feature in their language is dialogue. For this purpose 
they use four different terms to emphasise this idea: hiwar (dialogue) niqash 
(discussion), mujadalah (argumentation), munaqashha (exchange of ideas). There is a 
kind of logic in the pragmatists’ thinking. They stress the role of difference and the right 
to differ and then establish the values that allow different of opinion to be 
communicated peacefully through dialogue. In this logic, the values of pluralism, 
diversity and co-existence, respectively ta’addudiyya, tanawwu‘, ta‘ayush, make for an 
order in which moderation is about a civil order where politics are organised to include 
competing ideas. So in this order, again it is logical for hurriyya or freedom, an 
important concept in the pragmatists’ language, to be a vital condition for diversity, and 
dialogue to allow co-existence. 
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The puritanical trend embeds its language in an outlook in which the divine 
order is primary and non-negotiable. Their interpretation of this divine order is 
facilitated through a set of terms, concepts and phrases (see Table 5) that confirms and 
supports their commitment to Islamic identity and affiliation within the Islamic umma 
of believers as well as patriotic belonging to Saudi Arabia. Here they are loyal to the 
Wahhabi vision which sees no clash between the nation-state and Islamic identity. In a 
way this reflects commitment to the politico-religious political culture of Saudi Arabia. 
The normative Islamic community supplements the normative nationalist community. It 
follows then that their language of muwatana or citizenship in an Islamic state, for 
instance, serves both the morality of Islam as well as the nationalist imperative for 
worldly order and co-existence with Christians and Jews, peoples of the book (ahl al-
kitab). In a way, using the language of muwatana reflects the principle that the morality 
of the normative umma-ic order intended for the community of believers everywhere 
presupposes the form of citizenship within nationalist borders. That is if muwatana is a 
good made binding and moral in the umma, then it is relevant in any type of community 
where believers form a majority. The language of the puritanical trend is therefore 
defined by umma-ic moral imperatives which they extend to the definition of the moral 
imperatives that should govern nationalist community. The importance of the divine 
order in the thinking of the puritanical trend is extensive in scope and meaning. 
Monotheistic morality is central to its conceptualisation. The set of terms used by the 
puritanical trend all revolve around monotheistic divinity. This monotheism, however, 
has a spiritual as well as civil relevance for moderation. Unity of God in spiritual terms 
requires adherence to the teaching of Islam by Muslims. In civil terms Islam’s laws are 
binding and applicable to Muslims whereas through muwatana people’s of the book are 
bound by their own teachings and laws. In addition to this, in civil terms monotheistic 
morality does not forbid organisation of civil matters and political affairs through 
pluralist channels so long as these do not undermine the Unity of god. Even pluralism 
itself takes its meaning from religion: ta‘addudiyya diniyya. They accept pluralism but 
it is not the type of pluralism that would allow atheism for instance. It is a pluralist 
vision tied to fixed set of beliefs about the supremacy of God and his laws, and man’s 
obligation to enjoin the good and prevent evil according to the moral imperatives of 
Islam. Man’s special role in the form of vicegerency (khilafat Allah ala al-ard) makes 
moderation rigidly defined by religious duties: institution of justice through al-dawla al-
‘adila (the Just State) and of God’s law, shari‘a, but without getting into the 
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complexities of its implementation.
453
 In the same manner they do not pick a fight with 
secular ideology in the way language was used by advocates of the religious trend in the 
early 1990s.
454
 
There is interpenetration between these concepts as all of them revolve around 
commitment to monotheistic morality and God’s law. This is the condition of 
moderation in the puritanical trend’s thinking. However, the language of justice or 
legality in general, and citizenship are key terms that are pivotal for the institution of 
order, and are used repetitively in this language. The prominence of these terms can be 
compared by the absence of the term jihad (spiritual struggle), and this is indicative of 
the kind of agenda the puritanical trend wants to advance in Saudi Arabia. It is 
concerned with internal reform in a context where the Kingdom has since the invasion 
of Kuwait witnessed a rise in violence and use of terrorism by local groups, including 
al-Qaida. Dropping the term from the puritanical trend’s language is deliberate and 
some interviewees refused to address this important concept, brushing it aside as not 
relevant to reform and moderation. They do not complicate the language and refer to 
Ibn Taymiyya’s concept of al-wilaya al-kubra (Godly rulership).455 They avoid 
involvement in complicated matter in order to present their thinking in flexible and 
appealing terms. The notion of da‘wa, by contrast is given a special place in the order of 
values and concepts used by the puritanical trend. It is considered to be amongst the 
chief normative institutions of Islam. Therefore in their conceptualisation of moderation 
it obligates Muslims to preach God’s message by enjoining the good (al-amr bi al-
ma‘rouf). This good is primarily concerned with islah, such as those before them in the 
religious trend,
456
 or reform, interfaith dialogue, tolerance, and lobbying for justice. The 
reference to insan, the human being with the attributes of equality as a creation of God, 
regardless of gender or colour, points to a form of Universalist morality in the thinking 
of the puritanical trend. This humanity as they see it is part of the monotheistic order 
intended to advance the maqasid or divine sanctions (respect of life, respect of different 
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faiths).
457
 Moderation in its entirety is interpreted, to serve reform and forms of 
inclusiveness that do not undermine the normative divine sanctions. A major aspect in 
the language of this discourse is the reference to ijtihad, rationalism, which hints at a 
kind of shift in the Wahhabi creed known for a long time for its literalism. Moderation 
requires the freedom to interpret divine texts and without this capacity the puritanical 
trend cannot push too far its agenda of religious renewal. Again, the reference to ijtihad 
points to the concern with internal reform and renewal. To accept political pluralism and 
adopt it as a value, the condition is to give the learned scholars freedom. The same goes 
for the ideas of competition or the value of freedom, which the pragmatists who are not 
bound by a religious agenda speak about openly. Probably, the term most indicative of 
this yet un-declared thinking is the use of the concept of wasatiyya, which I will 
examine in the following section. The preference for ‘the middle path’ is motivated by 
the desire to strike a balance between the worldly and sacred realms. Whilst the 
puritanical trend does not adopt a language that suggests adoption of separation of 
religion and politics, they nonetheless recognise that adopting wasatiyya in order to 
balance the realms of God and of man are required.  
Table 5 Puritanical Trend’s Language: Meaning & Source 
Language/Concepts Meaning Source/Basis 
Tawheed Monotheism Islamic  
Ijtihad Independent thinking Islamic 
shari‘a Islamic law Islamic 
al-dawla al‘adila The Just State Islamic 
Khilafat Allah al al-
ard 
Vicegerency Qur’anic  
ta’adduiyya Islamiyya Muslim pluralism Islamic 
Umma Muslim community Islamic  
tawheed ruhi Spiritual monotheism Islamic  
tawheed madani Civic monotheism Islamic 
shaqa’iq al-rijal Equality of women Islamic 
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da‘wa Preaching, call to Islam Islamic 
Muwatana 
Right to citizenship of Muslims 
and non-Muslims in an Islamic 
state 
Islamic  
shar‘iyya Legitimacy Islamic 
wasati umma 
Just and balanced nation or 
community 
Islamic  
Wasatiyya Moderation; middle path Islamic 
Maqasid Divine sanctions Islamic 
Insane 
Human being, without stress of 
gender or colour 
Islamic 
ahl al-kitab Peoples of the book Islamic 
ta‘addudiyya diniyya 
Pluralism based on religious 
teaching 
Islamic 
la ikraha fi al-deen Non-compulsion in religion Qur’anic 
 
7.4 Reflection II: The Content of the Pragmatist & Puritanical Discourses 
This section seeks to compare the content or substance of the two trends in 
relation to moderation.  Generally, the two discourses’ content follows in the footsteps 
of the Saudi forebears in terms of maintaining solid faith to the identity of the Saudi 
state. This identity elaborates a close relationship between Islam and politics, and 
between God and man. This relationship remains a ‘given’: there is no direct challenge 
to it. It is, however, indirectly, that the challenge is mounted but in a very subtle fashion 
that requires close analysis of the substance that one reads in the two discourses. This 
challenge is one of degree. The challenge never seeks total break with the politico-
religious tradition. Rather, it tries to reconcile the indigenous politico-religious heritage 
with liberal values (in the case of the pragmatists) and with indigenous accumulated 
thinking and practice of reform. The pragmatists rely less on less on defending their 
propositions by reference to Wahhabi dogma per se. What they do, however, is to 
pragmatically declare loyalty to the religious establishment and to Islam. They know 
they need their support or at least indifference to be able to reach a wider public and 
compete with rival projects of reform. Saudi pragmatists do not reject the dogmas of 
religion. They pay attention to ingredients of moderation that do not clash with Islam 
without necessarily dressing them in Islamic language. By contrast, the puritanical 
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trend’s notion of moderation uses the very content of religion working out its project of 
reform in general. They adhere to the dogmas of Islam and rely on its concepts and tools 
to elaborate a trend of thought whose assumptions do not depart far from the fixed 
heritage of the forebears. However, this must not be mistaken for renouncing renewal. 
To the contrary, they do not, and the way they go about this has its own form of 
subtlety. They drop jihad from their discourse and do not include it when speaking 
about moderation. This is despite the fact that they still show strong attachment to 
da‘wa, and to shari‘a. There is a reason for this. They take da‘wa, and shari‘a to be part 
of the normative repertoire that they take also to be a given: not negotiable. Plus, it is 
intended for the internal renewal and internal development and wellbeing of the Muslim 
community. Unlike them, jihad has been shown its controversial and even dangerous 
potential in Saudi society. The context does not help. Saudi Arabia’s rulers and even 
clergy in a context of terrorism and extremism that targeted fellow Muslims and Saudis 
is not a ‘popular’ or ‘easy’ item to adopt in one’s moral project of change and reform. 
Both trends of thought in fact show areas of silence – the pragmatists, generally, do not 
talk about da‘wa or shari‘a, and the puritanical discourses leave jihad out. Both are in 
different ways helping reformulate and pluralise the Wahhabi creed from within: their 
discourses through what is mentioned and what is left out challenge the existing 
politico-religious tradition. This is the element missing in analyses of the politics and 
society of the Kingdom. These subtle and not so subtle challenge against and 
reformulations of the existing Wahhabi dogmas by the pragmatists and the puritanical 
trend differ in one regard. The former utilise Western concepts and ideas for modelling 
reform, in general, and moderation in particular. The latter maintain tension with the 
Western heritage, rejecting its premises as the only ones worthy of emulation by 
Muslims. Hence the two trends somewhat ‘clash’ on gender inclusiveness. The 
pragmatists have no problem whatsoever with women being included in order to 
strengthen pluralism, and showing commitment to equality with women. This notion of 
gender inclusiveness as part of pluralism is not accepted fully with its Western terms 
and conditions. The puritanical trend’s thought on the question does not reject equality 
as a principle. However, they reject it principally as a specifically Western principal. 
Female interviewees from the puritanical trend are not fussed about equality as such. 
For them, equality happens in others fields where substance matters most than the 
superficial label of ‘gender equality’: they give priority to equality through the 
substance of safety, protection, and education over what they view as ‘gender equality’ 
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for the sake of gender equality. The pragmatists more or less follow the route of other 
Arab reformers including from the 19
th
 century: looking to the West for ideas of reform 
but not renouncing loyalty to the Islamic faith. This is the agenda of Rifa’t Tahtawi 
amongst others, as thoroughly documented by Albert Hourani.
458
 It repeats itself in 
various Muslim territories with different emphases. In the Saudi context sensitivity to 
religion never leads the pragmatists to claim a different culture. They can only claim a 
subculture of rights, competition, political parties, gender equality, diversity, dialogue 
and respect of difference. The tools of Western democracy are used to define the outline 
of their moderation. By comparison to the pragmatists, the puritanical trend’s thinking 
is insistent on use of Islam as the main frame of reference. This is the only furnish the 
framework they consider to be legitimate for realising the spirit of Islam, and only 
through it the tools that furnish moderation. Thus for this group cultural and intellectual 
self-determination is an issue of the utmost importance. Their reference to the Qur’an 
and Hadith is based on a solid conviction that divine texts are themselves a moral text of 
how to reconcile sacred and worldly affairs.
 
 The meanings they give to moderation all 
confirm one thing: that Islam is a purposeful politico-religio-moral framework that no 
man-made programme of reform or morality can compete with. Thus imitation of the 
Western outlook is unthinkable. 
This tension that exists in each trend highlights to two types of separation on 
which its followers base their ideas. The pragmatists prefer separation of the religious 
and the worldly but never renounce God. Their thought makes cohabitation of the two 
acceptable and possible by seeking the instruments of democratic competition, 
institutionalisation of parties, difference of opinion and ideology, and means of political 
deliberation and discussion. However, they never use the label ‘almaniyya (secularism). 
It is a type of de facto secularism, which goes without a name or declaration. This looks 
like another type of fragmentation within the puritanical trend whose advocates do not 
in any form separate the religious and the mundane. Separation for them is internal, a 
way to seek a civil order subsumed under the religious order, and this is the substance of 
their reference to spiritual monotheism and civic monotheism (tawheed madani), 
seeking a civil order in which laws, justice, tolerance and the practice of the obligation 
to enjoin the good and prevent the evil all take place within Islam’s normative 
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parameters. Thus justice, God’s law, da‘wa, tolerance of difference and acceptance of 
other religions obtain their legitimacy for Islam, intertwine with it, and never become 
ends in themselves above the maqasid, the divine socio-moral order of Islam. These 
maqasid or Godly sanctions are not negotiable either as argued by Al-‘Obaydi.459 
I wish to elaborate the point about the similarity and dissimilarity between the 
pragmatists and the puritanical trend, by referring to excerpts by leading figures 
affiliated with each. The similarity is that they both declare openly loyalty to Islam. The 
dissimilarity is that they use different techniques for clarifying their positions towards 
the role of religion in relation to ideas and values related to moderation or reform in 
general. 
The late Ghazi Al-Qusaybi is one of the most well-known faces of Saudi 
diplomacy and officialdom, having served the state for most of his life until his death in 
2010. He was known for his solid advocacy of reform and the kind of ideas that sums 
up the pragmatists’ notion of moderation. The ambiguity in his discourse is documented 
in a famous treatise he wrote in 1991 and he called ‘hatta la takuna fitna’ [So that 
Discord Does not Take Place].
460
 The treatise is written is a self-defence in the height of 
the first Gulf War in 1991 against his accusation of being secularist by a known 
Islamist, Naser Al-‘Omar, and warns prominent religious scholars against causing social 
discord. The treatise is a good indicator of the sensitivity of the pragmatists to labels 
such as ‘secularist’. This they take to be more offensive than liberal. In the context of 
Saudi Arabia a secularist carries a particularly negative meaning as it refers to rejection 
of the existing politico-religious order in the Kingdom. The pragmatists may have 
adopted the language of political parties, competition, diversity, etc. But they have not 
openly put a label on their adoption of values or ideas that may be interpreted as 
associations of secularism. In a very ambiguous discourse al-Qusaybi’s 100-page 
treatise defends himself against the charge of secularism by using the language the 
Qur’an and the Hadith. He intended this to be proof that the values of renewal, reform, 
and moderation are all found in the divine texts. Through this ambiguity he cleverly 
points out that the Saudi learned scholars are involved in all aspects of Saudi life, sacred 
and mundane, but without forming a ‘papacy’ or a ‘theocratic’ establishment or class 
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(tabaqa kahanutiyya). His idea is that in Islam a/ “there is no religious class”, and b/ 
that there is the principle of ‘deen wa dawla’ [religion and a state].461 He intended this 
to mean two things, which is typical of his ambiguity. Firstly, this means there is no 
possibility of separation, a realm of secularists and a realm for religion-ists. Secondly, 
since there is no ‘papacy’ or ‘church’, then he is proposing that Islam is amenable to a 
kind of division between the religious and the political even if these two he takes to be 
intertwined. He uses this ambiguous defence to advance the idea that he, like the learned 
scholars, gets involved in politics through the practice of values of dialogue and out of 
their concern for the public good, mostly to enjoin the good and ensure cohesion and 
national unity. They do this not because it is part of their religious duty. Rather, they do 
this because the public expects them to serve the nation and invest trust in them. In spite 
of this role in mundane affairs, he says: “our scholars do not view themselves as being 
‘politicians.”462 He goes on to say, in defence against his accusation and through an 
accusation of his own, “in the Kingdom there are no secularists who are demanding 
separation of religion and state: everyone in the Kingdom knows that the state is based 
on religion and would not survive a minute if it was separated from it. So if there are no 
secularists in the Kingdom, there is no reason for the existence of fundamentalists to 
fight a secular government and to establish Islamic law, which already is the law of the 
land, thank God.”463 Al-Qusaybi fails to convince because he was defensive and as held 
a Ministry in government at that time did not want to been seen to be at odds with the 
public discourse of the state, a state that deals with the West, uses Western technology 
and expertise, collaborates in Western security arrangements,
464
 is part of its defence 
planning,
465
 and in 1991 even fought side by side with the non-Muslim US-led forces 
against a neighbouring Muslim state (Iraq), which invaded another (Muslim) state. Just 
as the establishment clergy rallied to defend the state using the Qur’an and the Hadith, 
al-Qusaybi did the same to defend himself. It was not the best defence for the forces of 
pragmatism in the Kingdom since he tried to also defend female education and 
inclusiveness, dialogue, the right to differ, and the idea of ‘otherness’ in thought. In 
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defending himself against the accusation of secularism, Al-Qusaybi did not mention 
separation of religion and politics as his definition of secularism. He was employing a 
different definition of secularism (‘almaniyya) “al-kufr al-muhrij ‘an al-milla” 
[disbelief that takes one out of his faith].
466
 Al-Qusaybi deliberately avoided using a 
precise definition as he did not wish to have a public showdown about the pragmatists’ 
project or use of Western models of thought and even borrowing of standards such as 
political competition, pluralism, gender inclusiveness as the basis of their project of 
moderation. 
Moderation for the puritanical trend has no agenda of separation. Typically, the 
discourse reaffirms the primacy of the divine order and the role of Islam within it. This 
role for figures like Abdallah Al-Hamid is primarily civil – he is the author of the idea 
of spiritual (ruhi) and civil (madani) monotheism. Under the madani type of 
monotheism values of civility are adopted: renaissance (nahud), progress (ruqi), renewal 
of religion (tasheeh al-mafaheem) or ijtihad through activation of the Godly sanctions 
of Islam, free speech and work ethic (‘ala kull muthaqqaf an yudli bi ‘amalahi wa 
qawlihi). Al-Hamid affirms the importance of justice as “the foundation to endurance of 
nations civilisations” through a vicegerency that seeks good for all. In politics he 
repeats the idea that shari‘a is the moral compass of all rulers if they are to establish the 
“just state” and succeed in reform.467 He even goes as far as talking about a civil 
society, within an Islamic order, with “a set of values that champion freedom, justice, 
consultation in government, dignity, equality, and pluralism.”468 This language can 
easily be mistaken for the language of ‘liberals’ or ‘pragmatists’. In its commitment to 
the values associated with moderation and democratic reform it refers to religion, and is 
not at all inclined to drop the religious framework. By contrast, a pragmatist would state 
all of these standards but without reference to shari‘a or the divine order, implying 
preference for separation of religion and politics. For a puritanical trend it is the non-
separation which informs the preferences for moderation, reform, progress, and 
patriotism. Shaykh Abdallah Ibn Sulayman Al-Mani‘, a top learned scholar, gives an 
example of how respect of the rules of the political game themselves, namely 
patriotism, is granted only as a condition of total “loyalty to religion and traditions,” 
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country, and values of “solidarity, participation, co-operation, sacrifice,” and 
“commitment to nationalist goals.”469 Coming to the fore in a period which is in a way 
the twilight of a new era of confident but subtle challenge of the longstanding Wahhabi 
dogma, the puritanlial trend of thought, like its pragmatic counterpart, produce the 
linguistic and moral devices of a discourse that is emerging as the hallmark of the new 
discourses propagating the values of two types of moderation. They differ in their use of 
language, concepts and the sources of these concepts. However, both commit to religion 
in different ways. Both to an extent are hinged on addressing the emergence of a serious 
threat to Saudi society waged through violence. So the state had no choice but to ignore 
or tolerate these discourses as on way of facilitating the induction of the Saudi populace 
into the values of moderation as a remedy against the danger of terrorism and even 
‘fundamentalism’ as Al-Qusaybi himself refers to it. The endeavour to deepen the 
culture of moderation is easier when helped by two or more projects of moderation at a 
time when the forces of extremism is sufficiently strong and widespread. What is 
important to note is the endeavour for the pragmatists is concerned with inducting the 
public into the values of respect of difference and diversity, and the channels of 
facilitating their equal participation and competition. They do not see the necessity of 
justifying these values, and assume their tacit acceptance and inner good without having 
to refer to tradition or religion. For the puritanical trend, the values of moderation, be 
they pluralism, muwatana, inclusiveness or respect of the rules of the political game 
have their internal good in their moral standing and kinship with a the notion of a divine 
order seen as the ideal paradigm for re-enacting justice, God’s law, and reconciliation of 
the ultimate balance of the worldly and the mundane. Moderation for the pragmatists 
takes place when the values they champion are enacted. For the puritanical trend the 
socio-moral order of Islam contain within them the values and standards only through 
their enactment can moderation takes place.     
 
7.5 Conclusion 
The answer to questions about the change or ‘cultural shift’ in terms of 
‘moderation’ in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has to be based on the evidence obtained 
through the analysis of the discourses of the pragmatist and puritanical trends of 
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thought. The two trends are a logical result to a long process of social revolution
470
 of 
which ‘reintellectualisation’ is the most prominent feature today. The fact that there is 
different trends of thought that are entangled in public debate about reform in the 
Kingdom. What is important about this socio-political phenomenon is that it happens 
with the approval of the rulers and the religious establishment which is today very 
restrained even if it maintains hard-line positions in various matters of policy. It has 
accepted the King’s decision for women to vote and run in elections but it still opposes 
women driving. The main observation in relation to the two trends of thought discussed 
in this chapter is that they are agents of maturation, building on the foundation of 
struggles from the 1990s. They do this without confrontation either with each other or 
with the state, and definitely not with the hard-line religious establishment. This is in 
itself a moderating factor in the progression towards the Qur’anic concept of an “umma 
wasat” (balanced community) as the puritanical trend calls it. Both trends have inherited 
normative projects from earlier struggles which not only exercised little sensitivity to 
the context of time and place in which they sought to propagate their ideas and values. 
For instance, the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights used in the early 1990s 
Western concepts such as human rights at a time when reintellectualisation was not 
deep and the Saudi public was not ready to accept and deal with such ideas. It 
propagated for those ideas at a time of international conflict and the state’s involvement 
in the US-led war in Kuwait meant that it was not in the mood to consider such a 
discourse. However, they left behind a legacy of struggle which the pragmatists have 
developed in a way making it today acceptable. They propagate their values without 
being offensive to Islam. They stay away from issues of Islamic law and da‘wa has no 
place in their vision of moderation and reform. In addition to this their values of 
dialogue and acceptance of difference can easily defended, when they need to, by 
referring to the Qur’an and Hadith in the same way done by Al-Qusaybi. When he 
needed to defend against accusation of secularism he spoke as if he were a religious 
figure with religious commitment. The puritanical trend does the same. They maintain 
only part of the normative framework of the sahwis, especially the non-radical branch of 
it.
471
 They develop it though means that leave out jihad, and their choice of time cannot 
be better. The wave of terrorism in the Kingdom has made this Islamic concept 
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controversial in public debates. They maintain the normative content of the sahwis 
before them, by committing to shari‘a and da‘wa and the Godly sanctions, all of which 
they place within monotheistic parameters. Regarding Jihad, they drop it building on the 
foundation left to them by the early sahwis’ struggles for reform and modertation. For 
instance, al-Hawali started from the early 1990s preaching ‘spiritual jihad’, by making 
this superior to military jihad. As Lacroix quotes Al-Hawali’s statement that “jihad by 
the sword is the type of jihad that has the least value…Anyone can play a role in it, in 
contrast to jihad by preaching where very few can be useful. The essential jihad on 
which we should concentrate our efforts, and without which any jihad is futile, consists 
of bringing people together, training them, educating them.”472 The puritanical trend has 
built on this foundation through which an earlier generation began to downgrade the 
role of jihad. Its followers today leave it out of their discourses. They even go further by 
creating a civil branch under monotheism that is compatible with the arena of 
mu‘amalat (worldly transactions) in Islam. In this they rely on the Hadith that Muslims 
must perfect their worldly affairs and know them well for the management of the state, 
commerce or war. Under this civil arena they allow for equality of citizenship, and 
forms of inclusiveness. Al-Hamid even refers to the notion of a civil society so long as 
this is intended to advance the Godly order and the Godly sanctions, including good 
government, freedom. The synthesis attempted by the pragmatists is the only facet of 
their discourse that the puritanical trend finds objectionable: imitation of the West 
should not be given priority over seeking renewal and attributes of moderation 
available, according to them, in the socio-moral order of Islam. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION: ‘MODERATING’ SAUDI ARABIA 
 
This dissertation set out to understand the dynamics of change in Saudi Arabia 
with focus on the question of ‘moderation’. The contents of the previous chapters have 
attempted to analyse the complex discursive processes involved in the construction of a 
culture of ‘moderation’. The discussion borders on another theme, not directly 
addressed in the thesis: the reconstruction of Saudi identity at a time when the Kingdom 
witnessed its worst crises since its emergence as a nation-state in 1932. The twin 
problems of the tragedy of 9/11 for which Saudi citizens are responsible, and the rise of 
radical forces using violence in the name of Islam have raised legitimate questions 
about the kind of ‘culture’, if not ‘religion’ and ‘citizen’, that lead to the perpetration of 
such acts in today’s world.473 The Kingdom did not experience such violence on its 
territory after the takeover of the Grand Mosque in 1979. Throughout the thesis the 
research agenda is indirectly about ‘moderating’ Saudi Arabia. Partly, this is done to 
respond to the Orientalist assumptions and generalisations that contribute to a library of 
knowledge about the Kingdom in which little has changed since the first Western 
travellers crossed the ‘empty quarter’ (Al-Rub‘ Alkhali) early in the 20th century and 
since Orientalists began their investigation into the ‘sultans of Arabia’.474 The 
knowledge produced, whilst solid and impressive in parts, in other parts it typifies what 
Said attributes to all Orientalism: reductionistic through use of contrast, 
oversimplification and omission of local knowledge. More directly, however, the 
investigation in this thesis seeks to establish through reliance on local knowledge that 
there are moderating ‘shifts’ in Saudi Arabia, and this justifies new types of research 
and knowledge about the politics and society of the Kingdom. The local knowledge 
used here apart from reliance on my own authorial agency is to seek responses from 
Saudi activists and opinion-formulators about the norms, values, and concepts that 
define their conceptualisation of ‘moderation’. The thesis has attempted to capture all of 
this through the local discourses and counter-discourses of moderation’. The fact that 
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there are diverse discourses is in itself a ‘moderating’ dynamic rarely noted by students 
of Saudi Arabian politics and society. The dialectic nature of these discourses is helping 
shift the political culture towards new areas where the language of politics is being 
changed, where the norms of political activism are themselves changing, and where new 
political actors are proving that there is nothing ‘static’ about Saudi Arabia. It is within 
a rapidly shifting context of norms of authority, power-relations, media and social 
dynamics, that these discourses must be understood. They point to the fact that 
understanding of the country’s Wahhabi creed itself requires innovative thinking, 
researching and writing. Wahhabism is without a doubt undergoing a process of 
revitalisation through a reinterpretation that seeks new norms of moderation, reform, 
and rules of political engagement for reordering of the religious and political. Al-Qaida, 
‘fundamentalists’ or ‘radical forces’ cannot be taken as ‘texts’ for comprehending Saudi 
Arabia. It is from within a widely assumed conservative creed that discourses and 
counter-discourses are emerging in the Kingdom. The ‘texts’ this thesis has relied on 
are primary, obtained from Saudis who are amongst the agents of the ongoing and yet 
hidden socio-political revolution in the Kingdom. This thesis has aimed to show that the 
study of emerging trends of thought and social groups, operating within a religious 
context, cut across each of the big questions of tradition and modernity, nationalist 
identity and Islamic belonging, religious and secular morality and local and global 
norms.  
The analysis in this thesis on society and socio-political discourses of 
moderation has shifted the focus from Islam to Muslims, and from the Islamic texts and 
dogmas to the actual space of Muslim political activism and its concepts and content 
that is today, according to James Piscatori and Dale Eickleman, producing increasing 
contestation and discourses from within. It is within this space that this investigation has 
sought to contextualise and understand moderation. Therefore it is within this space and 
the contestations and discourses led by various groups and projects that one can 
understand the continuous and discontinuous responses to the challenges of norm 
production, and renewal of identity, morality and politics. The themes that have directly 
and indirectly been used to provoke the discussion throughout the previous chapters are 
produced below to try to summarise as well as criticise some shortcomings within this 
thesis. 
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8.1 Researching ‘Moderation’: Gains and Limitations 
The research conducted for this thesis aimed at gathering a set of data that 
allows Saudis to speak for themselves. The huge library on the Kingdom seems to be 
‘texts’ about Saudi politics, culture, society, and people by non-Saudis. One objective 
was to seek local views and ideas not to discard or belittle what has been written by 
impressive non-Saudi scholars. The idea was rather to add to the field of scholarship 
analysis obtained from within Saudi Arabia in which Saudis tell their own ‘stories’ of 
politics, moderation, religion or reform. My task was not easy as the research 
environment posed its own challenges for gathering local views from the perspective of 
Saudis. There is still a culture of fear or perhaps distrust that stands in the way of easy 
access to the local data.  
The research site posed difficulties, logistical, ethical, and of time. Despite the 
joy involved in doing the research and learning about one’s own country through this 
process of data gathering, my biggest difficulty was that I did not undertake the research 
fieldtrip in the research site I planned for initially: to explore moderation within the 
multiple majalis (the traditional male forums where politics, amongst other issues are 
discussed openly) of the Kingdom. Like the majalis, the research site I worked with was 
local, not related to the state, and supplied indigenous perspectives. The only difference 
was that the data obtained from the majalis would have been ‘natural’ and ‘direct’ not 
prompted through questions and interviews. Reliance on my own authorial agency and 
my own interpreting of the data is another set of ‘textuality’ that rendered the data not 
‘pure’ and ‘natural’, and this is to an extent one of the weaknesses of the discourse 
analysis method. It is the price one pays for a solid qualitative methodology that is 
suited to interpretation of meaning through spoken and written texts. The texts I have 
used here do not lack ‘authenticity’. They lack the ‘naturalness’ I was hoping to obtain 
from observing and accessing discourse as it was produced without the help of my 
interference through questions. Nonetheless, by using the additional resource of written 
texts, I have acquired evidence that allowed me to verify continuity and discontinuity 
with the spoken discourse obtained from the informants who responded to my questions 
from the two trends analysed in this dissertation. One gain is that I was able to seek 
explanations for missing information or unclear statements. A key gain in this exercise 
was that I had additional non-verbal evidence to rely on in informing myself about the 
discourses I was investigating. I could see that my female informants spoke about 
gender inclusiveness with seriousness and passion when they wanted to state their 
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displeasure with Western models and explanations, and when at the same time they 
expressed full conviction about their own approach and understanding of the question of 
pluralism and the gender question. The benefit of having an additional behavioural and 
physical ‘language’ or ‘text’ easily makes up for the problem of ‘naturalness’ of 
information. This strengthened my own authorial agency in the full knowledge that the 
informants from the pragmatist and the puritanical trends knew what ideas to 
communicate with precision and clarity. This made me feel comfortable to be part of the 
‘conversational’ process of explaining moderation, which I initially thought would have 
been better if unaided by my active role as an initiator of conversation and Q & A 
meetings. 
 
8.2 Knowledge and Agency 
The idea of conducting this type of investigation was partly motivated by the 
desire to seek a ‘different’ perspective from the ‘doom and gloom’ scholarship available 
on Saudi Arabia. One’s evidence is part of one’s ‘text’ about the ‘story’ any social 
scientist wishes to write. Since evidence of knowledge is part of the ‘text’, I placed high 
importance on the agency involved in producing it. Saudis speaking about Saudi affairs 
was important to the investigation only as an equalising mechanism for allowing self-
description and self-expression. The result was that the discourses analysed and the 
texts they produced proved to me the point about the relationship of knowledge and 
agency. Saudi texts by Saudi informants in this thesis are given agency, an agency they 
practically claim and struggle for through the pursuit of moral and political projects. 
This double agency is the best response to Orientalist ‘texts’ about Saudis that deny 
agency and self-expression. One shortcoming is the subjectivity involved in the 
production of meanings about the self – as opposite meanings written by the ‘other’, the 
Orientalist or the non-indigenous. Here the role of authorial agency plays the role of the 
fair critic. One way of doing this is through the mixing of sources, which is done in this 
dissertation firstly by seeking texts from two sets of discourses of moderation, and 
secondly by using interviews and written texts as a way to verify discursive 
compatibility or incompatibility. Part of highlighting this agency has been the aim to 
investigate moderation from non-statist forces, to show in some way that society is not 
totally inactive in Saudi Arabia. There is an element of empowerment involved not only 
in working on a topic that seeks to work with local knowledge, but also knowledge the 
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empowering feature of it is not in any wholly geared towards proving the superiority of 
Islam as past generations of Muslim reformers sought to do. The role of local 
knowledge here is to gain agency by not standing passively towards the inherited 
knowledge of Islam. In various ways, both the pragmatists and the puritanical trends of 
thought try to go beyond this passivity, which is a feature of Wahhabi theology since 
the creation of the state, and since the 1930s when the learned scholars became 
employees of the state whose chief role is to justify mundane political decision-making. 
The sahwis’ texts and speeches of the 1980s and early 1990s were using inherited 
knowledge in the same way, literally to justify jihad, or to cast doubt about the Islamic 
credentials of the ruling class. What is noticeable in this new phase is the beginning of a 
process of rethinking inherited knowledge by validating it in new ways or seeking (the 
puritanical order) to go beyond it (pragmatists). The result of this is the creation of a 
foundation of struggles and innovative use of local knowledge that future generation of 
activists will feel encouraged to push the limits of independent reasoning or ijtihad even 
future. This is where one finds the first signs of a ‘cultural shift’ in the Kingdom. In this 
shift, gradualism is maintained, and this is the most enduring feature of Saudi Arabia’s 
political culture.  
 
8.3 Moderation as a Site of Contestation 
The two discourses which this dissertation tried to understand and interpret 
through discourse analysis are proof of the gradual emergence of a culture of discussion 
and debate what was not so visible in Saudi Arabia more than ten years ago. In this 
debate, which it is in its own right a form of moderating practice, there is pluralism, 
signs of ideological moderation and respect of the rules of the political game, the very 
three criteria used in this thesis to define and ‘measure’ moderation in the discourse of 
the pragmatist and puritanical trends of thought. In this side of debate, there is 
contestation at many levels: indirectly between the hard-line clerical class who have had 
monopoly on the interpretation of the Wahhabi creed and on its implementation as the 
ideology of the state and the creed of the people; directly between the pragmatist and 
puritanical trends of thought; and between all of these and the radical sahwis that still 
threaten social peace. The key contestation that this dissertation tried to analyse does not 
involve violence or exclusion. There is a kind of undeclared peaceful competition for 
the hearts and minds of the public amongst those who can be influenced by norms of 
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moderation, pluralism, inclusiveness, equality, dialogue and citizenship. The media has 
been one arena of this site of contestation through which the writings, messages and 
discourses of these two trends amongst others gets to be propagated widely. What is 
being contested however is not the normative socio-moral system of Islam but ways of 
adding to it (pragmatic trend) revamping (puritanical trend). It has been pointed out in 
the thesis that the latter are concerned with internal reworking of the existing religious 
dogmas to find and justify and propagate values and concepts considered amenable to 
moderation. This is largely an inward-looking exercise. It is a purely internal process of 
rethinking the Islamic heritage not sidelining it or moving beyond it. By contrast, the 
former are not concerned with finding meanings of moderation and reform in the 
Islamic repertoire. They try to go outside it to find meanings which are not all 
incompatible with Islam’s political thought such as argumentation and debate, tolerance 
of difference. But other norms such as free competition and pluralism, which may 
involve party politics or gender inclusiveness, are borrowed from the Western practice 
of democracy and civil society.  
The main feature of this debate is that there is the unchangeable core of Islam 
and that is the component both sides respect and do not wish to detach from too much. 
The pragmatists end up inventing a set of ideas and language the content of which may 
not always mention this unchangeable Islamic core. But at the same time these ideas 
and terms do not involve this unchangeable core in the contestation of norms they are 
trying to change. In comparison to them the puritanical trend uses this unchangeable 
Islamic core as a non-negotiable framework from within which they redefine existing 
norms. For them the normative nature of Islam is what allows them to involve 
themselves in contestation with ideas they have either inherited from a former 
generation of activists, moderate sahwis, or norms and ideas they consider to be 
challenging the normative system of Islam. The changeable component of Islam, the 
worldly transactions or mu‘amalat is the space in which the puritanical trend tries to 
apply independent reasoning. They creatively divide monotheism into a Godly/spiritual 
realm and into a worldly/civil realm. The former is the realm where the unchangeable 
core of Islam is respected and made to be very sacred, not open to human interference 
or modification. The latter is the realm where they exercise inventiveness and creativity. 
Hence they drop jihad from their language by preferring not to get bogged down in 
theological and political debates that may not serve their project. This is a type of 
discourse in which they omit and not add norms and values. This omission of jihad is 
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their own way to speak about the kind of moderation they want: one that is based on 
civil norms that can be manipulated for the purpose of religious pluralism, equal 
citizenship under an Islamic state, institutions of da‘wa and shari‘a with civil use, to 
respectively serve enjoining the good (al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf) and implementation of a just 
system. The pragmatists do not mind using the changeable core of Islam or the area of 
worldly transactions to borrow norms and concepts from non-Muslims, particularly the 
West. By borrowing they are not challenging Islam, which they do not do at all. Rather 
their aim is to add to the resources of Islam norms that have served non-Muslim nations 
very well in the institution of moderation, democratic government and civil order. The 
result of this contestation is the emergence of two techniques. The pragmatists seem to 
use synthesis with outside norms in the civil arena as their method for putting in place a 
vision and a project for reforming society and politics in Saudi Arabia. The puritanical 
order, by contrast, use the method of reformulation of existing ideas inherited from 
Saudis before them to advance their project. Both methods are not difficult to legitimise 
since one does not offend Islam even if it does not use it as its main frame of reference. 
The second legitimises itself since its tools are local and return all justifications to Islam 
itself. It is their interpreting of Islam that may differ but not their challenge to Islam that 
is the novel element in this contestation.  
Future research could potentially focus on this area of contestation, comparing 
and contrasting the techniques more profoundly and not so much the discourses which 
are the subject of contestation. This is where study of political Islam in general lacks 
innovative work that tells us about how religion and reason are involved in the 
rethinking of Islamic dogmas, and about how far synthesis and reformulation can go 
and the extent to which the Islamic philosophical tradition of ‘ilm al-kalam (dialectical 
philosophy) and fiqh (jursiprudence) shapes this exercise. This would be a legal-
philosophical inquiry into the politics of rethinking Islamic dogmas in relation to 
reform. 
 
8.4 Wahhabi Tradition and the Trend of Renewal 
The discussion in the previous chapters focused on seeking to understand two 
competing interpretations of moderation. This moderation’s significance in the current 
Saudi context is directly attached to the prospect of reform and change in Saudi Arabia. 
The types of moderation discussed from pragmatist and puritanical trends add new 
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concepts, reformulate others, and have ‘modernised’ thinking on diversity, difference, 
pluralism and citizenship. However, this discussion is concerned with a broader picture 
about the potential for this culture of moderation and the new norms being invented 
within it to help reform in the Kingdom, politically and socially. Wahhabism has 
traditionally defined the normative parameters of the political, religious and the social. 
Through this discussion one is opening up room for venturing further into asking 
legitimate questions about the whole future of Saudi Arabia with or without 
Wahhabism, and Wahhabism with or without Saudi Arabia. This moment of ‘tradition-
modernity’ tension, which is now more visible in the Kingdom and the neighbouring 
Gulf region than ever before, leads to questions about the viability of ‘tradition’ and 
under which forms, and the potential of ‘modernity’ (the innovations capable to lead to 
a coexistence of the old and the new to ensure viability of the cultural, political and 
social systems) and under which forms. The discussion in this thesis points to the onset 
of a process of pluralising the Wahhabi creed. This process is not new and its agents 
have been visible in the country’s political scene for some time now. They knew 
confrontation and accommodation with the state and with the Wahhabi theological 
establishment. We would not be at this point of time discussing moderation if it were 
not for the ground work done by these agents of reform, which Lacroix has documented 
very well.
475
 The pluralisation of Wahhabism is in my view happening through the 
attempt by the new forces of reform to incrementally renew Wahhabism itself. The 
norms of debate, pluralism, inclusiveness and respect of the rules of the political game 
are in a way being invented as the means by which to initiate in this process not only 
with the rest of the lay public, but also with the religious establishment. This is the 
subtlety of contained in the two trends since the only thing standing between them and 
their vision is the Wahhabi hard-line clergy, and even some of this clergy are changing 
their own discourse, which is another area of future research that should be considered 
for me at least after this thesis. The substance of this pluralisation lies is to initiate a 
process of purging Wahhabism of its monopoly of deciding on all things religious, 
including those that touch on civil and political rights. This purge would primarily 
address those areas in the creed’s dogmas which are not necessary for dealing with 
worldly affairs: political parties, competition, acceptance of non-Wahhabi values, and 
greater role for women and minorities, including the country’s citizens from the Shi‘a 
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sect. This pluralisation is about reconsidering the whole heritage of al-salafiyya al-
islahiyya (renewalist Salafiyya) of which Ibn ‘Abd Al-Wahhab was a leading innovator. 
Wahhabism has been reduced to maintaining the interpretations of the salaf (the 
religious ancestors) but without a reformist core. Through this pluralisation of Wahhabi 
dogmas the pragmatists, to a lesser extent, and puritanical trend, whose vision is based 
on religion, are advancing a project to change this creed from a closed set of dogmas 
into a set of values and norms with the inner resources to reform itself into a force of 
positive transformation, not a force holding back change. My own view, and based of 
my discussion and current research is that this is what is happening in Saudi Arabia: we 
are entering into a phase of Wahhabisms not a single Wahhabi creed. This is what I 
consider the puritanical trend to be: an innovative branch focused on civil struggle for 
reform from within Wahhabism itself. It is a movement pioneered by the moderate 
sahwis such as Shaykh Al-‘Awda, al-Hawali amongst other leading figures of reform 
loyal to the normative order of Islam. In this regard, I disagree with the proposition, 
including by Lacroix, that we have entered into a phase of post-Wahhabism based on 
the combination of state and social activisms joining forces to isolate the creed. Lacroix 
is correct in noting that ‘revision’ of Wahhabism is taking place through the activism of 
what he calls “Islamo-liberals”.476 But his speculation on the era of post-Wahhabism is 
a bit too premature at this stage. The current phase is the phase of renewal from within, 
and Wahhabi learned scholars have trained and produced most of the voices speaking 
today on behalf for reform. It is through their own epistemological offspring and 
trainees that the Wahhabi clergy may be very gradually and subtly reinventing itself. In 
addition to this, the state has no autonomy to be able to detach itself from the ideology 
that gives it legitimacy. At least this is not possible now until the state finds an 
alternative repository of norms and ideal and resources and modes of legitimation to cut 
its ties with the Wahhabi clerical establishment, which up to now it has maintained 
alliance with for the purpose of political survival given the non-democratic nature of 
rule.  
Neither ‘modernity’ nor ‘tradition’ in the Saudi context poses problems for 
change. In a strange way, it is the meeting of the two that is defining the current phase 
in the modernisation and transformation of Saudi Arabia, politically, culturally, and 
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socially. Saudi Arabia may be a ‘late-comer’ to modernisation, but right now the 
substance that the pragmatist and puritanical trends are effecting in terms of change is a 
shift towards a zone of flexibility. This zone of flexibility, which is a site of ongoing 
contestation, involves association with religion (the puritanical) and detachment from 
religion (the pragmatists). It is a zone which is pushing the Kingdom towards having the 
resources of renewal. Without this renewal, including the substantive work being done 
by the discourses studied in this thesis to embed moderation as a permanent value in 
Saudi society, negotiation of the challenges of how to wed modernity and tradition will 
continue to weaken the forces of reform and strengthen the forces of extremism. This 
would be tragic for both religious and political reform without which the struggles 
currently conducted by forces such as the pragmatist and the puritanical trends of 
thought will not come to a happy fruition in the land where Islam was born. Where 
moderation, just government, reform from within and renewal, the way of Islam as the 
doctors of Wahhabism would readily argue,  are concerned, the way of Islam has been 
to be guided by the pragmatic rule of maslaha (public good), which accords needs and 
necessities (darura) of the Muslim community, of which Saudi Arabia is an inseparable 
part, full agency.  That full agency is today being tested in the pursuit of a public good 
and a Godly objective, the wasati or balanced community, a community today needing 
moderation not only as a necessity but also as an urgent public good.  
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GLOSSARY 
Arabic Term Meaning 
Tawheed Monotheism 
tawheed ruhi Spiritual monotheism 
tawheed madani Civil monotheism 
Ijtihad Independent thinking 
shari‘a Islamic law 
al-dawla al‘adila The Just State 
Khilafat Allah al al-ard Vicegerency 
ta’adduiyya Islamiyya Muslim pluralism 
Umma Muslim community 
tawheed ruhi Spiritual monotheism 
tawheed madani Civic monotheism 
shaqa’iq al-rijal Equality of women 
da‘wa Preaching, call for Islam 
Muwatana 
Right to citizenship of Muslims and 
non-Muslims in an Islamic state 
 
shar‘iyya Legitimacy 
wasati umma 
Just and balanced nation or 
community 
 
Wasatiyya Moderation; middle path 
Maqasid Divine sanctions 
Insane 
Human being, without stress of 
gender or colour 
 
ahl al-kitab Peoples of the book 
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Arabic Term Meaning 
ta‘addudiyya diniyya 
Pluralism based on religious 
teaching 
la ikraha fi al-deen Non-compulsion in religion 
Ta’addudiyya Pluralism/ diversity 
Tanawwu‘ Diversity 
Tasamuh Tolerance 
Al-ra’y al-akhar Other opinion 
Al-ra’y al-mukhalif Opposing opinion 
Al-Hiwar Dialogue 
Niqash Calm debate 
‘lakum dinukum wa liya dini’ Freedom of religion 
Mujadalah Discourse and counter-discourse 
Munaqasha Debate 
Ikhtilaf The right to differ 
Mukhalafa Difference of opinion 
Hurr fima yudeen Non-compulsion 
Hurriyyah Freedom 
Ta‘ayush Coexistence 
Tanafus hurr Free competition 
Jihad 
Spiritual struggle 
Holy war 
Umma Islamic community 
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